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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a comparative study of the theory and practices of Roman 
warfare. The content of the various treatises, both extant and lost, 'is 
described, along with a discussion of the ancient traditions of textbook 
composition, their role in education and their possible practical use. The 
following chapters consider various aspects of Roman warfare for which 
sufficient historical and archaeological evidence exists and which are dealt 
with fully in the treatises. The size and internal organization of the different 
units of the Roman army we- discussed with particular reference to the de 
munitionibus castrorum and Vegetius; a discussion of marching camps follows 
which considers the origins of these camps and an estimation at the density of 
soldiers per acre through the application of the rules of the de munitionibus 
castrorum to examples in Britain. The practices of the Roman army in the field 
are dealt with in the next three chapters., the order of march, pitched battles, 
and siege warfare. The first of these includes a discussion of Arrian's order 
of march and the relationship between the order of march and the line of battle 
whilst that on pitched battles considers the role of auxiliaries in the battles of 
the early Empire and the suggested reintroduction of the Greek style phalanx 
in the second century AD. The development of siege techniques, both 
offensive and defensive, i. 5 discussed, and this is followed by an analysis of 
the "rules of war". Although it is difficult to argue how much influence the 
treatises may have had on actual practices, the thesis illustrates the very 
close correlation between the treatises and actual field practices of the Roman 
army and shows that some of the treatises were of practical value. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
"Si vis pacem, para bellum" 
Latin proverb. 
The subject of the Roman army has had a fascination for people from the time 
of Polybius, who was interested "by what means ... the Romans succeeded in 
less than 53 years in bringing under their rule almost the whole of the 
inhabited world" (1 1). The army was also of interest to the Romans 
themselves, evidenced by the number of treatises produced concerning the 
military system and its operations in the field. The success of the Roman 
military system led many later generals and military theorists to look for 
inspiration from this time; Charlemagne required all his generals to read 
Vegetius, and Machiavelli based his Arte della Guerra on this treatise. 
Translations of Roman military writers were produced during the Napoleonic 
wars and as late as World War II, and it is these treatises that are the principal 
topic of this thesis. 
Apart from an introductory article on the subject (Campbell 1987), there has 
been no comprehensive study of Roman military handbooks, or of the workings 
of the army in the field from the point of view of , and with particular 
reference to, these treatises. Historians have had a tendency to quote the 
Roman military theorists when the evidence suited their arguments, but 
without considering the context of the quotation or the nature of the source. 
Most of the time the treatises seem to be ignored or dismissed, yet taken 
together they form a fairly large corpus of information on military theory. 
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This thesis will attempt to remedy this situation and bring the treatises out 
from their position of comparative obscurity. This will be done through 
analysis and comparison of the information contained in the treatises on 
particular aspects of warfare with reference to other literary sources and 
archaeological evidence. The thesis will attempt to evaluate how realistic the 
treatises are in the advice they give and whether there is any evidence of the 
influence of the treatises, and military theory, on the field practices of the 
Roman army. 
I believe it is essential to study all aspects of the ancient world within the 
context of all available information, whether it is archaeological, epigraphical 
or literary, and so this thesis does not deal exclusively with one type of 
evidence; it is not an 'archaeological' thesis but one that, I hope, approaches 
the study of Roman warfare making full use of all the varieties of evidence that 
are available. 
Chapter I will consider the treatises themselves, both extant and lost, and the 
range of information they contain. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
categories of treatises, the declared aims of the authors, and other uses they 
might have. The role of textbooks in Roman education will be examined 
briefly, and how the different categories of military treatises might fulfil this 
role. The ensuing chapters will then consider selected topics individually that 
the treatises cover in some detail and for which sufficient evidence is available 
for constructive comparison between the theory and advice in the treatises and 
the recorded field practices. Since it would not be possible to cover all 
aspects of Roman field practices within the thesis, the principal elements of 
campaigning, which are dealt with more fully in the treatises, have been 
7 
chosen for discussion whilst others which the treatises only consider briefly, 
such as logistics and foraging, have been omitted - 
The first of these will cover the somewhat controversial subject of the size and 
organization of army units and will make particular use of the de munitionibus 
castrorum and the antiqua lec along with epigraphic, ji of Vegetius, 
papyrological and archaeological evidence, and a translation of the de 
munitionibus castrorum is included as Appendix 1. 
The de munitionibus castrorum is also the principal treatise used in the third 
chapter, on camps. The origins of the Roman marching camp will be discussed 
here, as will the defences of marching camps and their sites, and in the latter 
case a clear comparison will be seen between the advice of the treatises and 
actual practice. The size of marching camps will be considered with reference 
to the precepts of the de munitionibus castrorum and the archaeological 
remains in Britain, which has important implications concerning the density 
of troops in marching camps and, therefore, the size of field armies on 
campaign in Britain. 
The order of march and pitched battles are the subjects of the following two 
chapters, both with particular reference to Arrian's Exm&tC KaT' 'Alavwv, 
and the question of deploying f rom line of march to line of battle. A short 
catalogue of major pitched battles of the late Republic and early Empire is 
included as Appendix 2. The second of these chapters also addresses two 
problems arising from accounts of battles during the late 1st and early 2nd 
centuries AD; the use of auxiliaries as the main striking force in the light of 
Tacitus' famous comment about preserving the lives of citizen legionaries at 
Mons Graupius (Agric. 35), and the suggestion that the battle line reverted to 
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a phalangic formation during this period. An attempt will be made to explain 
these issues and show that they do not represent major changes in Roman 
military thought or practice. 
Chapter 6 discusses the attitude of the treatises towards siege warfare, and 
why the theorists provide less practical advice on this than on other subjects - 
Appendix 3 contains precis of sieges mentioned in the text using both literary 
and archaeological sources, but the catalogue is selective and makes no 
attempt to provide an exhaustive survey of all Roman sieges during the period 
under study. The final chapter, on morality, considers accepted modes of 
conduct on the part of Roman armies, particularly commanders, and this draws 
on the more philosophical writers such as Onasander, as well as on other 
authors like Cicero and Seneca. Most of the advice and evidence on this 
subject relates to siege warfare so the discussion will again make reference to 
the examples contained in Appendix 3. 
Each of these chapters could be the subject of a thesis in its own right and so 
the various topics are discussed primarily in the light of the contents of the 
treatises. Chapter 5 on pitched battles, for example, does not discuss the 
actual fighting of battles since the treatises only deal with deployment, 
reserves and retreat or pursuit. This is especially the case with chapter 6 on 
siege warfare; many of the contrivances usually associated with Roman sieges, 
such as circumvallations, siege ramps etc. are barely touched upon by the 
treatise writers, so they are only considered briefly. 
In conclusion, this thesis will illustrate and discuss the strong correlations 
between the advice given in the treatises and field practices. There is 
evidence to suggest that manuals were available to assist those directing field 
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oPerations, and that under certain circumstances they might be used, along 
with personal experience and the advice of experienced officers, to assist the 
commander in making some of his decisions. 
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Chapter 2: The Literary Evidence 
Information concerning the activities of the Roman army in the field can be 
obtained from a number of literary sources, in particular histories, 
commentaries and military treatises. This chapter will consider the first two 
types of sources briefly after a description of known treatises dating to the 
Roman period and a discussion of the purposes behind their compilation. The 
treatises are considered in approximate order of their production. 
The Treatises 
Cato the Elder - de Re Militari, or de Disciplina Militari (Veg. 1 15). Possibly 
the first Roman to compile a military treatise. 15 fragments survive. Astin 
(1978 185) suggests that the treatise included information on the taking of 
auspices, methods of maintaining discipline, unit organization, march and 
battle formations and the uses of specialist troops. He suggests that examples 
were used to illustrate the points made. Frontinus quotes Cato (Strat. IV i 
10), and Vegetius lists him as one of bis sources (1 8). Cato also wrote a 
treatise de Acfri Cultura. 
Asclepiodotus - TEXvn Tarawn'. A Greek philosopher and pupil of 
Posidonius (Seneca Nat. Quaest. 11 26 6), writing in the lst century BC. The 
earliest surviving military treatise of the Roman period, Asclepiodotus' work 
is a detailed description of the Greek phalanx and its tactics, including 
sections on the disposition of light troops and cavalry, and the use of chariots 
and elephants in warfare. 
'It should be noted that although breathings are included in Greek texts, 
accents are not. 
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Cincius Alimentus - de Re Militari. The work, cited by Aulus GeUius, is 
probably that of the constitutional antiquarian writing at about the time of 
Augustus. The treatise was at least six books long, with the third including 
declarations of war, the fifth the levying of troops and the sixth the 
organization of army units. 
Vitruvius - de Architectura. Architect working under Augustus who wrote 
a treatise on architecture. During the civil wars he had served as a military 
engineer and worked with artillery in particular (de Arch. Pref. ). Bookten, 
on mechanics, includes a detailed description of various artillery pieces. 
Athenaeus Mechanicus - TEE12t pjj Xqvnpq-uwv . Probably a contemporary of 
Vitruvius. His treatise is very similar to Vitruvius' section on military 
engines. Both Athenaeus and Vitruvius probably based their works on that 
of Aegesistratus whom they mention as a source (Athen. Mech. 7 6; Vit. de Arch 
vii Pref . 14) . 
Comelius Celsus - Title unknown; cited by Vegetius (1 8). Writing an 
encyclopedia at the time of Tiberius of which the military treatise was a part; 
only fragments of his de Compositione Medicamentorum survive, though 
Schenk (1930) believed the military treatise was a general one based on Cato. 
The Elder Pliny - de iaculatione equest , written whilst 
he was prefect of an 
ala in Germany (Pliny Ep. 111 5), probably under Claudius. Pliny quotes the 
work briefly in the Natural History, and it included advice on the best type 
of horse and ways in which a trained horse could assist the rider in battle (NH 
VIII 159,162). 
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Onasander - E-cQq-cjj! jj&qC. A Greek philosopher who wrote a treatise on 
generalship dedicated to Quintus Veranius, probably the same man who was 
consul in AD 49 and died whilst governor of Britain in c. AD 58 (Annals xiv 29; 
Agric. 14; AE 1953 251). The treatise is rather different to other surviving 
works as it lays great emphasis on the moral qualities and other abilities which 
the author considered a general should possess. The author then gives advice 
on how the general should conduct himself and proceed in a variety of 
situations, very often giving fairly general guidelines rather than laying down 
strict instructions for each situation as Vegetus does. 
Frontinus - Strateqemata. The only surviving milita-ry work in Latin from the 
early Empire to have survived. The author, Sextus Julius Frontinus, held the 
consulship three times, was governor of Britain, and Curator Aquarum in 
Rome. He seems to have been a keen author of handbooks, producing works 
on the art of war (de Scientia Militari, or de Officio Mihtari according to Lydus 
(de Mag. 147)), on the aqueducts of Rome (de Aquis) , and surveying 
(treatises 
in the manuscript collections of the Agrimensores are ascribed to Frontinus). 
The de Aquis was written to help him and his successors understand the 
administration of Rome's water supply (de Aquis Pref. ), and his military 
works, unlike those of the Greek philosophers, were written by an expert. 
Frontinus claims to be the only man interested in military science to have 
reduced its rules to a system (Strat I Pref. ), and he considered his 
Strategemata to be completing the task begun by his treatise on warfare. 
According to Vegetius (Il 3), the work was very highly thought of by Trajan, 
and Lydus claims it included information on siege machinery as well as on 
strategy (de Maq. 1 47). However, Frontinus himself did not include the 
subject of siege machinery in the Strategemata because he believed that the 
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development of machines and engines for siege warfare had long since reached 
its ]in-dt (Strat III Pref .)- 
The Strateqemata comprised four books with over 400 examples of military 
stratagems mostly taken from historians and referring to the classical Greek, 
Hellenistic and Roman periods. Each book covers a particular topic; 
preparations for battle (book 1); battles, ambushes and retreats (book 2); 
sieges (book 3); general topics including discipline, justice and sayings (book 
4). 
de Munitionibus Castrorum. Author and date disputed. Ascribed to Hyginus 
Gromaticus because the text survives as part of a manuscript of treatises on 
land surveying. Probably written by a military surveyor in the late lst 
century - early 2nd century AD (for arguments on date of DMC, see chapter 
A detailed work explaining a new method of organization for temporary 
camps, and some information on camp defences. 
Aelian - Talc-uirTI @Ew pla. A Greek ph: Uosopher and contemporary of 
Frontinus who dedicated his work to an emperor, probably Trajan. Aelian's 
treatise, like that of Asclepiodotus, was a description of the workings of the 
Greek phalanx. 
Heron of Alexandria - BEXoTtottica; MtpoOaXta-cp .G reek artillery 
technician writing in the late lst or early 2nd century AD. BE), onottKa is 
based on a 3rd century BC work by Ctesibius and therefore reflects earlier 
usages (Marsden 1971 1-2), but the XEtpoOajtcvT; p includes recent 
developments. 
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ApoUodorus of Damascus - JjbjjopjKEi; i . An architect working 
during the 
reigns of Trajan and Hadrian, Apollodorus was the designer of Trajan's bridge 
over the Danube and Trajan's Forum. He was exiled in AD 129 and later 
executed by Hadrian (Dio Epit. Ixix 4), supposedly for criticizing the 
emperor's designs for the Temple of Venus and Rome. He wrote a book on 
siege machinery dedicated to Hadrian which describes a variety of equipment 
needed for assaulting a stronghold. He does not, however, deal with the 
defence of strongholds. 
Arrian -. TEXvn TqK-cjrn (Tactic ) 'ýEKualtC iKa-c Alavwv. Arrian was a Greek 
senator who was governor of Cappadocia under Hadrian. He wrote three 
military works, two of which survive, the Tactica and the ýr, -cql I r,. The first 
of these was dedicated to Hadrian in AD 137 and was a treatise primarily about 
the Greek phalanx, similar to that of Asclepiodotus and Aelian above. Arrian 
made some attempt to make his treatise more up to date by including references 
to contemporary practices, such as the British chariotry. The last section of 
the Tactica is a description of the hippica gymnasia, exercises carried out by 
the Roman cavalry. Stadter (1978 118) illustrates the very close similarities 
between the texts of Aehan and Arrian, and it is generally accepted that the 
two writers were using a common source, and that both they and Asclepiodotus 
were using manuscripts that ultimately descended from Posidonius. 
I The EjaqZjr, probably dates to c. AD 132 when Arrian was governor of 
Cappadocia. It describes his proposed order or march, battle line and battle 
plans for dealing with a threatened Alan invasion. This is the only document 
of its kind dating to the Roman period and the most detailed description of an 
army dating to the early Empire. 
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Polyaenus - E-upq-cE! jEpq-u . Written by a philosopher and 
dedicated to Marcus 
Aurelius and Lucius Verus in c. AD 162. It is similar to Frontinus' work, 
containing eight books of examples taken from different periods and including 
the exploits of gods and mythical heroes - The examples are not arranged by 
subject matter like those of Frontinus but each book contains a seemingly 
random selection of stratagems, some appearing to be simple anecdotes whilst 
others provide useful precedents. 
Tarruntenus Paternus - de Re Militari or de Re Militarium. Legal expert and 
probably the Praetorian Prefect under Commodus who was executed for 
treason (Dio lxxii 5), described by Vegetius as diligentissimus iuris militaris 
adsertor (1 8). The treatise dated to the time of Marcus Aurelius or 
Commodus. Schenk (1930) believed that it was largely based on the 
Constitutiones of Hadrian and that Vegetius made extensive use of Paternus 
in his second book on the organization of the legion. Little is known of the 
actual contents, though, except that it illustrated the author's knowledge of 
the law; his definition of immunes in the army and list of examples was 
included in Justinian's Digest (50 6 7). 
The Emperor Julian (? ) - MnXavt-Kot. On siege machinery. The reading of 
the name in the text is not genera. Uy accepted (Bandy 1983 282 n. 74), but 
Ammianus states that Julian built a helepolis during the siege of Pirisabora in 
AD 363 (Ammianus xxiv 2) and I see no reason to dismiss the possibility that 
the emperor did indeed write such a treatise. 
Vegetius - de Re Militari, or Epitoma. de Militari. Written probably in the late 
4th century, this is the only manual on Roman military institutions to have 
survived. Vegetius made extensive use of earlier writers whom he lists at one 
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point (11 3). The treatise is divided into four books; on recruitment and 
training; on the organization of the legion; on the order of march and of 
battle; on siege and naval warfare - Vegetius can be problematic as a source 
because it is often difficult to determine to which period the information he is 
using belongs. 
The Role of Treatises 
Campbell (1987) notes that there was a tradition of practical irdlitary 
handbooks from at least the late Classical period which continued in the Roman 
period together with a series of textbooks on a wide range of subjects 
including agriculture and architecture. He outlines the part played by 
manuals on various subjects in the Roman education system, quoting evidence 
from Cicero that military knowledge could be acquired from textbooks as well 
as from practical experience (Cic. Pro Fonteio 42; Pro Balbo 47; Lucullus 1 1- 
2), and I do not intend to repeat his discussion here. He does conclude that 
military manuals may have been of some use for prospective generals but 
suggests that there is a difference between the military treatises and those on 
other subjects: 
"Apart from Frontinus and Arrian, the writers of military 
handbooks, unlike most of the agricultural writers, had no 
experience of what they wrote about. Furthermore, advice on 
farming procedure could perhaps be more directly helpful to a 
farm owner than examples of stratagems to an army commander. " 
(1987 19) 
There are, however, problems with both these statements. Campbell's article 
does not discuss treatises which are no longer extant or exist only in 
fragmentary form, or the artillery manuals. Once these are included in a 
discussion of practical experience, though, the situation changes somewhat. 
18 treatises are described above, and with the exception of Cincius Alimentus 
and Cornelius Celsus, for whom insufficient evidence is available, the only 
authors of military handbooks without the relevant practical experience are 
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Asclepiodotus, Onasander, Aelian, Polyaenus and Vegetius. Those without 
experience, therefore, were primarily Greek philosophers following (very 
closely in some cases) a strong literary and philosophical tradition that was 
Greek in origin (see below p. 20). The claim in many of the treatises to be 
giving practical advice may be part of a literary topo , as Campbell suggests 
(1987 19), but in most cases it would appear to be justified. 
The importance of past examples of how to do something, and how not to, has 
always played a part in education. The study of past campaigns, both 
successful and unsuccessful, can help the aspiring general to formulate his 
own plans and strategies and the study of military history is still part of a 
modern officer's training2. Polybius states that books of examples played an 
important part in the education of officers and generals, along with manuals 
written by experts and personal experience (xi 8 1), and Frontinus' 
Stratecfemata were written for this first purpose (Strat. I Pref .)- 
However, the instruction of young officers in the art of generalship was not 
the only reason for the compilation of the military treatises. Spaulding points 
out that Homer was considered to be a military authority and that later 
philosophers "felt that to make good their claim to universality for their 
doctrines, they must treat the military art" (1933 657-669 )3 . This statement 
would help to explain the treatises of the Greek philosophers who had no 
2 eg: Sandhurst & West Point include courses in military history and the 
Russian military academies place particular emphasis on the study of 
campaigns of the Second World War. I am grateful to Mr Oliver Gilkes for this 
information. An example of how this such knowledge could be applied 
occurred in the Gulf War when General "Stormin' " Norman Schwarzkopf claimed 
his classic pincer movement against the Iraqi army was based on the tactics of 
Hannibal at Cannae. 
3 Both Arrian (Tact. 31 5) and Vegetius (1 5) quote Homer as an expert on 
military affairs. 
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experience of military affairs, but were also eager to ren-dnd their audiences 
of the glories of Greece's past (Campbell 1987 19). Onasander seems to have 
written his treatise with the genuine intention of honouring his Roman patron 
while Asclepiodotus, Aelian and Arrian are c-01 following in the tradition of 
earlier Greek philosophers who wrote on the Greek phalanx. 
The 'Greek phalanx' treatise seems to have been part of a literary genre that 
does not include the other military treatises. Both Aelian and Arrian claim to 
be writing the work to remedy the obscurity of previous treatises which were 
written for those already knowledgeable (Aelian 13; Arrian Tact. 12), but are 
of the same level of technicality as that of Asclepiodotus. Heron makes the 
same claim for his treatise on artillery (BElonolliga Pref. ). A clearly written 
treatise on the construction and use of artillery would no doubt have been 
very useful for the education of and use by military engineers, but it would 
hardly make any difference to the use of treatises on phalanx tactics because 
it is so difficult to see much potential use for them anyway. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Aelian doubted the value of his work, but claims to 
have been encouraged by a visit to Frontinus and states: 
"So I ceased to hesitate about writing on military tactics. For I 
thought that Frontinus would hardly be enthusiastic about such 
a work if he believed that it lagged behind Roman military 
practice" 
(Aehan Pref . 3) 
Campbell suggested that Frontinus' interest "may suggest that there was some 
practical benefit to be derived from it" (1987 17). However, it seems more 
likely that Frontinus encouraged Aehan because he was himself an 
antiquarian, "no less interested in the military principles of the Greeks" (than 
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those of the Romans; Aelian Pref . 3), and these interests are 
illustrated in his 
Strategemata'. Later, Aelian states: 
"As to the mode of drawing up chariots and elephants in order of 
battle, although we find them to be of little use, yet lest this 
treatise should seem deficient, we will add the terms used by 
those writers who prec eded us. " (Aelian 27.1) 
Thus Aelian includes information on chariot and elephant warfare which he 
knows is useless. Arrian at least made some effort to make his treatise more 
relevant by including contemporary references to enemies of Rome and Roman 
tactics against heavy cavalry, the British chariotry, and finishing with his 
description of Roman cavalry exercises (Tact. 4 7; 11 1-2; 33 ff. ). The 
evidence from both treatises, and Aelian's in particular, suggests that their 
work is more of a philosophical and literary exercise than a serious attempt to 
provide a practical military handbook. 
Heron, on the other hand, does seem to have provided what he promised; a 
specialist treatise on artillery that was accessible to non-experts, whether 
soldiers or civilians. Marsden states that a layman could gain "an excellent 
understanding of the basic principles of artillery construction" (1971 1-2). 
Vitruvius' section on artillery and siege machinery in Book 10 of his de 
Architectura was probably included because it was part of the tradition of 
architectural treatises that he was following, but also because he was primarily 
a military engineer and had been particularly concerned with artillery during 
the civil wars (de Arch Pref . 1) . 
4 When an English translation of Aelian was published in 1814, the translator 
suggested that it could be of use as an example of Roman discipline, which was 
considered one of the principal reasons for their success (Di-Uon 1814 Pref .). 
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Another specialist treatise was the de munitionibus castrorum on the 
arrangements and fortifications of summer camps. The author claims to have 
followed all the previous authors who wrote on this subject and claims to be the 
first to explain all the measuring from the beginning in written instructions 
45). Lenoir (1979 ix) has suggested that in addition to earlier treatises 
hinted at in the text, the author may have made use of Polybius' description 
of the Roman camp (vi 26-32). The technicality of the work suggests that the 
author was probably a military surveyor and although the book is addressed 
to a superior, it was probably intended for use by other surveyors. The 
author claims to have developed a new system of measuring for marching camps 
based on the number of legions present, and he believes it is better than the 
"usual method of measuring" (§ 47). Fraccaro (1934 157) has suggested that 
Polybius took his account of the Roman camp from a book of military 
regulations and these works, along with those of the artillery writers, would 
seem to be written primarily for specialists, surveyors, tribunes, cavalry and 
artillery officers (as appears to be the case with Pliny's treatise de iaculatione 
equestri), and so would have a much more specific purpose than the general 
treatises. 
Vegetius, the only writer of a Latin treatise known to have had no military 
experience, appears to be writing for a number of reasons. The work is a 
direct descendant of the Greek and earlier Roman treatises, suggesting that 
the Greek tradition was taken up and continued by the Latin writers in the 
Roman period. The work draws on earlier authors whom Vegetius lists at one 
point5 . The de Re Militari even included a section on 
the use of elephants and 
chariots in warfare (cf: the treatises on the phalanx p. 20), and sections on 
5 They are: Cato the Elder, Celsus, Frontinus, Tarruntenus Paternus and the 
Constitutiones of Augustus, Trajan and Hadrian (1 8). 
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siege and naval warfare, no doubt following the tradition of Aeneas Tacticus 
who wrote on all aspects of warfare (see below). The date of Vegetius' work 
is much discussed (Gordon 1974, Goffart 1977, Birley 1982), but it generally 
placed in the later 4th century or first half of the 5th century AD. The 
treatise tends to stress defence over attack, particularly in Book 4 on siege 
warfare, and this may reflect the uncertain times during which the author 
lived. 
The de Re Militari became the standard military textbook for the western 
Roman Empire and remained so until well into the Middle Ages. Goffart (1977) 
describes it as the soldier's equivalent of Benedict's Requla, Machiavelli based 
his own treatise "Arte deIla Guerra" very heavily on Vegetius, and Lt John 
Clarke's translation of Vegetius, originally published in the 18th century, was 
republished in the present century in the USA along with translations of 
several other ancient treatiseS6. 
All the military treatises are ultimately derived from the Greek tradition of 
writing handbooks on a variety of different subjects. Aeneas Tacticus may be 
one of the earliest of these writers, and his " On the defence of Fortified 
Positions" is certainly the oldest surviving work belonging to the military 
tradition. He is believed to have written some eight pamphlets and treatises 
on warfare, including castrametation . naval tactics, general tactics and 
collections of examples A la Frontinus. These may well have formed the basis 
for many of the later treatises on both individual topics such as castrametation 
6 Ancient military treatises seem to have become especially popular in the late 
18th century and during the Napoleonic Wars; Shepherd's translation of 
Polyaenus was first published in 1793, and Dillon's 1814 translation of Aelian, 
intended as a textbook for military schools and colleges, was circulated by 
order of the War Minister. 
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like the de munitionibus castrorum, and for the more general works like that 
of Vegetius. 
Whatever justifications the authors themselves give for writing, and virtually 
all of them hope or claim to be of practical use, the treatises can be divided 
into three principal types; those providing some instruction in the art of war 
for officers by general textbooks and collections of examples (cf : Polybius 
Hist. xi 8 1-2); those providing more detailed manuals on specialist topics such 
as artillery and camp surveying; those which are a literary and philosophical 
7 
exercise following a particular Hellenistic tradition 
Other Literary Sources 
Commentarii 
Of the other types of literary evidence dealing with the Roman army in detail, 
commentarii, because of their very nature, are likely to provide more detailed 
and accurate information than histories. Syme (1958 157) explains this 
contrast: 
"Accurate intelligence about numbers and regiments, the detail 
of operations both principal and subsidiary, the times and stages 
of a march, such were the facts to be registered in the reports of 
generals or the commentarii of military emperors. 11 
Thus commentarii could later be published to provide a detailed chronological 
account of a campaign and source material for historians. The best known, 
and only surviving examples of these are Caesar's de Bello Gallico and de Bello 
Civili, but commentarii did not have to relate to a military campaign. Cicero 
wrote commentarii on his consulship and Vitruvius states that architects 
Some treatises, like those of Onasander and Arrian, belong to both the 
philosophical tradition and that of providing instruction whilst Heron 
attempted to make his specialist treatise more accessible to the layman. 
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should be literate so they can write commentarii on their work, implying that 
it was the architect's duty to publish them (de Arch -1 14; VII Pref . 18). 
Cicero's account of his consulship was intended as source material for others 
writing history (Ad Att. 11), while both he and Aulus Hirtius claim the same 
motive for Caesar's works (Brutus 262; BG VIII 1), though of course there 
was also the propaganda value in publicizing one's military victories, 
especially in the late Republic. 
Syme (1958 297) suggests that Suetonius Paulinus wrote commentarii on his 
campaign in Mauretania which Pliny used for his description of the area (NH 
V 14), and it is possible that he produced a similar work concerning his 
governorship of Britain which was used by Tacitus. Tacitus would no doubt 
have made use of any commentarii written by his father-in-law Agricola for 
both the Aqricola and the Histories and Syme has suggested that Corbulo 
published some kind of account of his campaign in Armenia which the historian 
used (1958 297). Josephus used the commentarii of both Vespasian and Titus 
to write his account of the Jewish war and because of this, and his presence 
in the Roman camp during the campaigns, he claims to have produced a more 
authentic record than any of his rivals (Vita 342,358; Contra Apion 49). 
Finally, Trajan published commentarii on his campaigns in Dacia, of which one 
fragment survives in the 6th century grammarian Priscius, which Cassius Dio 
may have used. 
flistories 
Livy, Polybius and Josephus each included an excursus on the Roman army in 
their histories. Livy's descriptions of army organization and reforms (142-43 
on the Servian Constitution; VIII 8 on the reforms attributed to Camillus) are 
included as part of his annalistic history, and were probably inspired by 
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Polybius' section on the Roman military system - Polybius' main object 
in 
writing his history was to explain how "the Romans succeeded in less than 53 
years in bringing under their rule almost the whole of the inhabited world" (i 
Pref. 1) and Walbank (1957 698) describes Book six, which includes the section 
on the Roman military system as "an essential and integral part of Polybius' 
overall framework". Because of the army's central role in Rome's imperial 
success, an explanation of its workings was essential, and may have been 
useful for the author's non-Roman readers. Polybius' account is generally 
considered to be accurate, partly because had personal experience of the 
workings of the Roman army, but also because he was probably using some 
form of textbook for at least part of his description (see above p. 21). 
Josephus also included a description of the army on campaign, probably 
influenced by that of Polybius, especially his explanation of the Roman method 
of camping, but his is far less detailed, and he is prone to exaggeration at 
times'. 
Other authors providing useful information on the army on campaign are 
Sallust, Appian, Tacitus, Cassius Dio and Ammianus Marcellinus as part of 
their histories. I do not at this point wish to discuss the accuracy of these 
historians but will do so later when and if necessary. 
Conclusions 
The military treatises were written for a number of reasons discussed above. 
Those pertaining to the Roman army rather than the Greek phalanx describe 
how, according to their authors, the army should function, or how complex 
machinery worked, or are advocating the introduction of new techniques, the 
"Eg: BJ 111 245-6, on the effectiveness of the Roman artillery at Jotapata, 
sending a man's head flying 3 furlongs. 
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latter two types being more technical types of manual. The histories and 
commentaries describe the procedures of the Roman army in the field, in other 
words, how they really did things. Analysis of the activities of the Roman 
army in the field using all the forms of evidence available will help to ascertain 
how realistic the treatises are, whether there are any indications that treatises 
could be of use, or were actually used, and may provide further information 
concerning certain procedures and techniques of the army. 
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Chapter 3: The Strength and Orqanization of UnitS 
Introduction 
The strength and internal organization of legions and auxiliary units is one of 
the more debated topics of the Roman army. As it has been the subject of 
numerous studies, it is not the intention of this chapter to consider the matter 
in great detail. However, several of the ancient treatises provide at least 
some information on these matters and they are relevant to the arrangement 
of the line of march and the disposition of forces in the line of battle. 
The ancient treatises provide very limited data on the size and internal 
organization of army units. There is no equivalent for the imperial period of 
the detailed explanation of legionary organization given by Polybius and Livy 
for the Republican army. The most comprehensive description of the army 
relating to the imperial period is that given by Vegetius (Book II), and this 
deals exclusively with the legion. Additional, much briefer, information, is 
provided in the de munitionibus castrorum which also contains equally brief 
comments on the size and internal organization of auxiliary units'. 
The comments made in the de munitionibus castrorum on unit organization are 
incidental to the work itself. The author claims to be writing his handbook for 
use by contemporary military surveyors (§ 45-47) who would presumably be 
aware of the usual organization of army units. As a result, the author finds 
it unnecessary to give a detailed description of these units and confines 
himself to providing only the information directly relevant to his work: the 
number of men in a century (§ 1), the number of horses in each cavalry unit 
'DMC § 1,3 &5 refer to legionary organization; § 16,26-28 deal with auxiliary 
units. 
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16,26), because these numbers have a direct affect on the allocation of 
space for each particular unit in the camp. The work itself begins by 
suggesting that some kind of description of legionary cohorts has already been 
given (§ 1), but comparison with the author's descriptions of the auxiliary 
units later in the work suggest that it would not have been particularly 
lengthy. 
Vegetius is the only treatise writer to have included a detailed description of 
the strength and organization of the Roman legion, and this is a much fuller 
account than that given by the de munitionibus castrorum. Since he is 
referring to an organization that is obsolete in his time (the antiqua legi , II 
7), and that he is actuaUy recommending a return to (I Pref .), it is necessary 
for him to provide a more comprehensive description of the legion's 
organization and equipment. In addition, this description is a necessary 
introduction to Vegetius' third book, which considers the deployment and role 
of the legion cn the field of battle. 
Some information on unit organization is also included by military writers such 
as Caesar and Josephus in their works. Caesar was writing for an informed 
audience, and so probably did not consider it necessary to provide details 
about unit size and organization. Despite -this, there are a few references to 
unit sizes, though Caesar is much more useful as a source for the operations 
of an army on campaign. Josephus' excursus on the Roman army (PJ 111 70- 
109), as noted above (chapter 2), is similar in structure to that of Polybius 
and may have been written in emulation of the earlier work. Their purpose 
was partly to explain the workings of the army to non-Romans but Josephus 
does not include the detailed description of the different forces that Polybius 
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did, though he does make a few comments on the size of auxiliary forces (BJ 
11167). 
The Legion 
The writer Cincius Alimentus produced a treatise in the early Empire in which 
he stated that the legion contained 60 centuries, 30 maniples and 10 cohorts 
(r2 Ap4a Aulus Gelhus NA xvi This is the earliest reference in a treatise 
to the legionary organization traditionally attributed to the military reforms 
of Marius in the late 2nd century BC, by which the cohort of three maniples 
became the principal tactical unit of the army. The commentaries of Caesar 
clearly illustrate the use of the cohort in this role, tactically more important 
3 
even than the legion 
The transition between the two forms of organization seems to have taken place 
at some time between the 2nd Punic War, to which the accounts of Livy and 
Polybius refer, and the mid lst century BC when Caesar was campaigning in 
Gaul. Although the introduction of the cohort has frequently been attributed 
to Marius (Parker 1928 28; Speidel 1992 7), Bell (1965 411) has argued from 
the evidence of Livy that the use of the cohort as a tactical unit was developed 
to solve a specific tactical problem, that is the need for tactical units smaller 
and more flexible than the legion but larger than the maniple for the Roman 
campaigns in Spain. Polybius appears to state that the cohort contained three 
maniples (gnEj par. ) 4. However, because there was no Greek word for cohort 
'Servius (Aen 11 463) and Isidorus (ix 461) provide the same information, 
although the latter states that the legion contained 12 cohorts. 
3 Eg: Thapsus (B. Mr. 79-80) where five cohorts of a single legion held each 
wing. 
4 Polybius xi 23; -upEIC cynEtpaC - -cou-co 6E raIE-ual -co oj)v-cayýia -uwv nEC(ov 
TEaga 'Pwpatotr. icoo-p-c". 
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at this time (Polybius transliterates it as ), he may be referring 
simply to three cohorts, using the word gnE t pa C to mean cohort as it certainly 
does by the early Empire (Acts 10 1; BJ 11142; IGRom 110). Bell argues that 
the cohort evolved from being a formation introduced for the purpose stated 
above, to being the principal tactical unit of the Roman army by the time of 
Marius' campaigns in Africa (1965 416). He states that by the time of Caesar, 
There was a tendency to think of the cohort as the basic unit, 
employable in any number of ways, of which the formation of 
legions with groups of ten was only one. 11 (1965 412), 
as Caesar's tactics at Thapsus and elsewhere prove (see below chapter 6 on 
pitched battles). Although the cohort might have been very important 
tactically, it was the legion that fostered the 6sprit de corps, illustrated by 
Marius' reform of the legionary standards (Pliny NH x 5). 
Parker (1932 138-9) and Domaszewski (1887 45 & 69) suggest that the 
manipular organization was still in force at the time of the de munitionibus 
castroruM5. Schenk (1930 18-26) attributes the abolition of the maniple to 
Hadrian as part of his general army reforms but there is evidence to suggest 
that the maniple was by this time, and indeed much earlier, neither a tactical 
nor an administrative unit, and that what Parker sees as evidence for the 
continued existence of the maniple in the de munitionibus castrorum (§ 1-5) 
was in fact only a residual trace of the earlier type of organization, retained 
by the traditions of Roman camp and fort design; the method of camping two 
centuries opposite each other during the empire was essentially the same as 
in the Republican camp described by Polybius (vi 27-32). Lenoir (1979 119) 
suggests that the different ways for a cohort to camp mentioned in the de 
munitionibus castrorum disprove the theory that two centuries always camped 
opposite each other - He adds that the importance of the term hendstricr,,,., 
'For consideration of the date of this work, see below p. 36ff. 
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rather than striga proves that the camping system was organized in terms of 
centuries rather than maniples. Although most barrack blocks in forts and 
fortresses are found in pairs, this also could be simply a continuation of the 
traditional method of camping and not prove anything about contemporary 
legionary organization'. 
The term manipulus continued to be used in military contexts by historians and 
commentators such as Tacitus and Caesar, though for Tacitus the actual 
meaning of the word has become less precise. As stated above, Caesar 
appears to have been using fully developed cohort tactics during his 
campaigns in Gaul and he rarely uses the term mani PUIUS7. In his 
commentaries, Caesar appears to use the term usually in technical contexts 
such as manipulos laxare, to open out the ranks (BG ii 25). Although the term 
is not found in Livy or any other Latin writers on military subjects, it may 
refer to an actual drill used in battle, the terminology for which had not been 
altered, although it would have been centuries and cohorts carrying out the 
order rather than maniples". 
Tacitus seems to use the term manipulus to denote simply a group of soldiers 
smaller than a legion, and generally smaller than a cohort, particularly when 
he is referring to the line of battle (eg: Annals iv 25; Hist. iv 78). Tacitus 
rarely uses the term centuria, and this is usually when he wishes to emphasize 
the small size of the unit or group of men he is referring to - He does not seem 
to differentiate between a century and a maniple; to him they seem to be simply 
6 Since a cohort contained six centuries, the easiest and neatest method of 
camping them was in pairs. 
Caesar uses the term only five times; BG ii 25; vi 34; vi 40; BC i 76; ii 28. 
The Greek equivalent is 6tac-unpl, Appian Mithr. 42; PC 11 79; Dio 37 4. 
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sub-units of a larger force, and these sub-units are of indeterminate size; 
Tacitus felt no necessity to provide further technical information - 
The epigraphic evidence also suggests that the maniple was an obsolete 
organization by the early Imperial period. Inscriptions very often record the 
century to which the soldier belonged as well as the legion, and some provided 
details of the cohort as well as the century 9. The term manipulus, by 
contrast, is never used on such inscriptions, and is only found in its 
compound form commanipularis which appears to mean simply 'fellow 
soldiers"O. This also seems to be the way historians such as Tacitus use the 
term (Hist. iv 46; SHA Pesc. Niger 10) and it does not appear to refer to an 
administrative or tactical unit. 
Information is given on the total numerical strength of the legion by a number 
of sources. The Republican legion, according to Livy (vid 8; xxi 17), 
contained 4000-5000 infantry and 300 cavalry, whereas Polybius (vi 20) 
indicates 4200 infantry and 300 cavalry. The numbers relating to the imperial 
legion also very; the legion of the de munitionibus castrorum totals just over 
5000, Vegetius' weU over 6000 (116). According to Suidas, Servius, Isidorus 
and Lydus, the Roman legion numbered 6000 (Suidas 11519; Servius Aen. VII 
247; Isidorus Orig . XI 346; Lydus de Mag. 140). Alexander Severus raised six 
legions, each with a strength of 5000 men (SHA Alex. Sev. 50). 
However, during the Republic the actual strength of the legion could very 
considerably. Polybius states that in times of particular danger the infantry 
could be increased to 5000 (vi 20) and Livy notes the fluctuations in legionary 
9 eg: CIL 111 6594,6605,6611,12054. 
10 eg: CIL 111 6577; VI 30881; VIII 9615; X 1766,1775,6069. 
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size, particularly occasions when legions are increased in reaction to an 
emergency; in 216 BC the legions were increased by 1000 infantry and 100 
cavalry giving an infantry strength of 5000 and 300 cavalry (Livy xxii 36), 
and in 204 13C Scipio increased two of his Cannae legions to 6200 infantry and 
300 cavalry (Ldvy xxix 24)". Whatever its paper strength, in practice the 
legion could be much smaller. At Pharsalus, Caesar's cohorts appear to have 
been greatly under strength compared with the size suggested by the writers 
of the Imperial period. Caesar's 80 cohorts at the battle totalled 22,000 men, 
giving a cohort strength of under 300 and total legionary strength of about 
3000 (BC 11189). These numbers may be especially low because Caesar's army 
had been engaged in civil war for some years and he may have been unable to 
obtain enough recruits to bring his units up to their theoretical strength. 
It is impossible to use the same method to ascertain the actual strength of 
legions during the imperial period because of the lack of detail in historians' 
accounts of ancient battles. Alston has used legionary discharge dedications 
in an attempt to calculate the approximate number of recruits and strength of 
legions under the Empire. Taking the age of recruitment as between 15 and 
25, and basing a mortality rate for the 25 years service on Hopkins' UN figures 
(1966), Alston concludes that about 50% of recruits would survive to 
discharge. However, the available sample of inscriptions is very small, with 
only seven discharge lists surviving in a suitable state, aU dating to the 2nd 
century, and these may not provide an accurate assessment of the strength 
"Although this fluctuation may have been due to residual custom since the 
legions were in theory of a set number for each consul, in times of crisis it was 
much easier and quicker simply to increase the size of the legions rather than 
raise more from scratch. 
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of all legions 12 . The information the inscriptions contain may be tabulated 
as follows: 
Reference Legion Year (s) of 
recruitment 
Veteran 
numbers 
CIL 1116178 V Macedon. C. 109 114+ 
AE 1955 238/ 
1969 633 
11 T raiana 132/133 133 
CIL 111 8110 VII Claudia 134/135 239 
CIL VIII 18067 111 Augusta 140/141 90+ 
CIL 111 6580 11 Traiana 168 C. 100 
CIL 111 14507 VII Claudia 169 c. 180 
CIL VIII 18068 111 Augusta 173 90+ 
The discharge of 239 men from Legion VII Claudia who were recruited in AD 
134/135 (CIL 111 8110) represents the recruits of two years and suggests a 
total legionary strength of c. 4500. This corresponds very well with what 
might be expected for a legion of the type described by the de munitionibus 
castrorum that is slightly under paper strength. As Alston points out, the 
numbers of veterans discharged for each year of recruitment varies 
considerably, with only c. 66 per year for Legion II Traiana in the n-dd 2nd 
century (AE 1955 238; 1969 633), suggesting a legionary strength of c. 2500 
whereas the large discharge from Legion VII Claudia who were recruited in AD 
169 (CIL 111 14507) suggests a legion that is greatly overstrength 13 . 
12 Dr Alston and I carried out much of the epigraphic work for this study 
together. 
13 Alston rejects the theory that Legion II Traiana suffered very high casualties 
in the Bar Kokýba revolt resulting in small numbers of veterans, and explains 
the large Legion VII Claudia discharge in AD 194 (recruited in AD 169) as 
representing a massive reinforcement of the legion in preparation for Marcus 
Aurelius' Danubian wars. These calculations do not take into account the 
possibility of high mortality rates due to illness, such as the plague during the 
reign of Marcus Aurelius - 
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Alston provides further evidence to illustrate that Legion II Traiana may well 
have been understrength in the form of the centuries named in the AD 194 
discharge list (CIL 111 6580). Of the 22 centuries named in this inscription, 
8 are identified by the adjectival form indicating that the century lacked a 
centurion 14 . Alston suggests that the delay in filling the posts of centurion 
showed there was no pressure to keep the number of officers and troops up to 
theoretical paper strength. 
The Treatises 
The two principal treatises which provide information on legionary strength, 
the de munitionibus castrorum and Vegetius, are problematic because it is not 
known to what date the descriptions are relevant. Vegetius simply refers to 
his legionary organization as the antiqua leclio (114), and the date of the de 
munitionibus castrorum is much disputed. 
The de munitionibus castrorum. 
This treatise provides the principal details of what is considered by many to 
be the standard legionary organization of the early imperial period (accepted 
by Webster 1985 110 and Luttwak 1976 fig. 1.1). The author states that a 
century contained 80 men (§ 1). The area assigned to each legionary cohort 
implies that there were six centuries to a cohort (§ 2), whilst the first cohort 
was of double strength (§ 4), although the author does not indicate how many 
centuries this double cohort contained. The author never actually states that 
a legion contained ten cohorts, but this may be assumed from other comments 
(eg: § 18 refers to the 10th cohort camping by the porta decumana). 
14 This adjectival form is also fairly common on the centurial stones from 
Hadrian's Wall and this is discussed by Birley (1951 71-72). 
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Dating 
Many attempts have been made to date the de munitionibus castrorum, and 
suggestions range from the late lst century to the mid 4th century AD. The 
various elements of dating evidence are discussed by Lenoir (1979 111-133). 
Much of the argument concerning the dating of the work centres on the 
composition of the army described in the text, and using this to associate the 
work with a particular campaign. This method has been used by Birley (1953, 
1981,1982) and Frere (1980) who both associate the work with a war on the 
Danube, partly because of the presence of the emperor himself on the 
campaign, and of four miWary alae in the army 15 . The two different 
arguments will not be repeated here, but on the grounds of composition of the 
force, Frere dates the text to the Danubian wars of Domitian, between AD 85- 
89, whilst Birley (1982 279) rejects some of Frere's arguments about the 
existence at such an early date of some of the units mentioned, and prefers 
instead the Marcommanic wars during the middle years of Marcus Aurelius' 
tar 
reign. Birley argues ^ 
this later date almost solely on the composition of the 
army, though Frere also uses archaeological evidence. 
Lenoir (1979 111) is generally critical of these attempts to tie the treatise down 
to a particular war of campaign of a certain emperor. He suggests that the 
characteristics of the work show that it is military theory and believes that 
war is unlikely to be the time for the introduction of a new method of camping 
because of the inevitable teething problems. Lenoir goes on to suggest that 
the force described is not a real field army but a mixture of all the different 
types of unit serving in the Roman army. This argument neatly solves the 
problem of the four milliary alae serving together; Lenoir believes that no such 
"With only 8 known milliary alae at this time, an army containing four of them 
would represent a massive concentration (Holder 1980 Appendix III). 
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army would ever have been constituted. Having dismissed the use of force 
composition as dating evidence, Lenoir then considers other dating evidence 
in the treatise, including the use of particular vocabulary - His conclusions 
are that a 2nd century date is required by the presence of a leqatus legionis 
and the strength of the praetorian cohorts, and a Trajanic date implied 
because this was the only period when all the terms he considers (veredari-i , 
classici, metator, vexillarii and the epithets referring to the emperor) were in 
use, as well as Trajan's supposed preference for miEiary alae (Lenoir 1979 
126). 
The work itself is theoretical in nature, as Lenoir points out, but the author 
hoped and probably expected that his new method of camping would be field- 
tested (§ 45/47). However the work may be categorized today, the author at 
least intended the work to have some practical application. Although I agree 
with Lenoir's criticisms of attempts to date the treatise to a particular 
campaign, I do not agree with his suggestion that a new way of camping would 
not be introduced during wartime. The author believed that his method was 
more logical and an improvement on other methods (§ 45/47) and it is 
frequently the case that improvements in military equipment and practices are 
made during times of war rather than peace. There is therefore no reason to 
suggest that the de munitionibus castrorum relates to any period of war or 
peace. 
Since the army of the de munitionibus castrorum appears to be hypothetical, 
the work must be dated using the kind of evidence Lenoir considers, in 
particular the use of the clavicula in camp defences which Frere (1980 57) also 
mentions. The de munitionibus castrorum appears to suggest the use of both 
claviculae (§ 55) and tituli (§ 49) to defend camp gates. As with the literary 
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evidence, Lenoir concludes that the work dates to the early 2nd century AD, 
and specificaUy to the reign of Trajan'6 . 
Vegetius 
Vegetius' description of the legion, although detailed, gives rise to a number 
of problems as it is not known which sources the author was using for his 
information or the date for which the description is relevant. Vegetius simply 
refers to the organization as the antiqua legio (114) and provides particulars 
of the infantry and cavalry strength of each cohort of the legion. The 
organization of the legion cannot itself be derived directly from Cato's treatise 
de Re Militari since that work was probably written before the complete 
adoption of the cohort system as opposed to the more traditional manipular 
formation of Livy and Polybius. However, the influence of treatises dating to 
before the cohort reforms is evident in comments such as each consul 
commanding two legions (11 4) and Schenk (1930 25-36) had suggested that 
Vegetius made use of Cato in compiling this section of his treatise. As stated 
above, the transition between the two forms of organization seems to have 
taken place at some time between the 2nd Punic war, to which the accounts of 
Livy and Polybius refer, and the late lst century BC, when the commentaries 
of Caesar illustrate the use of the cohort as the principal tactical unit. 
Vegetius is therefore likely to be using a Republican source for some parts but 
a late Republican or later source for his section on legionary organization. 
16 Lenoir (1977) 697-727; (1979) 132 on dating of claviculae. For further 
discussion of claviculae and camp defences, see below, chapter 4 on Marching 
Camps. Birley's suggestion that the de munitionibus castrorum is 
contemporary with Vegetius (1982) seems very unlikely since the basic 
structure of the legion is totally different (Vegetius' five centuries per cohort 
against the six per cohort of the DMC). 
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According to Vegetius the legion was the main reason for Rome's greatness 
as it contained light and heavy infantry as weU as archers, artillerymen and 
cavalry and was capable of defeating any size of enemy without any support 
from 'foreign' auxiliaries, supplied by allies and confederates (11 1). On the 
whole, Vegetius does not have much regard for the auxiliaries, referring to 
them as coming from different parts of the empire and having different 
strengths, each with its own organization, customs and methods of fighting. 
At the beginning of book II, Vegetius states that the military establishment 
consists of cavalry, infantry and the navy (11 1). Although Vegetius 
describes the navy and the legion in detail, he does not give any f urther 
consideration to the cavalry other than that attached to the legion, or to 
auxiliary units, not even when describing the disposition of the army in the 
line of battle. Cooper (1968 60) suggests that Vegetius worshipped the legion 
and "could not bring himself to admit that the legion was dependent for outside 
help on anything essential. 11 However, Vegetius may have been using only a 
description of the legion as a source for this section and so tends to emphasize 
the role of the legion in the absence of any detailed information on the 
auxiliary units. As suggested above, Vegetius probably used Republican 
sources as well as later works for this section, and as the Republican legion 
contained light armed troops Vegetius may simply be referring to these (Veg. I 
20; 11.15; Livy viii 8; Polybius vi 20). 
Vegetius' description of the legion is fairly complicated. His legion was 
divided into 10 cohorts, the first of which was of double strength (milliary), 
and also contained soldiers selected for particular qualities (11 6). The first 
cohort contained 1105 infantry and 132 cavalry. Each of the remaining 9 
cohorts contained 555 infantry and 66 cavalry, giving a total of 6100 infantry 
and 726 cavalry (though Vegetius seems to get his calculations wrong and 
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gives a cavalry total of 730). He ends the description with the interesting 
statement that these were the minimum numbers for the legion, and that the 
number was sometimes increased by the addition of other miWary cohorts 17 - 
Vegetius provides more information on the structure of the first cohort later 
in his 2nd book when explaining the duties of the centurions in this cohort (II 
8). According to the author, the primus pilus commanded 4 centuries, or 400 
men, the hastatus prior 2 centuries, or 200 men, the princeps and hastatus 
posterior each commanded lk centuries, or 150 men, and the triarius prior 
(Vegetius presumably means the princeps prior) 1 century or 100 men. 
According to this arrangement, the first cohort had 10 centuries of 100 men, 
commanded by 5 centurions, though the distribution of centuries to each 
centurion was uneven. 
Another inconsistency in Vegetius' description is the numerical strength of the 
first cohort. At one point he states it is 1105 (116), presumably including the 
5 centurions, but later the number totals 1000 (118). However, at this point 
Vegetius also mentions decani "who are now called caput contubernii" each 
commanding 10 men, and there would have been 100 of these in that cohort, 
giving a total cohort strength of the 1105 Vegetius mentions. Cooper (1968 41) 
suggests that Vegetius invented the rank of caput contubernii to make up the 
numbers" 
"Cooper (1968 55) suggests that Vegetius was confusing auxiliary cohorts 
with legionary and while auxiliary quingenary cohorts could be made MiEdary, 
the legionary cohorts could not, but see below p. 56. 
"'An inscription from Usk, however, referring to the contubernium Messoris, 
suggests that there may have been some kind of hierarchy within the 
contubernium, and possibly a caput contubernium, as Vegetius suggests 
(Britannia 7 (1976) 391, No. 66). 
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After describing the strength of the cohorts, Vegetius then lists the different 
officers attached to the legion, the prefect who commanded the legion 
(formerly a legate), the prefect of the camp and the praefectus fabrum (II 
There then follows a brief account of the qualifications and duties of 
military tribunes (1112). Vegetius states that the first cohort was commanded 
by a particularly well qualified tribune while the other nine were commanded 
by tribunes or other officers specia. Uy chosen by the emperor as cohort 
commanders. The only other pieces of information about legionary 
organization in this section of Vegetius' treatise are about the size of turmae, 
the troops of cavalry attached to the legion (11 14) and the legionary artillery 
(11 25). As stated above, in Vegetius' description the units of cavalry are 
attached to particular cohorts, and with 32 men and a decurion in each turma - 
The milliary first cohort had four turmae whilst the nine other cohorts had two 
each. According to Vegetius each century of the legion had a ballista served 
by ten men from that century and there are therefore 55 of these engines in 
each legion. There were also ten onagri, or stone throwing machines, one 
attached to each cohort. 
Cooper (1968 chap. 3) has attempted to explain the origin of Vegetius' antiqua 
legio, suggesting that it never in fact existed, but was invented by the writer 
from what information he had available. He suggests that Vegetius obtained 
his cohort strength of 550 from the size of legionary vexillations of the early 
Empire which consisted of one cohort with support staff of engineers and 
medics etc. and from this basis devised what he thought was the antiqua legio 
through mathematical juggling. However, at the time of the de munitionibus 
castrorum legionary vexillations varied in size". In addition, Vegetius' work 
"' This suggestion is made on the grounds of the 550 men mentioned by Dio 
(lxxv 12) and from the figures in the de munitionibus castrorum §5& 30. 
(continued... ) 
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. is partly a compilation of earlier works (Schenk 1930). The author presumably 
had access to treatises describing the organization of the legion in earlier 
periods, so there is no reason for him to have invented the legion which he 
describes; he could simply have obtained his information from the earlier 
works. 
Dating 
One of the major difficulties in the dating of the antiqua legio is that Vegetius 
made extensive use of earlier treatises when writing his own (see above 
chapter. 2). Cato seems to have been one of the most influential of these works 
since his account of the legionary dispositions in the line of battle reflects 
strongly the situation in the Republic as described by Livy and Polybius. 
There is little agreement on the date of the antiqua legio. It has been placed 
in the reign of Diocletian, the later 3rd century and the 2nd century 
20 
. 
Schenk (1930) and others believe that Vegetius copied his description of the 
legion from the latest of Vegetius' named sources, Tarruntenus Paternus, but 
all the evidence suggests that the organization of the early empire was still in 
force, with all cohorts but the first containing six centuries. Silhanek 
suggests that Vegetius may have been using two sources for his section on the 
antiqua legio, one for 117 and another for 118-13, presumably because of the 
repetition of some information, and it seems quite likely that this was the case, 
and that this may be one of the major problems in dating and using Vegetius' 
19 ( ... continued) However, Speidel (1984 307) has since shown that the 550 mentioned by Dio 
belonged to an auxiliary unit. On the size of vexillations: CIL 111 7449 
mentioned one 75 strong; CIL V 5829, three milliary vexillations, and a 
vexillation 8000 strong from three British legions was sent to Italy to 
support Vitellius (Tac. Hist. II 57; 111 22). 
20For the arguments concerning these dates, see Parker (1932) and Sander 
(1940 382-391). 
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description of the antiqua leqlo; by using a number of sources from different 
periods and amalgamating them, Vegetius may well have ended up producing 
something that was almost totaUY 
fictitioUS2 1. 
Auxiliary Units 
The strength and internal organization of auxiliary units is as problematic and 
contentious as that of the legionS22 . Little information is included in the 
treatises or other literary works, and after mentioning them briefly at the 
beginning of Book II, Vegetius makes no further reference to the auxiliaries, 
or socii, and does not consider their role in the line of battle. There is, 
however, papyrological evidence for the auxiliary units which is for the most 
part lacking for the legions - 
Josephus mentions two types of auxiliary units when describing the Roman 
force invading Judaea (BJ 111 67). The force included ten infantry cohorts 
1000 strong and 13 cohorts which had 600 infantry and 120 cavalry. Josephus 
is undoubtedly referring to the milliary infantry cohort and quingenary cohors 
equitata, although at their theoretical strength, assuming a century of 100. 
Birley (1966 55) has questioned whether miDiary auxiliary units existed at 
such an early date, but despite Josephus' tendency to exaggerate figures, I 
see no reason to reject his statement on the grounds that the earliest 
epigraphic evidence for mWiary units postdates this reference. 
2 '1 am grateful to Dr Richard Alston for discussing this section with me and 
making this suggestion. 
22 The subject has been most recently and comprehensively dealt with by Holder 
(1980). 
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The de munitionibus castrorum provides the most detailed evidence relating 
to the subject, though the author only provides the basic numbers in the six 
different types of auxiliary units - 
Table illustratinq unit strenqth according to the de munitionibus castrorum 
Quingenary Milliary 
Infantry cohort 6 centuries (§ 28) 10 centuries (§ 28) 
Cohors equitata 6 centuries + 10 centuries + 
120 cavalry (§ 27) 240 cavalry (§ 16) 
Ala 16 turmae (§ 16) 24 turmae (§ 16) 
-11 
Unfortunately the author provides no details about the strength of the 
auxiliary century or turma so it is impossible to tell the exact theoretical 
strength of these units. However, for the cohors equitata at least, more can 
be inferred from the space allocations given in the text. 
Attempts have been made to give century and turma sizes from the Coptos 
inscription (CIL 1116627), and to fit these in with the theoretical strengths in 
the de munitionibus castrorum. Thus the 788 men from 7 auxiliary cohorts 
mentioned on the inscription are divided between the ten centurions to provide 
a century size of 78 (Holder 1980 7), and the 424 equites are divided among 
the 10 officers (5 decurions, I duplicarius and 4 sesquiplicarii) to give a turma 
size of 42 (Domaszewski 1887, but see below p. 47). However, the legionaries 
appear to have been chosen at random, one from each century, and there is 
no reason to suppose that the same was not done with the auxiliaries; the 788 
infantry do not have to represent ten centuries, and there may not be any 
definite correlation between the number of infantry and number of centurions, 
or the number of cavalrymen and decurions and junior officers, and this 
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inscription provides little useful evidence for the organization of auxiliary 
units. 
The pridianum of Cohors I Tungrorum (Vindolanda tablet Inv. no. 88/841; JRS 
81 (1991) 62-73) can be used to illustrate the difficulties of establishing turma 
or century size from the number of officers and troops. Various detachments 
had been sent from Vindolanda, each under the command of one centurion; 
thus 337 were at Coria. under 1 or 2 centurions; 6 at' London under a 
centurion; 9 somewhere else under a centurion. It is clear from this that the 
number of centurions in vexffiations may not bear any relation to the number 
of soldiers in these vexillations. 
To facilitate the calculation of space required for a milliary part-mounted 
cohort, the author supplies the formula by "transferring into infantry" the 
cavalry (§ 25-26). The total space required for this unit is that for 1360 
infantrymen. The 240 cavalrymen each receive 2.5 ft whilst the infantry 
receive 1 ft. The 240 cavalry thus take up 600 ft, or 600 infantry spaces . 
The remaining 760 infantry spaces give the approximate strength of the 10 
centuries of infantry belonging to this unit since they receive 1 ft, or I 
infantry space each. This approximate total of 76 per century is very near to 
the 80 per century of the legions and it seems likely that in theory at least the 
century sizes were supposed to be about the same. 
Many modern writers state that the quingenary cohors equitata had 380 
infantry and 120 cavalry, quoting the de munitionibus castrorum to prove this 
27). The figure of 380 is obtained by halving the 760 infantry for the 
milliary unit which is implied in the text in § 25-26 (Cheesman 1914 29-30; 
Lenoir 1979 74). However, I believe this is a misinterpretation of the text. 
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27 states that the quingenary cohort had half the numbers but the same 
organization as the milliary (Cohors equitata quingenaria in dimidio eandem 
rationem continet quam cohors milliaria) , but later in the same section the 
author states cohors equitata cfuinqenaria habet centurias VI, relicfua pr 
parte din-dda. I believe that the author is only referring to the cavalry at this 
point, signified by the use of the word reliqua, and that it is only the cavalry 
that had half the numbers of the milliary cohort; he is not stating that the six 
centuries of infantry only contained 380 soldiers, with 62 per century. 
Birley (1966 54) does suggest different century sizes in the auxiliary cohorts, 
80 per century in the miWary cohors equitat and quingenary infantry cohort, 
and 60 per century in the quingenary cohors equitata. Davies (1971 110) and 
Holder (1980 8) however, suggest that all auxiliary centuries were 
theoretically the same size and that auxiliary units were based on legionary 
strengths. This seems the most sensible suggestion, and anyway, if the 
theoretical strengths of auxiliary centuries were different this would surely 
cause problems in the relative seniority of auxiliary centurions; for in this 
situation presumably a centurion in a quingenary infantry cohort, with 
centuries of 80 men according to Birley, would be superior to a centurion in 
a quingenary cohors equitat , with centuries of c. 60 men. 
There is more evidence for the size of the auxiliary turma than for the 
century. Polybius states that the Roman cavalry of 300 was divided into 10 
turmae, (vi 25); this gives a turma strength of 30. Arrian in the Tactica states 
that a Roman ala contained 512 men (18.3), and since the de munitionibus 
castrorum gives 16 turmae for this unit (§ 16), confirmed by epigraphic 
evidence (CIL 111 6581, listing the 16 decurions of two alae in Egypt), this 
suggests a turma of 32. However, Arrian is at this point describing Greek 
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cavalry units and his comparison of the size of the Greek with the Roman ala 
may be an approximation, and is not necessarily numerically accurate. The 
'diploma' of Pompeius Strabo of c. 89 BC conferring Roman citizenship on 
Spanish auxiliary cavalrymen lists 31 cavalrymen belonging to the Turma 
Salluitana (ILS 8888). This could suggest a turma size of 30 or 32, whilst 
Vegetius (1114) gives the strength of the legionary turma at 32, which Cooper 
(1968 60) believes he obtained from the size of the auxiliary turma. Although 
the exact theoretical strength of the turma is unknown, the evidence clearly 
points to 30 or 32. 
The strength of the turma in the milliary ala is, however, disputed. As stated 
above, Domaszewski suggested a strength of 42 on the basis of the Coptos 
inscription (CIL 1116627), partly because 32 per turma was considered too low 
a number for a milliary ala; at 32 per turma, the 24 turmae in this unit (DMC 
24) would give a total strength of only 768, hence the suggestions of larger 
turmae, at 42 or 40 (for the arguments, see Holder 1980 9). Cooper (1968 31) 
suggested that the first turma in a milliary ala was double strength and that 
the other 23 turmae contained 40 troopers each, giving a total of exactly 1000, 
and cites DMC § 16 to prove this. The treatise states that a milliary ala has 
"96 horses over the 1000, which is the number calculated when the extra 
horses are discounted". Cooper seems to have simply taken this as proof that 
the milliary ala contained 1000 troopers, and has failed to read the rest of 
16, which goes on " 3ft are calculated for each trooper; their number is 
established at 1000 so that the prefect of the ala can be assigned an area in the 
space and their principales can camp in a more spacious way. " The milliary ala 
does not contain 1000 troopers; the author of the de munitionibus castrorum 
has used that number because then there would be sufficient space for the 
officers to camp and it is an easy round number for use in his formulaic method 
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of camp arrangement". Far from being used as proof of 1000 troopers in the 
milliary ala, this section of the treatise can be used to suggest that there were 
weU under this number in the Urlit24. 
Since the papyrological evidence has been considered in detail elsewhere 
(Holder 1980; Hassall 1983), 1 shall not repeat it here. Suffice it to say that 
the evidence for quingenary cohortes equitatae suggests the 120 cavalry were 
divided into 4 turmae 30 strong, but the infantry in these units appear to be 
25 below their theoretical strength . The pridianum of Cohors XX 
Palmyrenorum, however, suggests that the unit was vastly above its 
theoretical strength, with 6 centuries of 140-150 men and 5 turmae of c. 70 men 
each (Fink 1). Davies (1967 108-11) attempted to explain this seemingly 
anomalous arrangement as a milliary cohors equitat with outposted centuries 
and turmae, but like Hassall (1983 99), 1 prefer the simpler explanation 
offered by Mazzarino (1971 61-4) that the original establishment was 6 
centuries and 5 turmae, and the size of these had been increased to 
strengthen the cohort. 
The evidence from Valkenburg may also suggest the enlargement of centuries 
in an auxiliary unit; the fort was occupied c. AD 40 by Cohort III Gallorum 
equitata and excavations revealed four pairs of infantry barracks, each pair 
23 The arrangement of the camp described in the de munitionibus castrorum will 
be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
2 4Assuming a turma strength of 30 and total unit strength of 720, this would 
leave 280 man spaces for the decurions and commander, perhaps 10 man spaces 
per decurion and the remaining 40 man spaces for the commander. Since the 
legionary centurion received ten times the space of a legionary (DMC § 1), this 
calculation may be approximately correct. 
25 Cohors I Hispanorum Veterana Equitata (Fink 63), Cohors I Augusta 
Praetoria Lusitanorum Equitata (Fink 64) and an unidentified cohort QRS 1977 
50-61). 
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having one centurion's quarters, rooms for py-incipales, fabriculae and 14 
contubernia. In his review, Hassall has suggested that the four pairs of 
infantry barracks may have housed four enlarged centuries of c. 112 men each 
(1977 115-7). The quingenary Cohors I Tungrorum may also have had 
enlarged centuries as 761 men and only 6 centurions are recorded QRS 1991 
62-73 )26 . This evidence suggests that perhaps auxiliary cohorts were not as 
uniformly arranged as might have been expected from the information 
contained in the de munitionibus castrorum. 
Vegetius states that his description of the antiqua legi provides the minimum 
numbers for the legion, and that the number was sometimes increased by the 
addition of other miUiary cohorts (11 6). There seems no reason to reject the 
possibility that auxiliary cohorts could also be strengthened if necessary. 
Vegetius' milliary legionary cohorts do not require extra centurions if they are 
on the same establishment as the first cohort, with five centuries each (118). 
In the auxiliary units, it would probably be simpler to increase the size of the 
centuries rather than add more centuries to the cohort so that it would at least 
retain its original structure and additional centurions would be unnecessary. 
The epigraphic evidence suggests that the milliary first cohort of the legion 
contained five double centuries rather than ten single centuries, so if a legion 
was augmented, as Vegetius suggests could happen, it may have been done 
simply by increasing the size of the centuries. Legions were increased in size 
during the Republic in times of crisis (see above p. 32) and there seems no 
reason to suppose this did not also happen during the Empire. One of the 
great advantages of the cohort system was its flexibility, and perhaps this also 
26 It has been suggested that the fluctuations in century size were caused by 
the gradual change of the unit from quingenary to milliary status QRS 1991 
67). 
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included flexibility in the size of the units and sub-units, both legionary and 
auxiliary. 
Archaeoloaical vidence and Unit Size and Orqanization 
Various attempts have been made to illustrate unit strength and organization 
using fort sizes and plans, and the number, type and groupings of barrack 
blocks within forts and fortresses. Richmond (1955 304-6) attempted to assign 
particular forts to the different types of auxiliary unit using this method, and 
then went on to suggest "type sites" of auxiliary forts for the different types 
of auxiliary units described above. Richmond was using primarily the 
information given in the de munitionibus castrorum as his basis for associating 
different auxiliary units with forts and the information given in this treatise 
suggests that a1LI the auxiliary units were of standard sizes and organizations. 
Studies of fort size and unit type are usuaUy based on the hypothesis that: 
"If Roman auxiliary units were standardized in size through the 
early principate ... then there should be a correlation between fort size and primary garrison" (Bennett 1986 707) 
There are numerous problems in using the archaeological evidence for this 
purpose, many of which have been fully considered by Davison (1989 168-74) J, 
such as vexillations and outpostings, changes of garrison, and the huge 
variety of barrack blocks both between and within different forts. One of the 
major problems, however, is that the available sample is very small, with only 
a handful of forts being fully excavated like Elginhaugh or Valkenburg whilst 
the remainder of fort plans have been mainly reconstructed from selective 
excavation. 
Bennett (1986) compared fort areas in the N-W. provinces with garrisons in 
cases where the primary garrison was known, with regard to the hypothesis 
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mentioned above concerning correlation between fort and unit size. His 
conclusion is that: 
"In the European part of the Empire there does not seem to have 
been any direct correlation between fort size and the majority of 
the units known. " (Bennett 1986 711) 
Bennett's hypothesis, however, does not include the possibilities of 
outpostings, vexillations etc. mentioned by Davison, and indeed admits that 
his primary hypotheses are incorrect: 
"Either Roman auxiliary units were not standardized in size... or 
there is the possibility that some auxiliary forts actually 
contained a composite garrison, perhaps more than one unit or 
parts of several units being brigaded together. " 
Both these comments are quite possibly true, certainly the former and, I would 
claim, the latter. As Bennett goes on to point out: the papyrological evidence 
suggests that not all auxiliary units were organized in the way that the de 
munitionibus castrorum suggests. Bennett concludes by stating that it is 
likely that: 
" The Roman army, like any other army, had units that could very 
in size and composition from place to place and from period to 
period. " (Bennett 1986 716). 
To obtain information on the actual organization of units rather than simply 
their overall strength, it becomes necessary to study the internal arrangement 
of forts, and particularly the accommodation in forts for both soldiers and 
horses. The number of barrack and stable blocks for each type of auxiliary 
unit at full theoretical strength has been calculated by Holder (1980 10). 
Studies on this basis have been carried out by Richmond (1955), Hassall 
(1983) and Davison (1989), and the latter states that one of the principal 
reasons for his study of Roman barrack blocks was the identification of 
garrisons through differences between barracks of the various auxiliary units 
and legionaries (1989 252). 
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Very few excavated forts conform to Richmond's 'type sites'. As Davison 
Points out: 
"A small number of forts may come into this category: but the 
great disparity in the evidence presented tends to call into 
question the concept of the type-sites. " (198955) 
For those sites which do not appear to be 'type sites', suggestions are often 
made for the type of garrison the fort may have held, from the number and 
type of barrack blocks, and the number of stables when these can be 
27 identified . 
Strageath is such a site and an attempt has been made to identify the garrisons 
of the three periods of occupation (Frere & Wilkes 1989 117-138). The 
identifications appear to be based primarily on the dimensions of barrack 
blocks and number of contubernia, and it has been suggested that the Flavian 
and Antonine II forts contained parts of more than one unit whilst some of the 
centuries may have been under strength 28 . Although there were variations 
in the barrack construction which were attributed to two different cohortes 
equitatae, the variations were not enormous and other suggestions could be 
29 
made as to the identity of the garrison . It does seem quite likely that 
detachments from a number of units may have been brigaded together. 
However, unless contemporary epigraphic or papyrological evidence can 
indicate the type or strength of a fort's garrison, attempts to identify the 
27 On the difficulties in identification of stables, see Johnson 1983 176-182. 
'8 The Flavian period garrison is suggested at a cohors equitata minus one of 
its centuries and two of its turmae; four turmae and three centuries of a 
second cohors equitat ;a legionary century. The Antonine II fort as one 
cohors equitata at almost full strength; part of a second cohors equitata, with 
four turmae and two centuries, one of these centuries being under strength 
by two contubernia. 
'9Eg: for the Flavian period a single overstrength cohors equitat . Strageath 
is a good example of the great difficulties in attempting garrison identification 
from archaeological evidence alone. 
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garrison from the number and type of internal buildings in a fort can in almost 
al I cases be little more than guesswork. 
Theoretically, if one accepts the figures in the de munitionibus castrorum as 
accurate in practice and assuming the army had a fixed and rigid 
organizational structure, the number of contubernia in a barrack block should 
provide some idea of the approximate size of turmae and centuries. These are 
usually the indicators used by those attempting to identify garrison types - 
Davison's thorough analysis of barrack blocks in both forts and fortresses 
shows that the number of contubernia, in these blocks can vary enormously 
(1989 figs. 9-9.7), even within forts where the entire garrison is known to 
have been solely infantry or cavalry. He suggests that: 
"The different numbers of contubernia, may be significant, but 
are not necessarily so. " (1989 187). 
Despite this, Davison's work has provided some information on the probable 
size of the century in the quingenary cohors equita . It was stated above 
that the size of the century in this unit was disputed (p. 45). However, 
Davison has shown that where it is possible to identify the type of garrison of 
particular forts, the barracks of quingenary cohortes equitatae are not in 
general smaller than the barracks of other infantry units, suggesting that the 
centuries in this unit were not smaller than in other auxiliary units (1989 253). 
However, analysis of Davison's figures illustrating contubernium areas (1989 
fig. 10-10.7) shows the great variation in the size of contubernia. at both forts 
and fortresses throughout the period being studied. With such a wide 
variation in the size and number of contubernia per barrack block, it is 
possible that the number of men per contubernia, and indeed the number of 
contubernia per century, may have varied between different units and legions 
at different times. The study of the size and divisions of barrack blocks may 
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therefore provide very little information on the size and organization of 
centuries and turmae - 
Similar analysis has been made of the layout and barrack blocks of legionary 
fortresses. Thus, Inchtuthil appears to illustrate perfectly the size and 
organization of the legion described in the de, munitionibus castrorum, and it 
is partly for this reason that Frere prefers a 1st century date for the work. 
The fortress at Inchtuthil has nine groups of barrack blocks, each with six 
centuries, and a further series of barrack blocks with five courtyard houses 
which has been identified as the accommodation for a milliary first cohort with 
the five centurions mentioned by Vegetius (11 6). Inchtuthil may be unique 
in having this provision for a double first cohort and various attempts have 
been mde to explain the need for extra accommodation, such as that for 
r- 
soldiers with clerical and technical duties, and for veteran soldiers, the 
former rejected by Breeze (1969), the latter by Frere (1980). However, 
Inchtuthil. contains only one phase of occupation, with none of the rebuilding 
that most other legionary fortresses went through, and it is one of the most 
fully excavated fortresses. 
Attempts have been made to illustrate the milliary first cohort in the 
archaeological evidence of other legionary fortresses, and to show the barrack 
groupings of the different cohorts. A number of fortresses have sufficient 
space to one side of the principia to house a miHiary first cohort, but only 
barrack accommodation for the six centuries of a quingenary cohort remain, 
eg: Chester, Caerleon, Neuss, Nijmegen, amongst others (Petrikovits 1975 38; 
Frere 1980; Davison 1989). It has been suggested that at some point the first 
cohort was milliary, but was then reduced to quingenary size, and it is this 
reduced size first cohort that is reflected in the remains of barrack blocks at 
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most legionary fortresses (eg: Davison 1989 57). This Ireform'of doubling the 
first cohort is usually dated to the Flavian period to tie in with the evidence 
30 from Inchtuthil and elsewhere . 
However there is no evidence to suggest that all legions had milliary first 
cohorts at any one time. Assuming this cohort was not double because it 
contained the legion's skilled workers or veterans (see above p. 54), first 
cohorts may simply have been doubled in provinces where legions were more 
likely to have been on campaign, such as Britain in the Flavian period. It may 
have been a convenient way of increasing the legionary strength. As stated 
above, Vegetius mentions that other cohorts can be made milliary to increase 
the strength of the legion (11 6). This thinking may have been behind the 
original decision to increase the size of the first cohort, and such an increase 
would presumably only have been necessary if a legion was likely to see 
action. 
Neuss 
Groupings of cohorts, including a quingenary or milliary first cohort, are 
clearly definable at some fortresses such as Inchtuthil and Caerleon, though 
at others they are more difficult or even impossible to define. Neuss 
illustrates these problems well. The legion occupying this fortress in the two 
stone periods appears to have been accompanied by auxiliaries. Auxiliary 
units attested at Neuss are the Ala Parthorum (Alf6ld-b 54), Ala Afrorum 
(Alfbldý 20), a Cohors Lusitanorum (Alf6ldý 140) and the Ala Picentiana (Tac 
"Excavated barracks of quingenary first cohorts usually belong to the stone 
constructions of fortresses and usually date to the later Flavian period 
onwards, eg: Chester, Caerleon. 
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Hist iv 62), which appears to have been brigaded with Legion XIV at Neuss in 
AD 7031. 
Auxiliary units were brigaded with legions or legionary vexillations at a 
number of forts, such as Exeter, and Jericho and Adida during the Jewish 
revolt (BJ IV 486), and some legions seem to have been very closely associated 
W1 particular auxiliary units. Tacitus mentions eight Batavian cohorts 
attached to Legion XIV (octo Batavorum cohortes, cruartae decimae legionis 
auxilia, tum discordia temporum a legione digressae, Hist. i 59). Because of 
the close association between legions and I their' auxiliary units, the brigading 
of auxiliaries with legions is perhaps not surprising, and made sense 
strategically as well, especially if cavalry were among the auxiliary units - The 
presence of auxiliaries within the fortress at Neuss provides an explanation 
for the excess number of barracks in both stone phases; there are, it is 
claimed, 80 'infantry' barracks and 28 'cavalry' barracks in Stone 1,62 
'infantry' and 27 'cavalry' in Stone 11.60/62 infantry barracks are required 
for a legion, depending on whether it had a quingenary or milliary first 
cohort, leaving 18/20 infantry barracks which are assigned to two milliary 
infantry cohorts by Koenen (1904). However, it is impossible to say whether 
the 20 infantry barracks in the praetentura are for auxiliaries or legionaries. 
Neuss does not have neatly arranged groups of barracks for each cohort as at 
Inchtuthil and as advocated in the de munitionibus castrorum (§ 2). The 
Praetentura barracks may have contained other troops such as a vexillation 
from another legion, or possibly two milliary legionary cohorts of the type 
mentioned by Vegetius. However, the suggestion that they are for auxiliary 
infantry is perhaps the more likely. Attempts have been made to assign 
" The reconstruction of the complete fortress layout for Neuss is not entirely 
certain, so there is an element of doubt when attempting to reconstruct the 
garrison - 
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barrack blocks to the different legionary cohorts at Neuss but it is impossible 
to do this with any certainty other than with the first cohort, usua. Uy to one 
side of the praetorium/principia (DMC § 3; Inchtuthil) - 
On the whole, legionary fortresses tend to be more regular in arrangement 
than auxiliary forts, and this might suggest that perhaps legions did not very 
as greatly in size and internal organization as auxiliary units. However, 
Davison's study has shown that barrack block and contubernium sizes vary as 
much in fortresses as in auxiliary forts, and it is therefore impossibly to 
gauge from archaeological evidence alone whether a legion was above or below 
its theoretical strength. 
Conclusions 
Most of the evidence relating to the size and organization of army units 
suggests that both could vary considerably. The evidence of Livy and 
Polybius shoms how greatly the strength of the Republican legion could be 
changed according to the contemporary military situation. This was either in 
response to a military emergency, or in preparation for a particular campaign. 
These variations in size appear to have had no e ffect on the organization of the 
legion. The information for the army of the Empire is much less detailm, but 
there is evidence to suggest that legion sizes could be increased during the 
Empire, or at least brought up to strength, either in reaction to an 
emergency, or in preparation for war 32 . Conversely, in areas of the Empire 
where there was no particular threat of warfare, units might remain under 
their theoretical strength. This would explain the relatively small discharge 
of veterans from Legion II Traiana, stationed in Egypt, in AD 157. 
32 Slaves were conscripted into the legions in AD 9 after the Varian disaster 
(Annals 1 31), and Legion VII Claudia may have been reinforced for Marcus 
Aurelius' Danubian campaigns (see above, note 13). 
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There is no reason why the same should not apply to auxiliary units as well as 
legions, and this would explain the overstrength centuries of Cohors 
Tungrorum at Vindolanda and the centuries and turmae of Cohors XX 
Palymrenorum at Dura. In theory at least, one would expect a certain degree 
of regularity amongst the auxiliary units, especially since their size and 
organiza . on structure appears to be based on that of the legion (see above 
p. 46). The de munitionibus castrorum assumes that all auxiliary units were 
of a standard size and type, but also provides the space allocations for the 
individual legionary, auxiliary infantryman and auxiliary cavalryman, possibly 
to enable a surveyor to calculate easily the space required for every unit, 
even those vastly overstrength or understrength, or with 'non-standard' 
organizationS33. 
Vegetius hints at flexibility in the strength of legionary cohorts (11 6), and 
it would be possible to apply the rules of the de munitionibus castrorum to 
units which did not conform to the standard types described in the treatise. 
BeU (1965 410) states that one of the great advantages of the manipular and 
cohort systems was its great flexibility, and perhaps this included flexibility 
in the size and organization of the units as well. 
33 For details of these space allocations, see chapter 4 on Marching Camps 
below. 
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: hinq Camps 
-oduction 
Roman marching camps, sometimes described as 'temporary camps, have been 
the subject of much discussion, particularly the attempt to identify camps and 
groups of camps with individual campaigns, especially those mentioned by the 
literary sources. As a result of this, the dating of camps has been considered 
by some to be of particular importance. According to Polybius, the Romans 
entrenched a camp each night (VI 41), and in the light of this statement, one 
might expect vast numbers of such camps to have been detected. Unfortu- 
nately whi-Ist large numbers of camps have been recorded in Wales, Northern 
England and Scotland, very few have been detected in other areas of the 
Empire. This deficiency may be related to geological and agricultural 
circumstances or a lack of aerial photography; it is only comparatively 
recently, for example, that the work of Agache in north eastern France (1966 
& 1970) has begun to reveal such camps in this area. 
The descriptions by Polybius (VI 27-32) and Josephus (BJ III 86ff) are well 
known, though Polybius deals almost exclusively with the internal arrange- 
ments of the camp and that of Josephus is somewhat sketchy. Onasander 
provides surprisingly little advice on the subject, and it is from the de 
munitionibus castrorum and Vegetius that most of our information comes. 
Although the de munitionibus castrorum concentrates on the size and 
assignment of space within the marching camp, at the end the author provides 
details of the best location for a temporary camp and the different types of 
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defence. Vegetius covers the subject in two sections (1 21-25; 111 8), 
frequently repeating his advice in the second section and elsewhere'. 
This chapter will consider the origins and development of the Roman marching 
camp, their locations and defence. This will be followed by a discussion of the 
internal arrangements of camps with particular reference to the space 
allocations advocated in the de munitionibus castrorum which has important 
implications concerning the size of armies occupying camps and series of 
camps. 
The Origins of Marching Camp 
Frontinus claims that Pyrrhus was the first to concentrate his entire army 
within the same fortifications in the field, and that after capturing his camp 
at Maleventum the Romans adopted his method of entrenchment (Strat. IV i 14). 
Livy agrees that Pyrrhus was the first to teach the art of castrametation (35 
14). Plutarch, on the other hand, describes Pyrrhus' surprise at the Roman 
disciphne and the arrangement of the Roman camp (Plut. Pyrrh. 16). These 
conflicting accounts illustrate the difficulty of establishing the origins of the 
Roman marching camp and its introduction. 
Polybius, who expresses great admiration for Roman military institutions in 
general, is particularly impressed by the organization and defence of the 
Roman camp (VI 26,42; XVIII 18), and contrasts the Greek and Roman 
methods of entrenching. 
The Greeks, when they choose, think above all of the security 
they can achieve by exploiting the natural strength of position, 
first because they grudge the labour involved in entrenching, 
and secondly because they think that man-made defence are 
'1 22 and 111 2, for example, both deal with suitable and unsuitable locations 
for camps. 
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inferior to those provided by the natural features of the site. 
And so as regards the plan of the camp as a whole they are 
compelled to adopt all kinds of shapes to conform to the lie of the 
ground. .. with the result that everyone is uncertain as to the details of the camp and his own position in it. The Romans, on 
the other hand, prefer to undergo the fatigue of digging and 
other defensive preparations for the sake of having a consistent 
and uniform plan for a camp which is familiar to everybody. 
(Polybius VI 42) 
The use of fortified encampments during sieges will be discussed below (see 
chapter 7 on Siege Warfare), and these are well documented from as early as 
the 9th century BC. The palace reliefs at from Nimrud illustrate Assyrian 
fortified camps; the representations are no doubt fairly stylized, but the 
camps are round, are fortified with turrets at regular intervals and appear to 
have a formalized internal arrangement with two roads intersecting at right 
angles in the centre. Thucydides mentions siege camps at Syracuse (Book 
VII), and other early examples of siege camps are discussed below (see 
chapter 7 on Siege Warfare). 
The Persian camp at Plataea, however, was fortified with a wooden palisade to 
protect the Persian army and to provide somewhere to retreat should the 
Persians be defeated (Herodotus IX 15)'. Plutarch mentions that Iphicrates 
in the 4th century BC fortified his camps with ditch and palisade even when 
entrenching in allied territory (Moralia 187.2), and Polybius criticizes the 
Messenians for not bothering to find a favourable site for their camp, and 
failing to protect it with a palisade or trench (V 20)'. 
2 Some of the defeated Persian forces took ref uge in this encampment and 
succeeded in keeping the Spartans out until Athenian reinforcements arrived 
(Herodotus IX 70). 
3 Arrian criticizes the Illyrian king Kleitos for a similar failure which the author 
describes as an act of carelessness (Anab -1 6) - 
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Xenophon's comments on encampments are particularly interesting. He states 
that it was a standard practice of the Assyrians to fortify their camp with a 
ditch (Cyropaedia 1113 26), and the statement implies that this may have been 
done on a nightly basis. Xenophon describes Cyrus' method of camping in 
detail. The king's tent was in the centre of the camp with various troops 
arranged in an organized fashion around it. 
Everything else was so organized that every one knew his own 
place in camp - both its size and its location... He himself 
(Cyrus) took up his position in the middle of the camp in the 
belief that this situation was the most secure. Then came his 
most trusty followers... and next to them, in a circle, he had his 
horsemen and charioteers... The hoplites and those armed with 
the large shields he arranged around all the rest like a wall. 
Xenophon Cyr. viii 3. 
These observations are likely to be more relevant to Xenophon's own day than 
6th century BC Persia, and he may perhaps have been influenced by 
contemporary practices or his own experiences in Persia. Despite this, the 
details of the caref ul arrangement of the camp are interesting and suggest that 
some logical method of camp organization was in use at this time, whether in 
Persia or Greece. Xenophon's contemporary Aeneas 'Tacticus' wrote a treatise 
on castrametation (Aen. Tact. xxi 2) which probably included advice on 
fortifications and internal arrangements as well as the disposition of guards 
and patrols etc. which he mentions. 
The existence of such treatises in the 4th century BC suggests that Frontinus' 
explanation for the origin of the Roman marching camp may be more likely than 
Plutarch's, though in the absence of any archaeological evidence of 4th 
century BC temporary fortifications this argument can only be conjecture; 
Aeneas' work on castrametation may simply have been theory and never 
actually put into practice. The evidence catalogued above, however, suggests 
that Garlan is correct in implying that castrametation was not simply a Roman 
development (1972 158), though the rationalization of camp organization may 
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have been taking place earlier than Garlan's proposal of the Hellenistic period. 
Keppie (1984 38) sees the possible influence of town planning on the lay-out 
of Roman camps and Josephus incidentally compares the Roman camp to a town 
mushrooming up (BJ 111 86 )4 . This would not confine the development of 
regular camps to the Roman period as there are plenty of planned Greek 
colonies (eg: Miletus, Priene), and although Polybius criticizes the Greek 
practice of camping on easily defendable hilltops and therefore being unable 
to organize their camps properly (see above p. 60), the examples of Priene, 
Knidos and Soluntum illustrate that a regular plan could be imposed even on 
a steep slope (Owens 1991 64-66). 
Although Livy mentions Roman fortified camps as early as 480 BC (11 47), as 
Keppie points out (1984 38) there is no securely dated evidence for Roman 
camps before the mid 2nd century BC, and the earliest of these do not have 
the regular rectangular or square fortifications of the later camps so common 
in Britain (see below p. 75). The camps at Renieblas may, indeed, illustrate 
the development of the temporary camp from the Greek defended hilltop to the 
standard rectangular form of the Roman period. The defencesof the earliest 
camps at Renieblas (I-III), dating to the mid 2nd century BC, follow closely 
the contours of the hill and so have irregular outlines. However the later 
camps (IV-V), which may date to the campaigns against Sertorius in the 80s 
B C, are fairly well surveyed rectangles, camp V enclosing the fairly steep S. W 
slope of La Gran Atalaya. Although Polybius' description of the Roman camp 
suggests a square or rectangular outline, this would not necessarily be the 
case on uneven terrain, and it is certainly not so at Renieblas. Although the 
"Vegetius also compares the marching camp to a fortified city (1 21). Others 
consider the influence of military architecture on towns, though more with 
reference to the forum/basilica complexes of North Western provinces (cf: 
Wheeler 1964 114). 
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absence of reliable data precludes any firm conclusions concerning the origins 
and introduction of the Roman marching camp, it seems likely that as with 
many other military procedures, the Romans adopted and adapted techniques 
which might be of use, for which Arrian praises them (Tact-33). 
site 
The comments of the treatise writers and the frequency with which historians 
mention the site of temporary camps indicates the great importance placed by 
the Romans on choosing a suitable place to camp. The ability to choose a 
campsite is one of the ubiquitous assets of the good generaI5 . Despite the 
obvious importance of the siting of temporary camps, modern studies tend to 
give little attention to the topiC6. 
According to the treatise writers, the temporary camp should be near to 
supplies of wood and grain (Polyb. VI 27; Veg. 1 22), and to a water supply 
(DMC § 57; Veg. 122), but it should not be on marshy ground or on land liable 
to flood (DMC § 57; Veg. II 2& 8). The site should be healthy, particularly 
if it is to be occupied for more than a few days (Onas. viii; Veg. 1 22; 111 2), 
and Vegetius advises against remaining too long in the same camp because the 
air and water will become polluted (111 2). The camp should be on a rise or 
plateau above the level of the plain (DMC § 56) and should not be overlooked 
by a higher place (DMC § 57; Veg. 122), or near to forests, gullies or valleys 
5An ability that is ascribed to Caesar (Cicero Pro Rab. 42), Vespasian (Hist. II 
5), Agricola (Acrric. 20) and Hadrian (SHA Hadrian X 6) among others. 
6 Hanson deals with the subject in a couple of sentences (1978 141) whilst 
neither Collingwood & Richmond (1969 chapter 2) nor Wilson (1974) mention the 
subject - 
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which might assist the enemy in a sudden attack (DMC § 57)7. The porta 
praetoria should always face towards the enemy (DMC § 56; Veg. 1 23), or 
down any slope (DMC § 56), or in the direction of the intended march (Veg I 
23). 
Appian sums up all this advice very neatly in his comparison of the camps of 
Brutus and Cassius with that of Antony before Philippi (BC IV 107): 
The former (Brutus & Cassius) were camped on high ground, the 
latter (Antony) on the plain; the former procured fuel from the 
mountains, the latter from the marsh; the former obtained water 
from a river, the latter from wells freshly dug; the former drew 
their supplies from Thasos, requiring carriage of only a few 
stades, while the latter was 350 stades from Amphipolis. Still it 
seems that Antony was compelled to do so as he did, for there was 
no other hill, and the rest of the plain, lying in a sort of hollow, 
was liable to flood at times. 
One imagines that this camp would come under the de munitionibus castrorum's 
category of I mother in law', but the passage indicates the main points of a good 
and a bad campsite. 
Although the treatises recommend camping near to supplies of wood, grain and 
water, it is the latter that appears to have had the most importance. Ramparts 
were occasionally constructed to secure the line between a camp and the 
nearest water supply (BC 1 73; B. Hisp. 13), and commanders seem to have 
made every attempt to camp near a water supply. Labienus harassed Caesar's 
army whilst on the march to force him to camp where there was no water 
(B. Afr. 69), and later in the same campaign Caesar was obliged to camp 
further from the enemy than he wanted to for lack of an adequate water supply 
(B. Afr. 79). On the other hand, Marius is supposed to have deliberately 
'Camps in such positions are termed novercae, 'step-mother' by Hyginus, 
though perhaps 'mother in law' would be a more appropriate translation. Such 
positions should be avoided if at all possible. 
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chosen a site for his camp some distance from a water supply to encourage his 
soldiers to fight (Plut. Mar. 18) - 
Clearly access to an adequate water supply was of great importance in 
choosing a camp site, perhaps of primary importance, overriding other factors 
such as proximity to the enemy (eg: B. Mr. 79). However, there were other 
important topographical features that had to be considered. The dangers of 
camping oo near land liable to flood are illustrated during Caesar's campaign 
in Spain when he camped between two rivers which then flooded and cut his 
army off for several days (BC 1 18), and also during the revolt of Civilis 
(Hist. V 24). Here the Romans appear to have had no choice but to camp on 
flat ground and when the Rhine flooded the camps were washed away. Rivers, 
however, could also be used to provide additional security for camps and to 
bring in supplies (BG 11 5). 
The treatise writers also warn against camping too near to forests, gullies etc. 
and Hanson (1978 141) considers the labour involved in forest clearing for the 
construction of temporary camps. Some generals attempted to get away 
without providing for this extra security, most notably Caesar. He was twice 
taken by surprise by the Gauls (BG 11128) and Germans (BG VI 37), because 
he was camping on the edge of a forest and the enemy were able to advance 
under cover. 
Historical sources frequently mention that a temporary camp was protected by 
the nature of the ground (eg: BG V 57; BC 1131; B. Hisp. 28; Hist. 1119), and 
this no doubt refers to the rise or plateau recommended by the treatises. 
When the topographical surroundings of a camp are mentioned by a writer, it 
is usually the case that it is situated on a rise (eg: BG 118; BG 111 19; BC III 
66 
37). Caesar mentions that one camp was on high ground at the top of a gentle 
slope a mile long (BG 111 19), so when the Gauls attacked it and charged up 
the hill, they were too exhausted to fight properly. Livy mentions one camp 
situated beneath a hill (44.3) which the treatises do not recommend, but the 
higher ground had been captured, and was presumably secured with a small 
garrison to ensure the safety of the camp below. 
The archaeological evidence for the most part illustrates very well the advice 
in the treatises on the siting of marching camps. Figure i below provides 
certain details of particular marching camps". Of the 51 marching camps for 
which adequate topographical data wp-rp- available, 41 are stationed within very 
easy reach of a river or other water supply, and nearly half are on rising 
ground beside a river or other water supply, as the treatises recommend. 
Thus an easily defendable site and good visibility are ensured as well as the 
water supply. Those camps without a water supply immediately available are 
generally not too distant from a supply (eg: Rey Cross, where the camp is 
fairly close to a steep sided river valley). Marching camps in Wales are 
usually situated on plateaux to ensure good visibility on all sides. Here, 
therefore, camps are further away from water supplies (eg: Y Pigwn, 
Ystradfellte). 
A number of camps are on less easily defendable ground, usually in river 
valleys, eg: Bromfield and Marcus, but good visibility is still possible, and 
with a few exceptions such as Ythan Wells, camps are not overlooked by higher 
ground. However, it is often the case that the defence of temporary camps are 
"Many of these camps were chosen in the first instance because the various 
archaeological reports provided details of dimensions of defences. The 
remainder were picked on the basis of sufficient information being provided 
in the archaeological reports for analysis. For bibliographical references for 
these sites, see below fig. i. 
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extended to maximize the defensive potential of the ground. As a result, 
camps are not always of a regular shape, though some slightly irregular plans 
have been put down to surveying errors rather than for the purpose of 
enclosing particular ground9. The irregular defence of the Republican camps 
at Renieblas have been discussed above (see above, p. 63), and although the 
camp at Raedykes is much more regular in plan, there is an irregular 
extension in the N. E corner. According to Crawford (1924 108), this was to 
enclose ground that would strengthen the camp defence. 
If it was not convenient for a camp to occupy high ground nearby, this might 
be partly enclosed by the camp as at Esgairperfedd, or fully enclosed within 
an annexe, eg: Little Kerse. Most camps, however, seem to have been sited 
to enclose any high ground or knolls within the immediate area, such as 
Ardoch III and Dolau. This is the case at Renieblas, and although here the 
camps were above rivers on two sides, additional precautions were felt 
necessary to secure the water supply. An annexe of Camp III enclosed a knoll 
overlooking the Aldehuela river to the south, and in addition covered a steep 
sided gully which might otherwise have enabled an enemy to approach unseen. 
Communications between camp IV and the river Merdancho to the west of the 
site were ensured by a bracchium, noted by Schulten (1929 144-5)'0. 
As stated above, there might be other factors which could influence the 
position of marching camps beside the importance of occupying a rise above a 
river. Camps could be sited to command river crossings and fords, valleys 
and mountain passes, eg: YstradfeUte and Pen-y-Gwyrd, commanding vaUeys; 
o)ep, r 
Rey Cross on the main line of march over the Pennines; Wooden the 
9Eg: Pennymuir C, PSA Newc 
4 
vu (1935-6) 107-12. 
"Probably the bracchia used by Caesar were similar (ý! Q 1 73; B. Hisp. 13). 
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confluence of two major rivers, and Annan Hill, Eskbank, Kintore and Wandel, 
beside important rivers, probably river crossings. In some cases a conflict 
might have arisen between occupying high ground for improved defence or to 
command a pass, and being close to a water supply. The literary and 
archaeological evidence suggests that this was not a common occurrence, for 
it seems that in such cases a compromise would be made. Additional defence 
might be provided to secure the water supply (eg: Renieblas camps III and IV, 
BC 173; B. Hisp. 13), or to enclose higher ground and protect against surprise 
attacks (eg: Renieblas camp III; Little Kerse). 
On the whole it is impossible to determine whether tree clearance took place if 
necessary during the construction of marching camps. This may have been 
the case at Ystradfellte, indicated from the results of pollen sampling (RCAHM 
Brecknock), but this is the only site for which such information is available. 
Finally, although a couple of the camps considered enclosed some marshy 
ground, this seems to have been generally avoided wherever possible" - 
However, marshy ground is generally avoided because, in keeping with the 
advice of the treatises, marching camps are usually situated on higher 
ground, usually hills or knolls, above rivers. 
Camp defences 
Polybius, Onasander and Josephus provide few details about camp defence, 
other than fairly general statements about the use of a rampart or palisade and 
ditch. It is the de munitionibus castrorum and Vegetius who describe the 
defence in detail, both writers indicating that these varied according to the 
potential danger and the type of soil. The de munitionibus castrorum suggests 
"Arosfa Careg, Esgairperfedd and Chew Green III all enclose marshy ground 
in one corner, though in each case this seems to be through lack of space. 
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five methods of protection for a camp; ditch, rampart, stakes, stockade and 
lines of armed men (DMC § 48). The last three are used if the soil is too 
friable for the construction of a regular rampart or ditch (DMC § 51-53). The 
author suggests that in a secure place, a single trench or a single row of 
armed guards was sufficient (DMC § 52) and this seems to be to maintain 
discipline as much as security. 
The ditch, according to the de munitionibus castrorum, should be 5ft wide and 
3ft deep, and either V-shaped or Punic, whilst the rampart of turf or rubble 
should be 8ft wide and 6ft high. Additional defencer were provided at the 
vulnerable gateways by the sanctum and titulum, a short stretch of rampart 
and ditch covering each entrance 60 ft in front of it, and by claviculae, 
12 
extensions of the rampart following an arc around part of the gateway . 
Vegetius lists the different dimensions of rampart and ditch in two sections (I 
24; 111 8) and these are the only camp defence he considers. The various 
dimensions are tabulated below, along with those of the de munitionibus 
castrorum and Josephus for comparative purposes. The ramparts were topped 
by a palisade of pointed stakes (1 24; 1118) or wooden caltrops (111 8) 13; the 
strong wooden stakes used presumably for either method were carried by the 
soldiers (1 24). Vegetius notes that the Persians, who copied the Roman 
camp, carried empty bags so a rampart of sand bags could be made if the camp 
was in a sandy area (111 10) and it seems quite likely that the Romans too 
would have carried empty bags to fill with sand and construct a rampart in 
desert conditions. FinaUy, Vegetius twice mentions that if the camp is being 
12 The interpretation of the description of the clavicula in the de munitionibus 
castrorum is disputed; see below pp. 76-78. 
"See above pp-60-64 for origins of marching camps, and below pp. 78-80 for 
palisade stakes - 
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pitched near the enemy, all the cavc-dry and part of the infantry should be 
drawn up in battle line to protect those entrenching (125; 1118), and includes 
a quotation from Virgil on the same matter' 
4- 
Table illustrating recommended dimensions of defences" . 
BJ III DMC Veg. i Veg. 
jil 
6 
Veg. 
iji 17 
Veg. 
ivl 11 
Ditch depth 6ft 3ft 7ft 9ft 3ft 
Ditch width 6ft 5ft 9ft 12ft 5ft 9-17ft 
Rampart 
eig t 
6ft 3ft 4ft 
Rampart width 8ft 
The practice of entrenching camp behind a protective screen of infantry and 
cavalry seems to have been a standard procedure for a Roman army entrench- 
ing in the presence of the enemy. The number of times Roman armies were 
attacked whilst entrenching illustrates the vulnerability of an army engaged 
in this labour (BG 11 19; BG 111 28; Appian BC V 110), and Tacitus explains 
why: 
Even entrenching camp was a perilous business in such close 
proximity to the enemy, for there was the threat that scattered 
parties of men engaged in digging would be thrown into disorder 
by a sudden sortie. 
Hist. 111 26. 
The standard practice seems to have been for the first two lines of the triplex 
acies to be drawn up for battle whilst the third line fortified the camp (BG I 
49; BC 1 41; B. Afr. 51). 
14 Veg. 1 19; the quotation is from Georgics 111 346-8. 
'5 For discussion of the archaeological evidence, see below p. 74 and graph, 
p. 75. 
16 For camp likely to be attacked. 
"For ditch dug in friable soil. 
"'Camp for long-term occupation (summer or winter). 
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Commanders who failed to entrench their armies at night were often criticized 
by ancient writers (Appian BC IV 130; Hist. IV 75), and the general criticisms 
of the Roman army in Africa before the arrival of Metellus included a comment 
that the camps were not fortified (Sallust. J . 45) Vegetius states that ! ýU-g 
learning to entrench a camp was one of the most important aspects of a 
recruit's training (Veg. I 21). Practice camps are well known in Britain, 
particularly in Wales, at Landidrodd Common and Tomen-y-Mur, and Hadrian's 
adlocutio also indicates that camp building was a fairly common military 
exercise (CIL VIII 2532/18042 = ILS 2487). However, since Davies (1968) has 
dealt comprehensively with the subject of practice camps, I do not intend to 
consider them here. 
The treatise writers suggest that the strength of marching camp defence 
depended on the proximity of the enemy, and whether the camp was in friendly 
or hostile territory, and there is a hint in the other literary sources that this 
may have been the case. Sallust mentions that when Metellus was bringing the 
demoralized African army up to scratch, camps were entrenched every night, 
and each one was fortified "with a rampart and trench as if the enemy were 
close at hand" (Jucr. 45 
)20 
. This statement could mean that defence were 
generally more substantial when entrenching near to the enemy, as Vegetius 
recommends, or that defence such as a rampart and ditch might not be 
necessary when camping in friendly territory or a secure place, as the de 
munitionibus castrorum suqcfests (DMC § 52). The latter seems to be the more 
likely explanation in the light of Appian's criticism of Antony for camping 
without palisade and ditch "as though he were camping alongside a friend " (B C 
19 Greek commanders were criticized for the same failing, see above p. 61. 
"iuxta ac si hostes adessat; the agmen quadratum was used under the same 
circumstances - see chapter 5 on The Order of March. 
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83). Although some generals like Iphicrates clearly played it safe (see 
above p. 61), it seems from this evidence that arn-des may not have entrenched 
a camp every night, if they were in friendly territory or a secure place. 
This could be one explanation for the absence of marching camps in some 
areas, particularly in southern and south western Britain where Legion II 
Augusta is known to have campaigned in the early years of the Roman 
occupation. St Joseph (1958 94) explains the absence of camps in these areas 
as the result of destruction through agriculture and building, and the failure 
of some of the soils in these areas to produce crop marks. However, it is 
possible that in the territory of pro-Roman or client kings, marching camps 
may have been considered unnecessary. This would not explain the absence 
of marching camps in other areas of southern Britain, but the possibility must 
not be dismissed that the camps in these areas may have had very slight 
fortifications or simply a palisade (DMC § 48) if there was not felt to be much 
of a threat from the enemy. Roman armies do seem to have camped with slight 
fortifications or none at all (see above) , and Tacitus states that one of 
Germanicus' camps in Germany had earthworks to front and rear, but only 
palisades on the sides (Annals 1 50). A palisaded line of defence would be 
unlikely to leave any archaeological trace. 
The three main forms of defence for a camp were the rampart and ditch, the 
additional protection of titulum or clavicula for the vulnerable gateways, and 
the palisade 
21 
. Historians generally provide few details about these defence 
with the exception of the palisade stakes, about which both Polybius and Livy 
include a long excursus (Polybius XVIII 18; Livy 33 5; see also p. 70 & pp. 78- 
2 'Because of the lack of accurate archaeological data concerning rampart 
dimensions, I do not intend to discuss this matter here. 
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80). Caesar only twice mentions the width of his camp defence (PG 11 5; jjC 
141), and at 18ft and 15ft these are much wider than most of the recommenda- 
tions tabled above. However, in both cases, Caesar may have expected an 
attack upon his fortifications, and this seems very likely in the latter case 
where his troops entrenched behind a protective screen because of the 
proximity of Afranius' army. 
With the archaeological evidence, of course, it is impossible to know the 
circumstances under which the camps were constructed, and the geological 
nature of the site could also have a considerable affect on the dimensions of 
trenches. At Carlops, Durno, Little Clyde, Malham and Rey Cross the ditches 
are not continuous or are much shallower than elsewhere because of solid rock 
near to the surface, whereas at Gogar Green the dimensions of the ditch vary 
because of the soil on which it stands. On the clay of the western side, the 
ditch is fairly small, whereas on the sandy north eastern side, the ditch is 
wider and deeper, because of the more friable nature of the soil. 
Although Richmond states that the ditches of semi-permanent camps were 
larger (Collingwood & Richmond 1969 14), in the light of the possibilities in 
variation mentioned above, it is not possible to identify a camp as semi- 
permanent solely on the size of the defence. Secure identification of such 
camps should, perhaps, be based on other features such as lines of rubbish 
pits and the presence of ballistaria as much as on the size of the defence. 
Almost all trenches of marching camps which have been examined are V- 
shaped, though there are a couple which are flat-bottomed, such as Finavon 
and Ardoch III, whilst that at Dunning is U-shaped. The use of the Punic 
ditch has never been recorded in the defence of a marching camp, and the only 
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two examples known are from the forts at Hod Hill and Cawthorn D 
(CoDingwood & Richmond 1969 p. 13). 
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The dimensions of marching camp trenches vary considerably, even bearing 
in mind the affect differing soil types might have. With a few exceptions, 
where ditches are particularly shallow, most ditches are 0.8-1.5 metres deep, 
around the 3ft recommended by the de munitionibus castrorum, or deeper, but 
almost all the ditches are much wider than the 5ft recommended in this 
treatise. In a large number of the examples, the width of the trench is 
approximately twice its depth, giving a ratio of 2: 1 rather than the 1.6: 1 ratio 
suggested in the treatise 22 .A comparison of the archaeological evidence with 
the advice in the literary sources suggests that, with the exception of the de 
munitionibus castrorum and Vegetius' figures for a ditch in friable soil, the 
recommended dimensions of ditches are considerably larger than what Roman 
commanders obviously thought was safe. The only examples with defence 
"Because of erosion of the edges, many of these ditches were probably 
originally wider so these ratios of width to depth may originally have been 
closer to that recommended by the treatises. 
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anywhere near the sizes suggested by Josephus and Vegetius (i & ii) are 
Bernhardsthal and Kollnbrunn on the Danube and Liercourt-Erondelle in 
France. It may be the case that those on the Danube, which have been dated 
to the Marcommanic wars, were more likely to have come under attack than any 
camps in Britain at any time, but because of the tiny sample available for this 
area, it is impossible to argue this with any certainty. 
The de munitionibus castrorum is the only treatise to describe the additional 
gateway defence that could be used (DMC § 49-50; 55). The design of the 
titulum is straightforward, but the description of the clavicula is somewhat 
ambiguous; 
The clavicula is traced round a circle from a line on the inside of 
the rampart from a point in the middle of the gate, the compasses 
wide open to the edge of the gate; from this centre point you 
draw an arc in front of the road following the same line which is 
fixed at the centre of the gate. Then with the compasses in the 
same place you add the width of the rampart and draw another 
arc on the same line so that those going in are always unprotected 
and those coming in a straight line are kept out. DMC § 55 
Lenoir (1979 89-90) believes that the writer is referring to a double clavicula, 
with extensions of the rampart on the interior and exterior of the camp, and 
that these extensions were an arc of 90 degrees. He dismisses the recon- 
structions of Domaszewski (1887 Tafel 1 fig. 8) and Stolle (1912 fig p. 119), 
both of which are single internal claviculae. with a continuation of the trench 
along the rampart extension. According to the de munitionibus castrorum the 
clavicula, unlike the titulum, is an extension of the rampart only; the ditch is 
not extended around the arc as Domaszewski and Stolle suggest. 
Lenoir (1979 § 93) admits that his interpretation of the clavicula would not 
allow the additional defence of the titulum although the de munitionibus 
castrorum clearly refers to the use of both clavicula and titulum simultaneous- 
ly. The use of a single internal clavicula could, however, easily be used in 
76 
conjunction with a titulum, although this is very rare 2 '. The suggestions of 
Domaszewski and Stolle, therefore, would appear to be the most likely 
reconstructions of the gateway defence described in the de munitionibus 
castrorum, and not Lenoir's double clavicula. The only ambiguities in the 
paragraph would appear to be whether the clavicula is internal or external, 
and the length of the rampart extension traced around the circle mentioned by 
the de munitionibus castrorum. Since Lenoir suggests external clavicula and 
titulum could not be easily used simultaneously, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the treatise is referring to an internal clavicula and titulum. 
Analysis of the gateway types of the camps included in the survey shows that 
the single internal clavicula was the most frequently used type, and Lenoir's 
own study of gate types confirms this (1977 tab 1). External claviculae in 
marching camps are comparatively rare (eg: Troutbeck 3, Dalswinton 2), and 
double claviculae even more so (Troutbeck 2). Lenoir (1979 88) admits that 
Stolle's interpretation of the internal clavicula is very similar to the archae- 
ological traces of these gate types. Stolle no doubt used the archaeological 
evidence to try to explain the description in the de munitionibus castrorum, 
though as stated above, on the evidence of this treatise alone, the interpreta- 
tions of either Stolle or Domaszewski may be correct. 
As stated above, use of an internal clavicula and titulum is extremely rare and 
it might be considered slightly odd that this should be advocated by the 
treatise. However, there does seem to have been a certain amount of 
experimentation in the design of fort and camp gateways in the later 1st 
23 Lenoir cites only two examples - Glenwhelt Leazes and Chapel Rigg (1979 90- 
91), both of which may be practice camps (Wilson 1974 344). Chew Green IV 
also has both titulum and internal clavicula, though Richmond (1934 50-61) 
identified this as a semi-permanent camp. 
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century AD (eg: Newstead, Crawford, Stracathro type entrances), and since 
the de munitionibus castrorum claims to be propounding an innovative method 
of camp organization (§ 45), there seems no reason why the treatise should not 
24 
also suggest a new type of gateway defence . 
Additional defence could be provided by the use of wooden palisades , 
mentioned by the de munitionibus castrorum and Vegetius (see above p. 70). 
Polybius and Livy both describe the wooden stakes and their use, and 
although the latter's description, being based heavily on that of Polybius, is 
not the primary one, it is slightly clearer: 
The Romans cut light forked stakes with three or perhaps four 
branches, as a general rule, so that each soldier could comfort- 
ably carry several at once, with his arms hanging on his back; 
and they plant them so close together and interweave the boughs 
so completely that it is difficult to tell to which branch each trunk 
is joined or to which trunk each branch belongs. Moreover, the 
branches are so sharp as to leave, interlaced, little space for 
inserting the hand, so that there is nothing that can be grasped 
and pulled out, since the interwoven branches bind one another 
together; and, if one is by chance pulled out, it leaves a small 
gap and is easily replaced. 
Livy 33.5. 
Various sources mention soldiers carrying bundles of wooden stakes or valli 
(Livy Per. 57; Dio xvii 63; Cicero Tusc. 2 16); Scipio's soldiers at Numantia 
carried 7 valli each (Livy Per. 57), specificaUy for use in the entrenchment of 
camps (Cicero Tusc. 2 16). Caesar, on the other hand, mentions that materials 
for a camp stockade would have to be fetched from a considerable distance (BC 
142), and it seems possible that soldiers did not always carry materials for the 
palisade with them. 
24 The use of the internal clavicula and titulum together on a few practice camps 
(Llandidrod Common xvi, Chapel Rigg, Glenwhelt Leazes) may simply have 
been to give the troops practice with both types of defence since there seems 
little doubt that they were in use at the same time (St Joseph 1958 93; 1969 
114). 
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Bennett (1982) discusses the identification of the wooden stakes erroneously 
identified as pila muralia, and I shall not repeat his discussion of the various 
explanations here 25 . Bennett believes the stakes are for use in camp or 
fort 
defence, either as an additional gateway defence or as a type of palisade in the 
form of the wooden caltrops mentioned by Vegetius (1982 204; Veg. 1118). As 
a type of palisade, they could be used in addition to the rampart, or to defend 
a camp wit out rampart and ditch if, for example, the soil was too friable for 
these (DMC § 51-53), or a camp of the type Germanicus is reported to have 
used in Germany (Annals 1 50). 
How they were actually used is difficult to determine, though Bennett explains 
how they could easily be tied together in twos or threes to provide a spiked 
obstacle that any attacker would have to negotiate (1982 204). These may 
have been positioned in gateways, as Bennett suggests, or on ramparts as 
Vegetius describes (111 8). Bennett states that "three stakes of the Great 
Chesters type, lashed together at the central 'grip' would prove an effective 
temporary fence or picket, which could not easily be moved and yet would 
prove easy to erect and dismantle after use" (1982 204). 
Although Bennett rejects the suggestion that the stakes were palisade stakes 
(1982 203), 1 believe that they may well indeed be a prefabricated version of 
the valli or palisade stakes described by Polybius and Livy and mentioned by 
several other authors; such stakes would have been much easier to carry in 
bundles than the branches described by Polybius and Livy. Vegetius' 
caltrops (111 8) do form the palisade on top of the rampart, and these would 
create an affect similar to that of barbed wire, though Bennett is no doubt 
25 For a description of these objects and their identification as pila muralia, see 
chapter 7 on Siege Warfare. 
79 
correct to dismiss the use of these stakes as being simply thrust into the 
rampart and tied together (1982 203), as others have suggested (Webster 1985 
173; Junk@A ýmann 1986 fig. 18 p. 228; Le Bohec 1989 fig 19) and which are 
unlikely to have provided a very solid protection. 
ProPortions of camps 
The length to width ratio of a marching camp should be 3: 2 (DMC § 21; Veg. III 
The de munitionibus castrorum and Josephus both recommend a rectangu- 
lar shape for the camp (DMC § 21; Bj III 86ff), and that of Polybius is either 
square or rectangular, depending on the number of legions encamped 
(Polyb. VI 32). Vegetius, however, although advocating the 3: 2 length to 
width ratio mentioned above, states that the camp could be square, triangular 
or oval (1 23), or square, round, triangular or oblong, depending on the 
topography of the site (111 8). 
The influence of the topography of the site on the shape of marching camps 
has been discussed above (p. 68), and although irregularities in the shapes of 
marching camps are frequent, it is only in the earliest examples that the lines 
of defence are totally dictated by the topography and contours of the site (eg: 
Renieblas, see above p. 63). Vegetius gives the same advice when discussing 
the siting of towns (IV 1-2), and his statement about camp shapes may be 
influenced by the emphasis on defence that pervades his work. This may also 
explain the greater dimensions of ditches that he recommends. 
The majority of marching camps are for the most part fairly regular squares 
or rectangles. Wilson (1974 343) states that Flavian camps tend to be square 
in proportion, though he does point out that there were exceptions. The 
series of 120 acre camps dated by Hanson (1987 132-3) to the Agricolan 
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campaigns in Scotland are all roughly rectangular with a length to width ratio 
near the 3: 2 recommended by the treatises. Nine of the marching camps 
included in the tables below (fig. i) are square or almost square (length to 
width ratios of 1: 1 or 1: 1.1) , and the same number have a ratio of approxi- 
mately 3: 2. The largest group has a length to width ratio of 1.2: 1 (eg: 
Esgairperfedd and the two camps at Y Pigwn), and so appear to be slightly 
elongated squares. Interestingly, a number of legionary fortresses have 
approximately the same ratio (Caerleon, Neuss, Lambaesis), and Inchtuthil 
with its 1: 1 ratio appears to be unique for a legionary fortress. Although the 
sample used was relatively very small, it appears that the surveyors of many 
marching camps did not use the 3: 2 ratio suggested by the treatises. 
The de munitionibus castrorum and the size of camps 
The method of camp surveying and arrangement described by the de 
munitionibus castrorum is based upon the size of the army, so the overall size 
of the camp should be proportionate to the number of men and supplies, and 
Vegetius also suggests this should be the case (1 22 & 111 8). The principal 
importance of this relationship between size of army and encampment is the 
defence of the ramparts when necessary; a camp perimeter could not be 
properly defended in times of desperation, for example following a defeat in 
a pitched battle (BC 111 95, after Pharsalus; Hist. III 26-9, after the second 
battle of Cremona), if there were too few soldiers to hold the perimeter. 
Under normal circumstances it seems likely that the entrenched army would 
form up outside the camp if it came under enemy attack (BG 111 19). 
The sizes of marching camps, therefore, can provide some indications of the 
size of a particular army on campaign. However, historians have very 
differing opinions of the number of men per acre to be used in calculating the 
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strength of an army in this way. Hanson (1980 142-3) lists the different 
Suggestions and also points out some of the problems in this exercise, 
including the number of cavalry, which required a larger assignment of space , 
and the inclusion of 'dead space' within camps. He does not mention one other 
possibility which might affect the density of troops in a marching camp, and 
that is an attempt by the general to deceive the enemy about the size of his 
force (eg: Onasander x 16; Front. Strat. Ii 5), though one wonders whether 
such a ruse would be necessary in the fairly small scale warfare that seems to 
have taken place in Britain. The suggestions range from 240 men per acre 
(Roy's interpretation of Polybius) to 480 (Grillone's of the de munitionibus 
castrorum). On the basis of the presumed internal lay-out of Rey Cross, 
Richmond suggests 300 men per acre (Collingwood & Richmond 1969 11) whilst 
Hanson prefers 380 per acre, based on the space allocation for one legion in 
the de munitionibus castrorum. 
According to the de munitionibus castrorum, the legionaries, auxiliary cavalry 
and auxiliary infantry all received different space allocations within the camp 
(DMC § 1; 16; 25) which Maxwell (1981 48) seems to ignore completely when he 
suggests the legionaries and auxiliary infantry received the same allocation. 
It has been suggested that the camp at Rey Cross held one legion and a 
vexillation (Richmond & McIntyre 1934 50-61), and a legion with "an additional 
complement of auxiliaries, partly no doubt cavalry" (St Joseph 1983 24), 
whereas the 58 ha (143 acre) camp at Durno has been described as represent- 
ing "a concentration of almost overwhelming force" (St Joseph 1978 281) and 
has been identified by St Joseph as the possible site of Mons Graupius. 
Because the basic internal arrangements of camps can be traced by the 
extension of the interior roads from the gateways, it is possible to apply the 
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rules of the de munitionibus castrorum to them, and Rey Cross and Durno are 
suitable examples. For explanations of the figures, see figure ii below - 
Rey Cross (7.53 ha, 18.6 acres) 
Total forces: Infantry Cavalry 
1 legion with (v lst coh 5120 1 ala oD 720 
1 coh eq 800 240 
1 coh eq 480 120 
2 coh quing 960 
scouts 200 
Total: 7560 1080 8640 
Density of troops per acre = c. 
46016. 
Durno (58 ha, 143 acres) 
Totalforces: Infantry Cavalry 
2 legions with oD Ist coh 10240 
15 cohort vexillation 
with 2 aD 1st cohorts 7840 
1 ala. aD 720 
11 quingenary alae 5632 
1 coh eq -m 800 240 
17 quingenary coh eq 8160 2040 
5 milliary infantry cohorts 4000 
25 quing. infantry cohorts 12000 
marines 600 
scouts 200 
guards 160 
equites sinqulares 600 
pedites sinqulares. 300 
Total 44300 9232 53532 
Density of troops per acre = c. 374"' - 
261t should be noted that for ease of comparison Imperial measurements are 
used during discussion of density of troops in marching camps. 
27 Because of the irregularity of Durno, to facilitate the calculations, the size 
of each plot has been reduced to the largest possible square that could fit, 
thus plot 5, with dimensions of 600 x 800 x 840 x 880 ft has been reduced to a 
600 x 800 ft area. This has resulted in approximately 15 acres of unused 
ground within the camp; thus the density of troops could actually be much 
higher (up to c. 415 per acre). Hassall believes Durno may be Severan 
because of its huge size (pers. comm. ), but Durno is 1.5 times the size of the 
camp in the de munitionibus castrorum which contains the (probably 
theoretical) army of an imperial campaign, and so is large even by such 
standards - 
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According to these theoretical reconstructions, therefore, Rey Cross could 
have held one legion with a number of auxiliary units, including cavalry, 
perhaps not an unreasonable force for an army based on one legion on 
campaign - Durno, however, according to the same theories, could have held 
almost the entire known garrison of Britain of the Hadrianic period. Although 
by this time (AD 122) one legion plus accompanying auxiliaries had been 
withdrawn, it seems hard to believe that almost the entire army of one 
province would be concentrated on one campaign, leaving a bare handful of 
units to garrison the whole of the rest of the province, much of which was 
barely consolidated territory2ll. 
It is conceivable that the reconstruction of the camp defences at Durno is 
wrong, and that fragments of the defences of more than one camp have been 
reconstructed to form one giant camp of unrealistic size. However, the 
defences of camp III at Ardoch are fully known and at 48.6 ha, this is 1.3 
times the size of the de munitionibus castrorum camp. Like Durno, Ardoch III 
could have held a very large army (up to c. 50,000 assuming a density of c. 400 
per acre) and again this seems unlikely. 
Grillone's calculations of the density of troops per acre from the de 
munitionibus castrorum are correct; the hypothetical army in this treatise is 
c. 41,000 and the camp c. 86.3 acres, giving an exact figure of 475 men per 
acre. However, although the reconstruction of Rey Cross may be acceptable, 
that of Durno seems improbable, leading to the suggestion that the space 
2"The AD 122 diploma (CIL XVI 64 lists 1 milliary ala and 12 quingenary, 3 
milliary cohorts and 34 quingenary. My reconstruction of Durno has 1 milliary 
ala and 11 quingenary, 6 n-dBiary cohorts and 42 quingenary. 
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allowances advocated by the de munitionibus castrorum are unrea]iStiC29. In 
practice, it seems likely that troops camped much more spaciously than 
suggested in this treatise, even though this meant fewer men per length of 
30 
rampart should the camp have to be defended . 
Units camped in permanent fortifications received a much more generous 
allocation of space, eg: Inchtuthil c. 100 men per acre (240 per ha), Fendoch 
c. 200 per acre (530 per ha), Heidenheim 60 per acre (150 per ha 
)31 
. 
However, other than proving that cavalry required about twice as much space 
as infantry, as implied by the de munitionibus castrorum, this is of little use 
when attempting to establish the number of troops in a marching camp. 
Clearly there was some relationship between size of camp and size of army 
(Onasander x 16), but one can only guess at the density of troops per acre. 
Any figure from 300 to 350 per acre seems reasonable. What does seem likely 
is that the theory propounded by the de munitionibus castrorum concerning 
the density of troops in marching camps was not practised in the field. 
Conclusions 
There is a clear agreement between the treatises and the other evidence, both 
literary and archaeological, concerning the situation of camps. The treatises 
advise that camps should be situated on rising ground near to a water supply 
2'These allocations are as follows: legionary 5 ydS2 , auxiliary infantry 
4 ydS2, 
cavc-dry 10 ydS2. 
30 However, since in the examples given there would be 12.2 cm of rampart per 
man at Rey Cross and only 3.05 cm per man at Durno, this would not seem to 
be a serious problem. 
"Assuming that the presumed units at these forts & fortress are at full 
theoretical strength. These figures give 50 ydS2 per man at Inchtuthil, 22 
ydS2 at Fendoch and 1112 at Heidenheim. Thus the cavalry at Heidenheim 
do 
receive double the legionary allocation at Inchtuthil which 
is proportionate 
with the figures suggested in the de munitionibus castrorum. 
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and not overlooked by higher ground. The archaeological evidence and 
Statements in other literary sources prove that for the most part these factors 
were taken into consideration when a campsite was chosen . Although the 
treatises stress the importance of these precautions they are fairly obvious 
steps in locating the safest and most convenient campsite and would always 
have been considered essential. Indeed, choosing the location for to camp is 
32 one of the standard qualities of a 'good' general . It would seem likely that 
the treatises are simply repeating well known advice, not suggesting anything 
new. 
The literary sources and treatises suggest that the strength of a camp's 
defence depended on the proximity of the enemy and the likeJihood of an 
attack - The de munitionibus castrorum also mentions the difficulties of 
digging trenches in rocky ground and the evidence of camps such as Rey 
Cross, Durno and others (see above p. 74) indicates that trenches were only 
dug when the ground allowed it. Although the dimensions of ditches vary 
considerably and are frequently greater than those recommended in the de 
munitionibus castrorum, because the circumstances concerning the entrench- 
ment of each camp cannot be known, it is impossible to make any firm 
conclusions on this matter. There cannot be any reflection in the archaeologi- 
cal record of the variations in camp defence which might occur if the enemy 
were present or not. 
Problems in interpreting the description of the clavicula in the de munitionibus 
castrorum do not facilitate comparison of the theoretical and archaeological 
types. I believe this gate type is a single internal clavicula, the most common 
32 Caesar, Vespasian, Agricola and Hadrian are among those who chose camp 
sites personally, see above note 5. 
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type of clavicula found in temporary fortifications in Britain and other 
33 provinces . However, it is very rarely found in conjunction with a tituluM 
as the de munitionibus castrorum suggests. It may well be that, as with the 
method of camp arrangement, the treatise is suggesting a new type of 
gateway. The additional defence of caltrops mentioned by Vegetius may be 
represented by the wooden stakes genera. Uy known as pila muralia, but their 
use is disputed and can only be suggested. 
As far as camp size and organization is concerned, many forts and camps do 
agree with the 3: 2 length to width proportions suggested by the treatises. but 
the theory propounded in the de munitionibus castrorum concerning the 
encampment and particularly the density of troops has been shown to be 
unlikely. Although there was obviously some correlation, however rough, 
between size of camp and size of army, it is impossible to assess accurately the 
size of an army solely from its marching camp. A large proportion of the de 
munitionibus castrorum, therefore, may weU be military theory which was not 
practicable to apply. 
Finally, although the regularity and abundance of marching camps are 
uniquely Roman, it has been shown that the idea of entrenching a camp at 
night was by no means a Roman one and some form of internal organization was 
used by the Assyrians. It seems that perhaps Frontinus was correct when he 
stated that the Romans took the idea of the marching camp from Pyrrhus 
(Strat. IV i 14). 
"Examples of the internal clavicula. are found at Mauchamp in Gaul, Masada in 
Israel, and it is also illustrated on Trajan's Column (scene 127). 
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Notes to tables above 
Ardoch III: Ditch incompletely cut - flat-bottomed - 
Arosfa Careg: Absence of ditch does not seem to be because of the nature of 
the soil. 
Carlops: Ditch slighter on rocky ground towards hills. 
Chew Green IV: May be a semi-permanent labour camp which would explain the 
strong defences. 
Corbridge: May be a labour camp rather than a temporary camp. 
Dolau: May be a semi-permanent camp. 
Dullatur II: Later camp, reuses fortifications of earlier. 
Durno-Benachie: Ditch does not surround camp completely because of rocky 
outcrop. 
Esgairperfedd: Site seems to have been laid out specifically to incorporate a 
small rise in one corner for enhanced vision. Location may be to get maximum 
protection from the prevailing winds. 
Kollnbrunn: Dated to Marcommanic wars - 
Little Clyde: Ditch probably rock-cut in places. 
Malham: Ditch apparently lacking round parts of circuit, where bedrock is near 
the surface. 
Mancetter: Identification uncertain; may be a camp or a fort. 
Plank am Kamp: Dated to Marcommanic wars. 
Raedykes: Irregular outline to suit the terrain - 
Rey Cross: Rock close to surface probably explains the absence of ditch. 
Summerston: May be an Antonine Wall construction camp. 
Sunny Rigg: This has been described as a camp of the Vegetian type with no 
ditch (111 8) though it is sited between Hadrian's WaU and the Valium, and is 
more likely to be a construction camp than a marching one. 
Y Pigwn II: This camp is inside Y Pigwn I but there was no reuse of fortifica- 
tions. 
Ystradfellte: Pollen sampling suggests there may have been some tree clearance 
in the area during camp construction. 
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Little Clyde Brit 15 (1984) 275. 
Lochlands Brit 15 (1984) 275; Brit 18 (1987) 29,39.; Brit 20 (1989) 
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Fiqure ji: Application of the de munitionibus castrorum to Rey Cross and 
Durno 
Rev Cross 
Dimensions: goo X gooft34 = 18.6 acres (7.53 ha). 
Intervallum: 35 ft 
Plot 1: 150 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae. 
1 legionary cohort (DMC § 2) 
Plot 2: 200 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae per striqas. 
1 legionary cohort (DMC § 2) 
Plot 3: 200 x 120 ft, 6 hemistrigae per strigas. 
I legionary cohort (DMC § 2) 
Plot 4: 250 x 120 ft, 8 hemistrigae per strigas. 
1 legionary cohort (DMC § 1) + 200 scouts (DMC § 30) 
Plot 5: 150 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae. 
I legionary cohort (DMC § 2) 
Plot 6&7: 200 x 200 ft + 200 x 200 ft, 12 hemistrigae 200 ft long per scamnum - Each hemistriga could take 66 cavalrymen (200 -? - 3 ft per cavalryman DMC § 16), or 2 turmae of 30 - 32 men. 
Total of 24 turmae, or a mi1liary ala. 
20 ft remain which is assigned to the tribunes (DMC § 36 which suggests 60 
ft). 
Plot 8: 220 x 220 ft, 14 hen-dstrigae per strigas, each 10 ft shorter than 
recommended (DMC § 1). 
I legionary cohort (DMC § 2), the remaining 8 hemistrigae could provide space 
for one quingenary cohort camped fairly spaciously (DMC § 40). 
Plot 9: 150 x 250 ft, 10 hemistrigae per strigas. 
1 legionary cohort (DMC § 2), leaving 4 hemistrigae, see entry for plot 10. 
Plot 10: Praetorium. 400 x 250 ft. 
Praetorium 150 ft wide (DMC § 9), leaving 8 hemistrigae (4 x 2) on each side. 
Latera sinistra: 6 hemistrigae, together with the 4 remaining hemistrigae from 
plot 9- Quingenary part mounted cohort (DMC § 25-27). 
2 remaining hemistrigae could take up to 80 equites singulares (DMC § 7). 
Latera dextra: 6 hemistrigae for quingenary infantry cohort (DMC § 28); 2 for 
infirmary (DMC § 4). 
Plot 11: 200 x 250 ft, 12 hemistrigae per strigas. 
Milliary legionary first cohort (DMC § 3) occupying 10 hemistrigae; fabrica the 
remaining 2 (DMC § 4). 
Plot 12: 150 x 200 ft, 6 hemistrigae per scamnum. 
Legionary cohort. 
34 Camp dimensions are given in Imperial measurements to facilitate application 
of the rules of the DMC where all measurements are given in Roman feet (0.97 
of an English foot) . 
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Plot 13 & 14: Quaestorium. 350 x 200 ft. 
Quaestorium 90 ft wide (DMC § 18), leaving 8 hemistrigae 200 ft long per 
stricra . This is room for 1328 auxiliary infantry (DMC § 25). If the Quaestorium was 
slightly narrower, or the auxiliaries were squashed in a bit, there would be 
space for 1360 auxiliary infantry, or the infantry and cavalry of a milliary part 
mounted cohort (DMC § 26). 
Plot 15: 150 x 150 ft, 6 hemistrigae. 
1 legionary cohort. 
Total forceS35: Infantry Cavalry 
1 legion with co 1st coh 5120 
1 ala. co 720 
1 coh eq. 800 240 
1 coh eq. 480 120 
2 coh quing. 960 
scouts 200 
Total: 7560 1080 8640 
Density of troops per acre = c. 460. 
Durno 
Dimensions: c. 930 x 650m = c. 56 ha (143 acres). 
Intervallum: 60 ft. 
Plot 1 (praetentura. left side): 840 x 900ft. 
6 legionary cohorts arranged around the perimeter (DMC § 2). 
Remaining space of 720 x 720 
ft16 
occupied by: 
scamnum of legates & tribunes (140ft wide including road) 
4 quingenary infantry cohorts (120 ft wide) 
I quingenary ala (90 ft wide) 
1 milliary ala (150 ft wide) 
Road (20 ft wide) 
180 ft width remaining contains: 
1 legionary lst cohort 
2 quingenary infantry cohorts 
1 quingenary cohors equitata. 
200 scouts. 
Plot 2 (praetentura right side): 900 x 900ft. 
6 legionary cohorts arranged around the perimeter (DMC § 2). 
Remaining space of 780 x 720 ft, (24 hemistrigae) occupied by: 
scamnum of legates & tribunes (140 ft wide including road) 
3 quingenary infantry cohorts (90 ft wide) 
3 quingenary alae (270 ft wide) 
35 Calculations are done on the basis of the theoretical strength of units 
accepted in chapter 3: Legion 5120; Ala oo 720; quingenary ala 512; milliary 
cohort 800; quingenary cohort 480; milliary cohors equitata 800 infantry + 240 
cavalry; quingenary cohors equitat 480 infantry + 120 cavalry. 
36 This allows space for 24 hemistrigae, each 30ft wide (DMC 34-6). 
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Road (20 ft wide) 
180 ft width remaining contains: 
1 legionary 1st cohort 
1 quingenary infantry cohort 
I quingenary cohors equitat 
600 marines 
hospital, vet, fabrica. 
Praetorium 220 ft wide (DMC § 9) 
Plot 3 (left side of praetorium): 600 x 1000 ft. 
4 legionary cohorts along the perimeter (DMC § 2). 
Remaining space of 480 ft x 1000 ft occupied by: 
Praetorium (80 ft wide) 
Guard post (20 ft, DMC § 9) 
Comites (60 ft, DMC § 10) 
Road (25 ft) 
300 Equites Singulares (30 ft) 
1 quingenary ala (60 ft) 
Road (25 ft) 
180 ft width remaining contains: 
1 legionary Ist cohort 
4 quingenary cohortes equitatae. 
Plot 4 (right side of praetorium): 1200 x 1000 ft. 
4 legionary cohorts along the perimeter (DMC § 2). 
Remaining space of 1080 x 1000 ft occupied by: 
Praetorium (80 ft wide) 
Guard post (20 ft, DMC § 9) 
Comites (60 ft, DMC § 10) 
Road (20 ft) 
300 Equites Singulares (30 ft) 
Pedites Singulares (30 ft) 
2 quingenary infantry cohorts +1 milliary infantry cohort (60 ft) 
1 quingenary ala (90 ft) 
Road (20 ft) 
3 quingenary alae +3 quingenary infantry cohorts (270 ft) 
Road (20 ft) 
2 quingenary alae +2 quingenary infantry cohorts (180 ft) 
Road (20 ft) 
180 ft width remaining contains: 
1 legionary 1st cohort 
4 quingenary cohortes equitatae. 
Plot 5 (left side of retentura): 600 x 
5 legionary cohorts arranged around 
Quaestorium (80 ft wide) 
Remaining 400 ft occupied by: 
2 roads (40 ft) 
1 milliary cohors equitat 
3 quingenary cohortes equitatae 
1 milliary infantry cohort 
1 quingenary infantry cohort. 
800 ft. 
the perimeter (DMC § 2). 
Plot 6 (right side of retentura): 900 x 800 ft. 
6 cohorts arranged around the perimeter (DMC § 2). 
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Quaestorium (80 ft wide) 
Remaining 700 ft occupied by: 
3 roads (60 ft) 
4 quingenary cohortes equitatae 
3 milliary infantry cohorts 
6 quingenary infantry cohorts 
Totalforces: Infantry Cavalry 
2 legions with oD 1st coh 10240 
15 cohort vexillation 
with 2 <-D 1st cohorts 7840 
1 ala co 720 
11 quingenary alae 5632 
1 cohors ecruitat cD 800 240 
17 quingenary cohortes equitatae 8160 2040 
5 nýdlliary infantry cohorts 4000 
25 quing. infantry cohorts 12000 
marines 600 
scouts 200 
guards 160 
equites singulares 600 
pedites sinqulares 300 
Total 44300 9232 
Density of troops per acre = c. 370. 
=53532 
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Figure iji: Reconstruction of the de munitionibus castrorum camp 
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the de munitionibus castrorum 
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PLIEure v: Hypothetical reconstruction of Durno accordinq to the. rules of the de munitionibus ca - strorum 
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Chai)ter 5: The Order of March 
Introduction 
An army in marching formation was in a potentially very vulnerable situation 
and the dangers are outlined in the treatises and reflected in the advice they 
provide. Polybius includes a fairly detailed description of the Roman line of 
march during the mid Republic. Onasander's advice, as usual, is much more 
general than that of Vegetius and less detailed too, but between them they do 
provide information on the organization of the marching column during the 
Empire. 
Descriptions of an army's line of march rarely provide the historian with the 
opportunity to exercise his dramatic abilities, though there can be a certain 
impressiveness about a detailed description of an army on the march. 
Josephus' descriptions of the armies of Vespasian and Titus (BJ III 115ff, V 
39ff ) are quite striking, as is Tacitus' account of the march into Rome by 
Vitellius' troops in AD 69 (Hist. II 89). To Lucian (On the writing of History 
29 & 37) such descriptions are a minor but integral part of historical 
narrative, and he stresses the importance of accuracy. Sallust, Caesar, 
Josephus, Tacitus and Arrian all provide details of Roman marching formations 
and so comparison between these and the advice of the treatises is possible. 
This chapter will compare the advice given in the treatises with descriptions 
of marching columns in the historical sources and consider the types of 
marching formations used in different circumstances, the length and width of 
marching columns and their vulnerability to attack. Finally, I will consider 
the relationship between line of march and line of battle, and the deployment 
of an army from one to the other with particular reference to Arrian's ektaxis. 
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Sources 
Onasander and Vegetius point out the vulnerability of an army in marching 
order, and the latter suggests there are more dangers on the line of march 
than in the battle itself (1115), because of the possibility of ambushes which 
could easily throw the line into disorder. Soldiers should be familiar with 
marching in formation on the alert (Onas. vi) , and this is no doubt one reason 
that the Constitutiones of Augustus and Hadrian required both infantry and 
cavalry to carry out route-marches regularly. Tacitus notes a prohibition on 
falling out on the line of march and this may have been a military regulation 
(Annals XI 18)'. 
Polybius and Vegetius provide details about the position of the different 
troops on the line of march (Polybius VI 40-41; Veg. 1115), but Onasander is 
much less specific. As usual, he provides more general advice to guide the 
commander in making his own decisions, whereas Vegetius' recommendations 
are much firmer and allow little latitude for alterations. Onasander states that 
the marching line must be as compact as possible, more of a rectangular 
formation, not very much longer than its width (vi-vii) - Such an 
arrangement, he suggests, is much safer and easier to manage in an 
emergency; a long thin column may panic. A flank attack would easily pierce 
it, and if such a column wheeled into battle line to face the enemy, it would 
lack depth and therefore be too weak to resist. None of the treatise writers 
suggests how wide the marching column should be, but Onasander's comment 
on the line wheeling into battle line suggests that it would have to be fairly 
wide to provide a battle line of sufficient depth, and that there had to be some 
relationship between the order of march and line of battle. 
lyeterem ad morem reduxit, ne quis agmine decederet nec puqnam nisi iussus 
iniret. 
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Although Vegetius stresses the vulnerability of the line of march, he does not 
provide any detailed advice on minimizing the threat of an attack, other than 
obtaining detailed intelligence and sending scouts in advance (111 5). 
Onasander and Vegetius, however, both emphasise that the soldiers must be 
prepared for marching and fighting simultaneously (111 5) and Onasander 
additionally advises that if the line of march passes through confined or 
difficult country, part of the force should be sent ahead to occupy passes and 
high ground to prevent ambushes. 
Polybius' description (VI 40- 1) and the recommendations of Onasander (vi-vii) 
and Vegetius (111 5) for dispositions on the line of march are as foUows: 
Polybius 
T 
Right wing of Socii - 
Cavalry 
Infantry 
(Their baggage) 
Legion I 
(Their baggage) 
Legion II 
(Their baggage) 
(Baggageof 
following: ) 
Left wing of Socii - 
Infantry 
Cavalry 
Onasander 
T 
Cavalry to scout in 
advance. 
Compact rectangular 
formation. 
Baggage & medical 
equipment in centre of 
column. 
Bravest soldiers at 
frontorrear 
depending on area of 
greatest threat. 
Vegetius 
T 
Scouts 
Cavalry 
Legions 
Baggage train, flanked 
by infantry 
Light infantry 
Light cavalry 
Picked cavalry & light 
inf antry on f lank 
under greatest threat. 
Picked troops from 
Socii at front or rear 
depending on area of 
greatest threat. 
In times of extreme 
danger (if sufficient 
space, the infantry 
marches in parallel 
columns of hastati, 
principes and triaru. 
The formation of the marching column differs very little from the time of 
Polybius to the date of Vegetius' source. Scouts were sent ahead of the 
marching column, cavalry situated at both van and rear, as were light 
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infantry, the socii or auxiliaries - The baggage train, or trains, were placed 
in the Centre of the line or in a well protected position, and could be supplied 
with a flank guard. The legions marched in the centre of the column. Picked 
cavalry and infantry formed extra protection for the part of the column facing 
the greatest potential danger, whether it was the van, rear or flanks - In 
times of extreme danger, Polybius' army could march in parallel columns able 
to manoeuvre directly into battle line. This was no doubt Onasander's 
intention also, and Vegetius' recommended line could wheel directly into a 
standard battle line with legions in the centre and auxiliaries and cavalry on 
the wings (cf: battle dispositions in Chapter 6 on Pitched Battles). 
Varro, also mentions two types of marching formation (ap. Servius Aen. XII 
121), the quadratum with the baggage animals within the marching formation 
and the pilatum f-,, rvej ) which advances in a very compact 
formation without baggage for use in dangerous or unfavourable ground. The 
term agmen pilatum is recorded in a historical context only once. Varro does 
not appear to mention the basic type of formation, for use in secure territory 
(see above p. 106). The evidence of the treatises does suggest that there were 
a number of variants to the basic line of march for use under different tactical 
and topographical circumstances - 
Although none of these authors mentiozrthe role of engineers and surveyors 
in advance of the main column to clear obstacles from the route, the de 
munitionibus castrorum provides some information on this matter, and their 
'Servius is again the source for this reference, from the autobiography of 
M. Aemilius Scaurus, in agrum hostium veni pilatum exercitum duxi 
(ap. ServiusAen. X11121). The context indicates that the acrmen Pilatum was 
used under the same conditions as the aqmen quadratum. 
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importance is well illustrated by Josephus (Bi 111 141 )3 . The army of the de 
munitionibus castrorum included 1300 marines from the fleets at Misenum and 
Ravenna (§ 30). These all camped in the praetentura because they lead the 
army out of the camp and constructed roads (§ 24), presumably also clearing 
obstacles etC4. 
, 
Field Practices 
Historians often neglect to mention the presence of scouts at the front of the 
column. Arrian mentions them (ektaxis 1), but there seems little doubt that 
the terrain through which the army was to march would always be carefully 
scouted in advance. Analysis of the descriptions provided by the historians 
shows little variation in the 'standard' line of march between the campaigns of 
Metellus in 109 BC Quq. 46) and Arrian's proposed campaign against the Alans 
in AD 135. Fig. vi below illustrated descriptions of marching formations from 
Sallust to Arrian. 
It was usually the case that the legions marched in the centre of the column 
with the allies or auxiliaries at the front and rear. Cavalry again were 
normally positioned as the van and rearguards5. The general and his retinue, 
including bodyguard and Praetorian cohorts if the emperor or a member of the 
imperial family was on campaign, were positioned in the centre of the line, 
3 The difficult mountain route from Gabora to Jotapata was transformed into a 
broad highway suitable for heavy infantry and the Roman siege train in four 
days. 
4 The army included 200 scouts also encamped in the praetentura (§ 24), 
because they would lead the army out of the camp. The construction of roads 
in unconquered territory seems a bit unrealistic and perhaps the clearing of 
obstacles was their primary function. 
'This has important implications concerning the correlation between the line 
of march and line of battle which will be considered below. 
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before or between the legions'. The baggage train and siege equipment wi-, F- 
also usually placed in the centre of the column (eg: Annals XIII 40), or it 
could be split up. Thus in Josephus' two descriptions, the officers' baggage, 
siege equipment and main baggage train are in separate parts of the column, 
as are the siege and baggage trains of Arrian's line - Caesar often placed his 
baggage train towards the rear of his marching line, followed by his less 
experienced legions (eg: BG 1119; VIII 8). Reference is occasionally made to 
flank guards, usually consisting of cavalry (Arrian), though the cavalry 
could be interspersed with skirmishers (Jucf. 46), as recommended by Vegetius 
(111 5, though here they are only on the flank under greatest threat). The 
use of flank guards in this fashion may be linked with the proximity of the 
enemy (to be considered below )7 , or with an intention to deploy from normal 
marching formation to line of battle when there would normally be sufficient 
time to manoeuvre under the cover of cavalry (see below p. 11 5ff ). 
Polybius' account suggests that there were two different march formations, 
the second being employed in times of extreme danger, when there was the 
probability of an attack. It is under these circumstances that one would 
expect to see a close correlation between line of battle and line of march and 
indeed, Polybius' second formation is essentially the battle line; a simple left 
or right turn would convert the marching column immediately into battle line. 
'General and retinue placed before legionary force, BJ III 115ff; V 39ff; 
Arrian ektaxis 4; between the legions, Annals 11 16. 
7jt is interesting to note that the position of the various units in marching 
camps, as recommended by the de munitionibus castrorum, is quite similar to 
their position on the line of march; cavalry and light infantry are stationed at 
both ends of the camp and the general, his bodyguard and the baggage are 
again in the centre, the best protected area. Such an arrangement in camp 
would no doubt facilitate forming up the line of march when the army set out 
again - 
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Several of the historians also appear to indicate that there were two different 
types of marching formation. Sallust mentions that Metellus' column in Africa 
was advancing "just as if an enemy were close at hand" Quq. 46), and again, 
Marius marched in a square formation (acfmen quadratum) "exactly as if he 
were in sight of the enemy" (Juq. 100). Finally, Seneca refers to a simile used 
by a philosopher Sextius about an army marching in agmen qUadratum "ready 
for battle, in a place where the enemy might be expected to appear from any 
quarter" (EP. 59.7.3). Other authors mention that a particular marching 
formation was almost a line of battle (Hirtius, BG VIII 8), or that the line of 
march could wheel directly into line of battle (Tac. Annals 151; 1116). At one 
point, Caesar's legions were marching in triplex acies formation (PG IV 14), 
most likely the arrangement for times of extreme danger described by Polybius 
and adapted for use by a legion with cohorts. Livy is the only historian to use 
the term acfmen quadratum regularly, and on virtually every occasion the army 
using the formation was either approaching the enemy or marching under 
dangerous circumstances 8. The historian gives some indication of how tightly 
packed the aqmen quadratum could be when he states that the soldiers at a 
military show formed up in this fashion preparatory to forming the testudo 
(39.30). 
The literature therefore seems to substantiate Polybius' statement that two 
types of marching column did exist, one for advancing through friendly 
territory or when there was no likelihood of an enemy attack, the other for use 
when the probability of attack was high, or the army was marching into battle. 
"Livy uses the term 12 times; 2.6; 7.29; 10.14; 21.5; 21.32; 21.57; 31.37; 
35.3; 36.10; 39.30; 44.9; Fr 21.97. 
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Various historians have attempted to analyze the different types of marching 
formation, categorize them and provide explanations for their use under 
different circumstances. Kromayer and Veith saw three types of marching 
column in the late Republic (1928 420ff), the route march (Reisemarsch), the 
first system described by Polybius, the Caesarian battle march (iter 
expeditum) in which the main legionary force or 'gros' marched without 
baggage, followed by the baggage train and with one quarter of the legionary 
force as the rearguard, and the agmen qUadratum. Marquar / dt (1891 131-4) 
also saw three distinct types, again mentioning the particular formation 
employed by Caesar. Le Bohec, however, sees only two different types of 
marching column during the Empire and suggests that the use of these was 
dependent upon topographical circumstances (1989a 136-7 & fig 18). He 
suggests the narrow column without flank guards used by Caesar (BG 1119) 
and Titus (BJ V 39ff) was for use in confined terrain whereas the column with 
flank guards, either of infantry or cavalry, was for level, open terrain (eg: 
Germanicus, Annals 11 16; Arxian). 
Apart from the aspects of the 'standard' line of march outlined above (p. 108), 
which most marching columns seem to have included, it is possible to see 
variations between the formations used by different generals and in different 
campaigns. The evidence from the Bellum Gallicum suggests at least three 
different orders of march used by Caesar, the iter expeditum mentioned by 
Kromayer and Veith and Marquar,, dt, his "usual type of marching formation" 
which Belgic scouts described to the Nervii (BG 11 17) and which from 
Caesar's own comments suggests was his normal march when not expecting an 
attack. Finally there is the tri plex acies marching formation (RG IV 14) and 
the aqmen quadratum (Hirtius, BG VIII 8). Caesar himself does not use the 
term actmen qu dratum but the context in which the two terms are used are so 
ill 
similar that they probably refer to the same formation, for use when the army 
was expecting to engage immediately in a pitched battle. 
Within the two types of marching formation defined by Polybius, the first for 
use in secure territory, the second for insecure, there appear to be a number 
of variants, particularly with the second type. This would appear to include 
the agmen quadratum or triplex acies, Caesar's iter expeditum, the type 
described by Tacitus which could wheel directly into battle line, and Arrian's 
column with its flank guards. The major difference between this formation and 
the first type described by Polybius and used by Caesar (BG 11 17), 
Vespasian (BJ III 115ff) and Titus (BJ V 39ff), is that the former was more 
compact, sometimes with flank guards Quq. 46; Arrian) and could deploy 
directly into line of battle. 
Le Bohec's suggestion that the different marching formations were for use in 
different types of terrain seems unlikely. He presumably argues this simply 
on the grounds that a confined space would require the marching column to be 
much narrower. Obviously there had to be some relation between the width 
of the line of march and the kind of terrain the army was marching through, 
and the Anonymous Byzantine treatise on Strategy describes how the width of 
the column should be decreased and increased as confined areas are negotiated 
(gitrat. 18), but the column returned to its normal width afterwards. It seems 
more likely that the major difference between the two types of marching 
formation is, as Polybius states, tactical. 
The repetition by the historians that the second type of marching formation 
could be wheeled or formed up directly into line of battle suggests Polybius' 
description and the reasons for the differences are accurate. Analysis of the 
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circumstances of these lines of march prohibits the dismissal of these 
statements as simply a literary toPo - In most cases when the second 
formation was used and the historian comments on the column's ability to wheel 
directly into line of battle, the army does indeed form up a battle line and 
engage the enemy, or the commander expected an attack on the column or an 
engagement (juct-46; 100; BG IV 14; VIII 8; Annals 151; 164; 11 16; XIII 40; 
Arrian). 
Although, as stated above, there are variations in the formations of different 
generals and campaigns, particularly in the Caesarian campaigns in Gaul with 
apparently three different marching formations in use, in the case of the 
actual order of march there does appear to be a fairly close agreement between 
the information supplied by the treatises and the field practices. 
Attacks on the line of march 
The number of attacks carried out on marching columns illustrates the 
vulnerability of the formation'. It was not only the Romans who realized this 
weakness; her enemies were also aware of it, and during Caesar's Gallic 
campaigns, the Gauls frequently attacked him on the march". As mentioned 
above, Caesar records how the Nervii planned to attack the Roman army on the 
march after receiving intelligence from Belgic spies about the Romans' usual 
marching formation (BG 1117) but their attack failed because the Roman forces 
were approaching the enemy and, as stated above, Caesar employed a 
different marching order under such circumstances. 
9BG 111 20; 111 24; VII 67; E! C 1 64; 1 78-9; B. Afr. 6; 67-9; 75; B. Hisp. 10; 
Annals 11 5; BJ 11 540. 
'00ne of the other times of danger for a Roman army was when entrenching, 
another favourite time for the Gauls to attack (BG 11 19; 11128), illustrating 
that they were perfectly aware of the best time to attack a Roman army (see 
above, chapter 4 on Marching Camps). 
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Such attacks were usually made primarily with cavalry or with cavalry and 
light infantry together, and cavalry were usually used initially to defend the 
column". The deployment of cavalry on the flanks of the column as well as 
at the front and rear was therefore important to provide some protection for 
the marching infantry from surprise cavalry attacks. As with deployment into 
battle line, the cavalry could provide a protective screen for the infantry to 
prepare for an attack by the enemy infantry should the cavalry screen be 
driven off (eg: BG III 20ff). However, the cavalry could become an additional 
burden if they were defeated. Under such circumstances, the cavalry might 
be taken within the lines of the marching column for protection in the same way 
that the baggage was (BC 1 79). 
The Bellum Africum includes several descriptions of attacks on lines of march 
and these illustrate the effects of the concerted harrying of the line. 
Labienus attacked Caesar's march (B. Afr. 69-70), primarily from the rear, 
with the intention of forcing Caesar's army to make camp where there was no 
water. Caesar was forced to halt his march and drive off the initial attack 
before continuing, and with repeated attacks by Labienus, he had to march 
slowly with the legions at the rear. The column alternately marched, then 
halted to make a stand. Caesar made his intended camp, but it took him a lot 
longer than he had planned. The next time Labienus attacked, Caesar was 
prepared with 300 men from each legion in light marching order, who would not 
be fatigued from carrying heavy kits (B. Mr. 75). Together with the cavalry, 
these legionaries drove off Labienus' men. Caesar was certainly aware of the 
"Attacks with cavalry: BG 11120; VII 67; BC 164; 178; B. Afr. 6; with cavalry 
and light infantry: B- Mr. 67,75; cavalry defending the marching column: BG 
111 20; VII 67; B. Afr. 6; 67; cavalry together with light infantry, against a 
similar attack: B. Af r. 78. 
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importance of keeping his men on the alert as Onasander and Vegetius 
recommended (see above p. 106) - 
Dio's description of the Varian disaster and his accompanying comments clearly 
illustrate the dangers of not keeping in proper formation; Varus' army initially 
kept to no regular order and because the baggage and camp followers were 
mixed in with the units, the soldiers were unable to form up in sufficient 
numbers to resist the enemy attacks (Dio LVI 20-1). The following day the 
march order was better organized but because of the confined space through 
which the army was passing, it was very difficult for the cavalry and infantry 
to form up properly. The Romans suffered severe casualties on both days and 
were unable to retreat to safety. 
Length and width of marching columns 
Both the treatise writers and the historians suggest that a long narrow line of 
march was in particular danger in hostile terrain, and the advice in the 
treatises in general is for the use of a rectangular formation (eg: Onasander, 
see above p. 106). Since the treatises do not advise any particular width for 
a marching column, this may not have been of particular importance as long as 
the column was wide enough to prevent it being pierced by a flank attack. 
Unless the enemy was close at hand, in which case the army would probably 
be marching in the agmen quadratum or triplex acies formation, there would 
usually be sufficient time to manoeuvre into line of battle under the cover of 
the cavalry, as Arrian intended his army to do (ektaxis 11). Although there 
is a clear correlation between the width of Arrian's marching column and the 
depth of his intended battle line, this is not necessarily the case with 
Vespasian's line, the only other example for which the actual column width is 
given. I shc-01 return to this matter shortly. 
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Onasander advises against an extended column for several reasons, including 
the concern that such a formation was more likely to induce panic and 
apprehension due to uncertainty (vi 5), and he gives an example of this: 
" For sometimes the leaders, after descending f rom mountains into 
treeless and level regions, observing those in the rear still 
descending, have thought the enemy were attacking, so that they 
have been on the point of marching against their own men as 
enemies, and some have even come to blows. " 
Such a misidentification could actually happen, as with Vitellius' army in AD 
68 (Hist. II 68). The dangers of a long line of march with a heavy baggage 
train are well illustrated in the historical literature; Caesar mentions that 
Cotta's retreating column was too long for it to be properly controlled (BG V 
and Tacitus remarks that a column with a long baggage train was easy to 
ambush and difficult to defend (Annals 11 5). 
Although analysis of actual lines of march and their length is difficult because 
of the few detailed accounts in the histories, Gichon has attempted to do this 
with Vespasian's advance into Judaea (1986 303-8), and he suggests the Roman 
army would have formed a marching column 28-30 km long. If this were the 
case, the army would have been extremely vulnerable to attack, especially in 
the absence of flank guards and with the possibility of attacks by the Jews in 
the mountainous territory. Gichon admits that with a column this long, "the 
head of the troops entered camp for their overnight rest before the last of the 
troops were able to leave the site of the previous overnight stay" (1986 307). 
This seems extremely long for an army with a core of only three legions despite 
the large number of auxiliary units and the siege train. 
Gichon has used Josephus' catalogue of the Roman forces as the basis for his 
calculations (BJ 111 65-69) and, like Josephus, gives the full theoretical 
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figures for every unit involved 
12 
- Thus, in his calculations the legions are 
call 6000 strong, milhary auxiliary units 1000 and quingenary 500, and cohortes 
equitatae at 500 infantry plus 120 cavalry. As I have argued elsewhere, these 
are highly unlikely to be the theoretical strengths of the units anyway (see 
Chapter 3, on The Organization of Units), and although the units may have 
been brought up to strength for the war, Vespasian's army is unlikely to have 
been quite so numerous. Gichon also has the advance guard marching in 
formation three cavalry or four infantry abreast, so the van is 7.2 km long, 
but many of the units in the van would probably have fanned out in advance 
of the main column carrying out scouting duties. 
There is no doubt that Vespasian's line of march would have been of 
considerable length, particularly with the siege equipment, but 28 km does 
seem excessive. The importance of a shorter column is illustrated when 
Caesar's legions were attacked when entrenching by the Nervii (BG 11 19), 
and the two legions at the rear of the column behind the baggage train were 
on the scene fairly quickly (BG 11 26). When his column was attacked on the 
march to Alesia, Caesar seems to have been able to take charge of the situation 
fairly easily, moving troops to protect the line where it was threatened (KIG 
VII 67). Had the column been more than a few miles long, this would not have 
been very easy to accomplish. An army marching in agmen quadratum or 
triplex acies, formation would be more compact because of the parallel columns, 
although the use of these formations might be affected by the general 
topography, particularly in mountainous regions. An alternative, which would 
be useful in the latter circumstances, was to advance in separate columns as 
Agricola did in Scotland (Aqric. 25), and as possibly illustrated on Trajan's 
12 Gichon's calculations, like those of Josephus, are based on the theory that 
each century contained 100 men. 
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Column (scenes 63-4; 106-9) "- Since the campaigning season was limited to 
the best weather of the year it seems probable that the ground would have 
been sufficiently hard for this to be achieved. 
The only other description of a line of march which survives in sufficient 
detail for similar analysis is Arrian's ektaxis. Arrian provides a unique 
picture of a Roman marching column but even here there are problems in 
calculating its exact length. Although many of the units mentioned by Arrian 
can be firmly identified, with others it is not entirely certain whether the 
units were quingenary or milliary. In addition, some of the units were present 
only as vexillations". Since part of the Cappadocian army was in Judaea it 
is impossible to tell whether other units were at full strength or present only 
as vexillations. Finally, although Arrian mentions that the legions marched 
four abreast (ektaxis 5& 6), he does not provide any details on the width in 
numbers of the auxiliary infantry and cavalry5. The figures for the size of 
Arrian's column are therefore based on a number of assumptions and the 
16 length of the column an estimation . On the basis of these calculations, 
Arrian's marching column may have been about 4.7km long, short enough to 
be easily controllable by the general who was riding up and down the line 
13 The interpretation of scenes on Trajan's Column is at times highly 
problematic and by no means certain. Marching columns may have been 
divided to attack different objectives simultaneously (cf: Annals 151) rather 
than to prevent them being surrounded (cf: Aqric. 25) or making them less 
vulnerable to enemy attack. 
14 Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum sag. -o equitata had cavalry present but no 
infantry; Cohors IV Raetorum equitata, cavalry but no infantry; Cohors I 
Ituraeorum equitata, cavalry but no infantry; Cohors I Germanorum equitata 
co, cavalry but no infantry; Cohors I Lepidorum had only 200 men present; 
Legion XII was only present as a vexillation. 
'5Many of the difficulties listed here can be applied equally to Josephus' 
description of Vespasian's line of march. 
16 For these estimations and details of Arrian Is order of march see below fig. vii. 
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(9k--_taxis 10) and for the line to deploy quickly into battle line. If this is 
approximately correct for Arrian's army of c. 15,000 maximum, 28 km continues 
to appear excessive for an army of less than 60,000. 
The length and width of the marching column could vary considerably and was 
not necessarily dictated by the size of the army; topography, the possibility 
of enemy attack and deploying into line of battle would also have to be 
considered when the line of march was drawn up. The fact that no 
recommended width for marching columns is given by any of the treatises 
suggests that, as with the line of battle, the exact width in numbers of 
soldiers was of less importance than the compromise between length and width 
mentioned by Onasander (see above p. 105, and Chapter 6 on Pitched Battles) - 
Wheeler (1979 312) mentions a rule of thumb that width of column equals depth 
of battle line and on this basis Veith argued that the depth of the maniple and 
cohort was 6 from Josephus' description of Vespasian's line of march 
(Kromayer and Veith 1928 429). Wheeler takes this further on the evidence 
of Schulten's suggestion of legionary contubernia of 6 at Numantia to propose 
that the size of contubernium equals the width of the marching column, and 
presumably the depth of the battle line. Arrian's column of four abreast is 
therefore explained as half an Imperial contubernium of 8, split in this way 
because of the different weapons being used by the legionaries. Wheeler 
explains the change from 6 in the Flavian period to 8 under Arrian as the 
result of a tactical reform under Trajan or Hadrian. 
It is always assumed, however, that the contubernium of 8 was introduced at 
the same time as the cohortal system during the late Republic. The 
contubernia in the de munitionibus castrorum are 8 and although Wheeler 
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accepts Birley's date of the reign of Marcus Aurelius for this work (1979 312), 
I have explained elsewhere my preferences for a much earlier date, in the lst 
or early 2nd century AD, and therefore before any hypothetical Trajanic or 
Hadrianic reform (see Chapter 3 on The Organization of Units). I have argued 
above that the width of the marching column could be affected by other factors 
than simply the depth of the battle line, that the treatises do not recommend 
any particular column width or mention a numerical relationship between 
column width and depth of battle line. In addition, because it seems unlikely 
that Vespasian's army was expecting to engage in pitched battle, there need 
be no relationship whatsoever between the column width of 6 and the size of 
the contubernium and depth of battle line. It is only in the case of Arrian's 
column where the numbers are given that it is possible to suggest a direct 
relationship between width of column and depth of the legionaries in battle 
line. 
Line of march and line of battle 
The vulnerability of the line of march is mentioned by both Onasander and 
Vegetius (see above p. 105), but an army was equally vulnerable to surprise 
attack when forming up a line of battle". Deploying from line of march to 
line of battle was therefore a dangerous time for an army, so it was important 
that there was a close correlation between the two formations. This correlation 
is clearly visible in Polybius' description of the second type of marching 
formation. As suggested above (p. 110), this system could no doubt have been 
adapted for use by a cohort legion, to form the triplex acies marching 
formation mentioned by Caesar. This may actually have been an easier 
17 eg: Lucullus' attack on Mithridates' vast army when it was deploying, 
resulting in the total defeat of Mithridates (Plutarch Lucul. 26-8; Appian 
Mithr. 84-5; Frontinus Strat. II i 14). 
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manoeuvre than that described by Polybius because of the uniform armament 
of the legionaries 
Cavalry which acted as flank guards to the line of march would have an 
important role in protecting the infantry whilst they deployed into battle line. 
This cavalry screen could then quickly redeploy to the wings once the infantry 
was in place. Such a system could give the infantry time to deploy in relative 
safety as Arrian indicates (ektaxis 11). Analysis of the lines of march 
described in the historical sources and descriptions of battle lines illustrates 
the very close correlation between the two formations. A popular marching 
column in dangerous circumstances or when anticipating battle was cavalry at 
front and rear, legions in the centre and usually auxiliaries between the 
cavalry and legions (eg Annals 151; XIII 40). This could easily be converted 
into one of the 'standard' battle lines of the Republic and Empire, with legions 
in the centre flanked by auxiliaries and with the cavalry on the wings (see 
Chapter 6 on Pitched Battles). 
The details of manoeuvring from line of march to line of battle are not included 
in any of the histories and are conspicuously absent from the treatises, other 
than references to 'wheeling' into battle line or making a single turn to form 
the line (Jug. 46; Annals 151; 1116). Arrian's ektaxis is the only description 
of both march and battle line that survives in sufficient detail for analysis of 
this and although it is possible to indicate the position of various units in both 
'8Polybius states that if the hastati were in the right column and the attack 
came from the left, a left turn to form the battle line would leave the hastati 
in the rear; they would then have to wheel round the other lines or pass 
through them - Walbank 
(1957 723) suggests that the triarii may have occupied 
the middle column of this marching line, so if an attack came from the right the 
principes would also have to manoeuvre in front of the triarii. 
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line of march and line of battle, the j! a±juýs 
should redeploy. 
does not describe how the units 
As Arrian states, the cavalry formed a screen around the infantry to protect 
them during the dangerous period of redeployment. Since cavalry were 
stationed on all sides of the marching column, this would not have been 
particularly difficult. It seems likely that the column wheeled to the right to 
deploy with the units in the van taking up position on the right wing, those 
in the rear on the left wing and the legions in the centre of the column holding 
the centre, of the battle line. Thus the infantry of Cohors I Italica and Cohors 
I Lepidorum held the right and left wing respectively because of their 
positions in the marching column, and in the same way Legion XV held the 
right and Legion XII the left of the heavy infantry (see fig. viii below)'9. 
The infantry archers would withdraw from line of march to the rear of the 
intended battle line, allowing the legionaries to form up in their 8 ranks 
between the two hills on which the wings were anchored. A detachment of 100 
archers from one of these auxiliary units would then join the left wing on the 
rising ground. The equites lecfionis and sincfulares would likewise have 
withdrawn to the rear of the line, along with the picked infantry, to serve as 
Arrian's bodyguard and reinforcements. The only noticeable difficulties are 
the deployment of the artillery and provincial militias on the two hills, 
particularly with the latter since they were at the rear of the marching column 
but unfortunately there is no further explanation of this. It is possible that 
the Armenian archers and the cavalry on the right wing actually marched 
ahead of the legions to facilitate their deployment. Once the infantry were 
"'Legion XV may have held the right because that was traditionally the position 
of honour in any battle line (Veg. 111 16) and the whole legion was present 
whereas Legion XII was only represented by a vexillation. 
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fully deployed, the cavalry could then move to their assigned positions on the 
wings behind the auxiliary infantry and the mounted archers behind the main 
battle line. 
It is clear that Arrian's line of march was caref ully thought out with his 
intended battle line in mind, and this must have been an important 
consideration for any general when drawing up a line of march which might 
have to deploy into battle line. Thus when Germanicus advanced against the 
Cherusci (Annals 11 16) with the intention of sending his auxiliary infantry 
into battle first, they led the army so they could enter battle immediately 
without the need for elaborate redeployment. Under such circumstances, 
therefore, when an agmen quadratum or its Imperial equivalent was being used 
and an engagement was expected, the position of units in the intended battle 
line probably had more influence on the organization of the line of march than 
any other factor. 
The General 
Although the treatises do not deal with the position of the general on the line 
of march this, and his functions when the army was marching, can be inferred 
from the other literary evidence. As stated above (p. 108), the commander's 
retinue and bodyguard was usually situated in the centre of the marching 
column, but the commander himself generally rode up and down the column 
encouraging his men, as Sallust describes: 
"On the march, Metellus moved up and down the column to see 
that no one left the ranks, that the men kept close together 
round their standards, and that each soldier carried his food and 
arms. 11 Sallust Juq. 45 
"Marius.. went round every section of the army distributing 
praise and reprimands as they were deserved -" Sallust Juq. 100 
123 
Sulla (Sallust Jug. 96) and Agricola (Agric. 20) are also praised for the same 
actions, and Caesar seems to have done the same when his column came under 
attack, ordering in reinforcements when necessary (BG VII 67). According 
to Tacitus, Vespasian was accustomed to marching at the head of the column 
(Hist. 11 5), and Arrian intended to ride along the column to ensure the 
soldiers remained in formation (ektaxis 10). 
This is very much a literary topos and used by historians and biographers to 
illustrate the skiUs of a 'good' general, along with other qualities such as 
choosing the place for camp (Aqric. 20; Hist. 11 5), or sharing the hardships 
with the soldiers (Plut. Mar. 7: Hist. 115 )20 . The fact that this is a topos does 
not matter, nor that the literary sources deal with the topic in an almost 
formulaic manner. Riding along the marching column was obviously considered 
one of the attributes of a good commander whether it is mentioned in the 
treatises or not, just as riding around the lines was in a pitched battle (see 
Chapter 6 on Pitched Battles). Arrian was clearly aware of this, the 
importance of encouraging and reprimanding his soldiers on the march when 
necessary and, of particular importance, ensuring that they remained in 
ranks. 
Conclusions 
Comparison of the advice contained in the treatises with descriptions of the 
order of march in histories and other literary works shows the close 
correspondence between the two. The overaU organization of the marching 
column generally reflects the advice in the treatises, and the literary evidence 
20 The language used is also very similar; Tacitus on Agricola choosing 
campsites - loca castris ipse caper (Aqric. 20) ; on Vespasian - locum castris 
caper (Hist. 115). As Ogilvie and Richmond point out, Sallust on Sulla - in 
agmine ... multus adesse 
Quq. 96); Tacitus on Agricola multus in aqm1ne 
ýLq. 2 0) . (ARn 
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illustrates clearly the two different formations, for use in friendly territory 
or when the possibility of attack was very low, and the column for passing 
through hostile territory when an enemy attack was likely or the column was 
likely to have to form up a line of battle. 
Vegetius as usual is far more rigid in his advice than Onasander, 
recommending a single formation, of the second type. Onasander, typically, 
provides outline advice but leaves it to the general himself to add the details 
depending upon the individual situation. Despite their different approaches, 
they both have the same concerns, particularly the dangers of being attacked 
on the march, a very relevant concern considering the number of times 
marching columns did come under attack. 
There is no hint in the treatises of any importance being attached to the width 
in men of the marching column; the concern is with the column being wide 
enough to withstand a flank attack, and it is possible to see a correlation 
between width of column and depth of battle line only in Arrian's ektaxis. It 
is perhaps surprising that the treatises do not consider the deployment of the 
line of march into battle line, though this may be because of the close 
relationship between the two formations and the ease with which this 
redeployment could take place, a constant theme of the historical narratives 
(see above p. 110). Although there area few problems in attempting to trace 
the manoeuvres involved in turning Arrian's line of march to battle line, again 
the relationship between the two is clearly indicated. Thus when an army on 
the march was likely to face an attack or a pitched battle, the position of the 
troops in the battle line is likely to have had more influence on the order of 
march than any other factor. 
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The usual order of march of an army is therefore unlikely to undergo a major 
alteration unless there was a major change in the deployment of troops in the 
line of battle. On the whole, there was no such change from the n-dd Republic 
to the mid Empire, although the one variation introduced, the use of auxiliary 
infantry in front of the legions, is reflected in Germanicus' march against the 
Cherusci (Annals 11 16; see also be-low Chapter 6 on Pitched Battles). The 
military treatises reflect the usual field practices, though may also reflect the 
contents of established military regulations covering this subject and referred 
to by Tacitus (Annals XI 18). 
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Fig - vi: Orders of march from the literary sources 
B. Jug. 46 
Light armed auxiliaries 
picked slingers & 
archers 
Legions? 
Cavalry interspersed 
with skirmishers on 
flanks. 
B. Juq. 100 
T 
Light infantry 
Legions 
Light infantry 
Cavalry + slingers, & 
archers on flanks. 
Battle ensued. 
Battle ensued. 
BG 11 14 
T 
In Triplex Acies 
formation 
No battle 
Annals 1 64 
T 
Same formation as above. 
BG VIII 8 
T 
3 veteran legions 
Baggage train 
1 Legion 
Troops almost in line of 
battle. 
Intended to join battle 
Annals 11 16 
T 
Gallic + German Aux. 
Foot archers 
4 legions 
General +2 Praet. 
cohorts + picked cavalry 
4 legions 
Light armed auxiliaries 
Mounted archers 
Auxiliary cohorts 
Could wheel directly into 
line of battle. 
BG Il 19 
T 
6 Legions in light 
marching order 
Baggage 
2 New Legions 
Cavalry & slingers + 
archers may have been 
positioned to protect line 
from flank attack. 
Marching through hostile 
territory. 
Annals 1 51 
T 
Cavalry + Aux infantry 
Legion I 
Baggage train 
Legion XXI 
Legion V 
Legion XX as rearguard 
Socii 
Some auxiliaries 
The line of march could 
wheel directly into line of 
battle. 
Annals XIII 40 
T 
Cavalry 
Foot archers 
Legion III 
Baggage train 
Vex. Legion X 
Legion VI 
? Foot archers 
Cavalry 
Expecting ambush or 
battle 
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Bj III 115ff 
T 
Aux. infantry + archers 
Heavy infantry + cavalry 
10 men from each 
century with 
entrenching gear 
Pioneers to level route 
Officers' equipment with 
mounted escort 
General with foot + 
mounted escort 
Legionary cavalry 
Siege train 
Officers with escort 
Legions, marching 6 
abreast 
Baggage train 
Auxiliary cohorts 
Rearguard of light + 
heavy infantry + cavalry 
Probably not anticipating 
battle 
BJ V 39ff 
T 
ADied forces 
Syrian auxiliaries 
Pioneers + surveyors 
Officers' baggage train 
General's escort 
Legionary cavalry 
Officers 
Legions, marching 6 
abreast 
Baggage train 
Mercenaries 
Rearguard (also to keep 
watch on mercenaries) 
Probably not anticipating 
battle. 
Arrian 
T 
Scouts 
Aux. cavalry 
Aux. infantry, flanked 
by cavalry 
Equites sinqulares 
Legionary cavalry 
Siege train 
Officers of Legion XV 
Legion XV 
Officers of Legion XII 
Vex. Legion XII 
Provincial militias 
Aux. infantry 
Baggage train 
Aux. cavalry 
Battle to follow. 
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Fig_. vii: Hypothetical Reconstruction of Arrian's Line of March 
Because of the problems involved in the reconstruction of Arrian's line of march 
mentioned above (p. 118), the calculations below contain a number of estimations 
and assumptions: 
i) AM regular army units are assumed to be at full paper strength and the 
vexillation from Legion XII Fulminata 2000 strong. The strength of the provincial 
Militia is estimated, as are the sizes of the artillery train and baggage train. In 
the latter case, because the march appears to be one to the battle site and no 
camp is to be constructed prior to the battle, it is assumed that the bulk of the 
army's baggage remains in camp. 
ii) All infantry march in columns four abreast, the cavalry three abreast. 
iii) The distances of 0.75m per infantry rank and 2.7m for cavalry ranks adopted 
by Gichon has also been used here. 
UNIT 
Scouts 
Cavalry: 
Coh III Ulp. Petr. 
Ala II Ulp. Aurian. 
Coh IV Raet. 
Ala I Aug. Gernina 
Coh I Itur. eq. 
Coh III Aug. Cyr. 
Coh I Raet. eq. 
Coh I Germ. eq. 
Infantry: 
Coh I Ital. 
Coh III Aug - Cyr. Coh I Bosp. oD 
Coh I Fl. Numid. 
MAX NUMBER 
Not included in calculations 0 
sag. cc eq. 240 
512 
120 
Colon. 512 
120 
eq. 120 
120 
240 
1984 
480 
480 
800 
480 
2240 
LENGTH (metres) 
216 
460 
108 
460 
108 
108 
108 
216 
1784 
90 
90 
150 
90 
420 
Equites SinquIares 120 108 
Equites Leqionis 180 162 
Artillery ? 100 
Officers Legion XV ? 50 
Legion XV ApoEdnaris 4800 900 
Officers Legion XII ? 30 
Legion XII Fulminata 2000 375 
7100+ 1725 
Infantry: 
Provincial militia 800? 150 
Coh I Lepid. 200 38 
Impedimenta ? 100 
1280+ 340 
Cavalry: 
Ala I Ulp. Dac. 512 460 
12866 4677 
c. 3 miles 
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Figure viii: Suggested deployment of Arrian's line of maLrch to line of battle - 
f 
I 
--I 
Scouts 
Cob III Dip Petr. sag. w 
Ala II Dip Aurian 
Cob IV Raet. eq. 
Ala I Aug Geikina Colon. 
Cob I Itur. sag. eq. 
Cob III Aug Cyr. sag. eq. 
Cob I Raet. eq. 
Cob I Gera eq. 
Cob I Ital. F-----' 
Cob III Aug Cyr sag. eq. 
Cob I Bosp sag. w 
Cob I Fl Nuaid sag. eq. 
Cob I Bosp sag. & eq. 
Coh I Fl Nutid sag. eq. 
Equites Sinqulares 
Equites Leqionis 
Artillery 
Officers Legion XV 
1. A Legion XV Apollinaris 
Officers Legion XII 
Legion XII Fulainata 
Provincial itilitia 
Cob I Lepid 
Baggage 
Ala IV Gallorm 
Cob I Ital 
r--77= 
Ala I Dip Dac 
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Chapter 6: Pitched Battles 
Introduction 
The importance of the pitched battle in Roman warfare is indicated by the 
prominence the subject is given in the general military treatises, particularly 
Vegetius, and in the ancient historians. A pitched battle could turn the 
course of an entire war, for example Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and Pydna in 
168 BC and, although perhaps not as dramatic as many sieges, could offer the 
historian an opportunity to exercise his literary abilities'. Because the result 
of a pitched battle could be so decisive and could never be assured, however 
great the force and the advantage, Vegetius suggests that it should only be 
resorted to when other ways of destroying or dissipating the enemy had failed 
(111.9). Ambushes, terror tactics or a scorched earth policy are the 
strategies he suggests should be attempted before resorting to pitched battle 
(111.25). Even when the commanding general had decided to offer a pitched 
battle, there were still many points that had to be taken into consideration, 
according to the treatise writers. These included timing and the nature of the 
terrain, the strengths and weaknesses of both armies, the use of reserves by 
both sides and the possibility of attacks in the flank and rear, as well as how 
pursuit or flight would be carried out. 
This chapter will consider various aspects of pitched battles that are covered 
by the treatises; on choosing the time and place for battle, the disposition of 
units and use of different types of troops, and developments in these, 
pursuit, and the role of the general in battle. The chapter will consider in 
'Tacitus' account of the second battle of Cremona, for example, is very 
dramatic, including an encounter between father and son who were fighting 
on opposite sides, illustrating the horrors of civil war (Hist. III 25), and he 
puts across the excitement of and confusion of a night action (Hist -11122-3). 
131 
particular the use of auxiliaries as the main striking force and the suggested 
re-introduction of the Greek style phalanx in the second century AD. 
Appendix 2 comprises summaries of pitched battles fought during the late 
Republic and early Empire and which are referred to in the text - 
Sources 
Onasander and Vegetius both offer advice on the choice of a site and a time for 
battle, the methods of drawing up troops and their deployment in battle. 
Vegetius' detailed description of legionary organization in book II introduces 
the subject of his third book, which is concerned with the procedures of the 
army in the field. Book II of Frontinus' stratagems provides exempla relating 
to all aspects of fighting pitched battles, from choosing a time and place for 
battle to retreating after a defeat. The exempla given can be used to illustrate 
the advice given by Onasander in particular and if the stratagems were written 
as an appendix to his treatise, the section of that work on general actions may 
have been very similar in content to that in Onasander2 - Vegetius may have 
based much of book III on Frontinus' treatise, according to Schenk (1930 39- 
64). Certainly a lot of the advice given by Onasander and Vegetius is very 
similar and they agree on Many matters, though they do offer contradictory 
advice on others. 
Accounts of pitched battles in ancient historians can be confused and lacking 
in detail, making it difficult or impossible to analyze the military dispositions 
and tactics. In their accounts of the Boudiccan revolt, for example, both 
Tacitus and Dio spend far more time on the speeches given by the two leaders 
For discussion of this suggestion, see Chapter 2 on the Literary Evidence. 
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than the actual battle 3. Accounts of battles may include other rhetorical 
devices which may obscure the actual field practices in use, but despite these 
limitations, the histories can be very usef u. 1 in the study of Roman battles - In 
addition, Caesar's commentaries and the Caesarian corDus provide much detail 
on contemporary military practices, with eye witness accounts of small. and 
large scale pitched battles, and there is also Arrian's description of his battle 
plans for his campaign against the Alans. The )EK-uqý14; Ka-c' 'Alavwv is of 
enormous value even though the plans never seem to have been put into 
operation. The advice given by the treatises on particular subjects relating 
to pitched battles will be discussed below under each section. 
Preliminaries to Battle 
The treatises provide little advice on when a pitched battle should be offered 
or accepted. Onasander does not mention the subject at all, but Vegetius 
states that "good officers never engage in general actions unless induced by 
opportunity or obliged by necessity. " (111 25). He also suggests that other 
tactics should be employed before resorting to pitched battle. Frontinus may 
also have included in his treatise a section on choosing the time for battle since 
he provides several exempla on the subject in his stratagems (Strat. II i) . 
However, these stratagems are all connected with the timing of the battle, not 
with the question of whether battle should be offered or not. 
The exempla illustrate delaying troop deployment to get the advantage over an 
enemy worn out from hunger and exposure to the elements (eg: Strat. II i 1- 
2), attacks when the enemy is hampered by religious scruples (II i 16-17) and 
when the enemy is deploying his line of battle (II i 14). In many cases the use 
'Tacitus Annals XIV 35-6; Dio LXII 3-6; cf : the speeches before Mons 
Graupius, Agric. 30-34, and the battle itself, Acfric. 35-7. 
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of such a stratagem would give the Romans a psychological advantage as well 
as a tactical one. Caesar forced Ariovistus' army to fight even though the 
Germans were reluctant to do so for superstitious reasons (BG 1 50; Strat. II 
i 16). Lucullus, though greatly outnumbered, attacked Mithridates when the 
latter was still trying to deploy his huge army; the enemy line was in chaos 
and fled almost immediately 4. The use of such a stratagem might also help to 
limit the number of casualties which was of importance to any general, 
particularly when the battle was just one in a campaign. 
Neither Onasander nor Frontinus gives much consideration to the use of 
methods other than pitched battles to defeat an enemy or scare him off without 
an engagement5 - Delaying tactics are mentioned by Frontinus in connection 
with the waging of a defensive war (Strat. I iii 3), but Fabius' tactics were to 
give Rome a breathing space in 217 BC after the disaster of Trasimene so her 
armies could prepare for the campaigns and battles to come. Vegetius, 
however, does not appear to be advocating delaying tactics, but rather only 
engaging when conditions were perfect (or when a battle was unavoidable), 
or not engaging at all. Vegetius appears to differ with the earlier writers on 
this matter, and the implications of this will be considered below. 
Choice of Terrain 
Onasander and Vegetius both stress the importance of the terrain where a 
pitched battle is to be fought, as they believe victory is greatly dependent on 
the nature of the battlefield (Veg. 11114). The general must choose the type 
of terrain to suit the strengths and weaknesses of his troops and those of the 
4 The accounts of Lucullus' battle are very similar; Plutarch Lucul. 26-8; 
Appian Mithr. 84-5; Strat. II i 14. 
5 The latter seems to have been Arrian's intention (ektaxi ), and according to 
Dio (LXIX 15) he was successful. 
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enemy; if the strength is in the cavalry, according to Onasander, rough and 
constricted ground near hilly country should be chosen (XXXI), but Vegetius 
advises plains and open ground for cavalry and cut-up, hilly or woody areas 
if the infantry is stronger (111 13). Vegetius mentions the importance of 
holding high ground because of the advantage of throwing weapons and firing 
missiles with greater force, and it is difficult for troops climbing a hill to 
engage. He suggests using other natural advantages, such as arranging 
troops so that the sun, dust and wind are in the face of the enemy (111 14). 
Such is the importance of the field of battle that Onasander recommends 
avoiding battle until a suitable place is found (XXXI). Frontinus provides 
exempla, for some of the tactics mentioned above, particularly the use of high 
ground for throwing missiles and charging down from (Strat. II ii 2-4), and 
deploying so the enemy is forced to face the sun, dust and wind (II ii 7-8), 
though he also mentions using natural features to protect the flanks (II ii 6) 
and deploying in a confined area to embarrass a large army (II ii 1) - 
Since the nature of the terrain could affect the outcome of a battle, it was 
important whenever possible to choose a place to fight that was suitable for the 
forces a general had at his disposal. Obviously this was not always possible, 
for example if the army was attacked on the march, but even then it was 
possible to make use of any natural phenomena that could be of use, or 
construct field-works to provide some kind of protection. 
The accounts of pitched battles do not give much indication that the strengths 
and weaknesses of the two armies had a great deal of effect on the choice of 
the terrain. It is rather the deployment of the line of battle that is tailored to 
suit these strengths and weaknesses (see below). Indeed, Tacitus has 
Germanicus at Idistaviso remark that "open ground is not the only battle field 
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available to a Roman. Woods and forests are good too, if he acts sensibly. " 
(Annals 11 16). The contradiction between Onasander and Vegetius 
concerning the suitability of terrain for cavalry is odd because all the 
commentaries and literary sources agree with Vegetius that plains and open 
ground are best for cavalry. Indeed, Caesar mentions that in one battle the 
infantry would be entirely surrounded by cavalry because the engagement 
would take place on flat, open ground (BC 171), and the author of the Bellum 
Hispaniens F- mentions that conditions at Munda were entirely suitable for 
cavalry as the terrain was flat and the weather calm and sunny (B. Hisp. 29). 
Roman generals seem to have been far more concerned about holding high 
ground in a pitched battle or in preparation for one. The two main advantages 
are pointed out by Vegetius; the extra height increased the range and 
effectiveness of artiRery, and made it harder for the enemy to engage. It also 
meant that an attacking army would be able to charge down on the enemy with 
greater force, and it was better also for an army on the defensive. Frontinus 
reports that Pompey easily overcame Mithridates in one encounter because his 
army charged down onto Mithridates' troops (Strat. II ji 2). The advantage of 
high ground for the use of artillery and other missiles is mentioned frequently 
by bistorians and treatise writers alike (Veg. 111 14; Strat. II U 3; BG VIII. 14; 
B. Alex. 73-76; ektaxis 19). Both Caesar and Arrian proposed to site artillery 
on high ground to take advantage of the extra range that would be provided 
and, perhaps more importantly, to protect their flanks. In neither case did 
an engagement actually take place, in the former because the Bellovaci had 
more sense than to engage the Romans in such formidable circumstances. 
It was only an advantage to hold the high ground if the enemy attacked despite 
the difficulty of the terrain; during the civil wars in Spain Marcellus refused 
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to let his army engage that of Q. Cassius because the latter had drawn up his 
troops on high ground and Marcellus knew his troops would be seriously 
disadvantaged if they did attempt to storm the hill (B. Alex. 60). The 
difficulties of engaging a force by attacking uphill are illustrated in Tacitus' 
account of Mons Graupius (Aqric. 36). The trick of using ground to the 
advantage seems to have been to hold the position most favourable to the 
troops and most unfavourable to the enemy, and still get the enemy to engage. 
Where Roman heavy infantry did have problems was in marshy ground. Caesar 
was concerned about his battle line at Munda because it had to negotiate a 
marshy river in order to engage the Pompeian troops (B. Hisp. 29), and 
Germanicus' army in Germany had severe problems trying to fight the tribes 
in the marshlands of the lower Rhine (Annals 1 64). Tacitus states that the 
ground was too soft for their heavy armour and made it impossible to throw 
missiles, whereas the Cherusci, according to the historian, were long limbed, 
naturally suited to marsh dwelling, and had long spears suitable for fighting 
in this kind of terrain. 
None of the treatises mentions the use of "specialist" troops other than 
cavalry, and the Roman army does not appear to have had many. However, 
under similar circumstances in Britain, Aulus Plautius made use of German 
auxiliaries who could swim across rivers in full armour, at the battle of the 
"Medway" (Dio LX 20). These have been identified as Batavians (Hassall 1970 
131-6), and they were also the first troops to cross the Thames (Dio LX 20), 
as well as having important roles in the two attacks on Anglesey (Annals XIV 
29, Aqr-i . 18). Batavians also fought in a more conventional role at Mons 
Graupius (Agri . 36), and it would perhaps be incorrect to describe them as 
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"specialist" troops. More likely, any general would make use of any particular 
abilities his soldiers might possess - 
In addition to using the terrain to his advantage, the general was also advised 
to take advantage of natural phenomena. Vegetius recommended deploying so 
the enemy would get the sun, dust and wind in his face (111 14; see above 
p. 135). This, according to some sources, is what Hannibal did at Cannae, so 
the Romans got the dust blowing in their faces (Livy XXII 43; Strat. II ii 7), 
but Polybius says that both sides deployed so that neither was put at a 
disadvantage by the rising sun (Polybius 111 114). It is not always possible 
to tell whether a general took such factors into account when deploying his 
troops or not; Marius deployed his troops against the Cimbri and Teutones so 
that the Germans had to face the sun, dust and wind, but there may well have 
been other factors affecting the Roman and barbarian dispositions not 
mentioned by the sources (Strat. II ii 8; Plut. Mar. 26). Plutarch, for example, 
gives no indication that Marius arranged his line of battle with this intention. 
Certainly at the second battle of Cremona it seems to have been completely by 
accident that the Vitellians found themselves facing the rising moon, causing 
them to fire their artillery off target, and to be Muminated by the moonlight 
and provide excellent targets for the Flavian troops to caim at (Hist. 111.23 
One of the best ways to take advantage of the terrain was to use natural 
obstacles to prevent any chance of being outflanked. Such a preventative 
measure was particularly important as an army was at its most vulnerable when 
attacked on its flanks or at the rear, as happened to the Macedonian phalanx 
at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC (Polybius XVIII 26). The manoeuvrability of the 
6jt seems quite likely that the line of retreat would be a more important 
consideration than where the sun rose (see below p. 171). 
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Roman manipular and cohort systems aided both the execution of outflanking 
movements, as illustrated at Cynoscephalae, and their prevention; with the 
cohort system it was possible for the rear cohorts of the line of battle to turn 
and meet an enemy coming from behind which the phalangists were unable to 
do. When Caesar's troops were surrounded by Labienus' cavalry during the 
civil wars, Caesar extended his line and ordered every other cohort to turn 
about, thereby fighting the battle on two fronts (B. Afr. 12). However, 
despite the flexibility of the Roman system, it was obviously better to prevent 
such a possibility. Onasander advises using natural features to secure one 
wing (XXI), and one of Vegetius' seven battle arrangements also advises this 
(11120). Frontinus gives one example of the use of this stratagem (II ii 6) but 
many more may be found in the histories. 
Appian states that the Roman left wing at Magnesia was secured by a river (XI 
31ff), and at Pharsalus Pompey secured his right wing with a stream so he 
could concentrate his cavalry and light infantry on the left wing. Caesar was 
thereby forced to make alterations to his own line of battle to counter his 
opponent's strong left wing (BC 11188-9 )7 . Germanicus at Idistaviso (Annals 
11 16) and Cerialis against Civffis (Hist. IV 16) fought pitched battles close to 
the rivers Weser and Rhine respectively and may well have used them to 
secure one wing. 
This strategy could be taken further and natural features could be used to 
anchor both wings as Arrian intended to do for his engagement with the Alani 
7 The alteration comprised ordering one cohort from each legion from his third 
line and positioning them on his right wing to oppose the extra forces on 
Pompey's left wing (BC 111.89), again illustrating the flexibility of the cohort 
system. 
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(Ervalic 12)'. Suetonius Paulinus, when faced with the huge army of 
Boudicca, positioned his line of battle in a steep sided valley to secure his 
wings, and with a wood at his rear to prevent outflanking movements, or an 
attack from the rear (Annals XIV 34). 
Fieldworks 
When natural obstacles were not available, an alternative was to dig 
entrenchments to protect the flanks, a practice that is not mentioned by any 
of the military treatise writers. Nevertheless, there are several examples of 
this, mainly from the late Republic. Caesar had used fortifications to protect 
his flanks from cavalry when he was attacking the town of Uzitta (B. Afr. 51), 
and although this was more in preparation for storming the town than fighting 
a pitched battle, the purpose was essentially the same - He later used the same 
fortifications to secure the right wing of his battle line (B. Afr. 60). More 
details are provided about the field works dug by Pharnaces to protect his 
flanks in battle against Domitius (B. Alex. 37). He dug two straight trenches 
4ft deep and fairly close together to the point beyond which he had decided 
not to advance his battle line, then drew up the infantry within the trenches 
and his cavalry outside. Because of unfavourable ground at Munda, Caesar 
began to restrict the operational area (locum definire coepi ). This may have 
involved digging trenches similar to those mentioned above. Caesar's men 
complained that this would hamper their chance of deciding the conflict, but 
the account does not mention whether the operations were completed 
(B. Hisp. 30). 
"Such a strategy, however, would almost certainly involve fighting a battle 
under particular topographical circumstances; Arrian mentions that the battle 
will be fought at an appointed place (ektaxis 11). 
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Caesar had previously used entrenchments in Gaul against the Belgae in 57 BC 
(B G 11.9). He states that he had trenches dug on his right wing about 400ft 
to the front and rear of his battle line. Forts and artillery were positioned at 
the end of each trench. Frontinus mentions that Sulla dug similar 
entrenchments to protect both his wings from envelopment by Archelaus'army 
(Str II iii 17). Napoleon III and Stoffel carried out investigations on a 
series of Roman fieldworks at Mauchamp, Aisne. These comprised a marching 
camp of 41 hectares with additional entrenchments running from the N. W and 
S. E angles of the camp. Napoleon claimed that the end of the S. E trench was 
destroyed by the river Aisne, but the N. W trench appeared to be complete and 
is c. 700m long, slightly more than the figure given by Caesar, and reaches 
almost to the Miette, a tributary of the Aisne. The dimensions of the trench 
are not known, but it would presumably have been wide and deep enough to 
break up a cavalry charge or hamper an infantry attack. Of the artillery 
emplacements at the end of each trench, only the northern one survives, and 
its outline is irregular; Napoleon could not explain it. The trenches of the 
redoubts are fairly shallow (20 cm-1m) but their main purpose seems to have 
been as a base for Caesar's artillery'. 
Caesar's entrenchments were to prevent his battle line being outflanked and 
the fieldworks at Mauchamp seem to be adequate for this purpose, especially 
as the lines linked the camp with the rivers Aisne and Miette, a further 
9The identification of these fieldworks as the site of Caesar's battle in 57 BC 
has been hotly disputed (the earlier arguments are summarized by Rice Holmes 
1911 659-68, the later by Goudineau 1990? 250). These arguments include the 
use of claviculae in the marching camp as indicators that the camp is later than 
Caesar's campaigns and that the dimensions do not correspond exactly with 
those given by Caesar. However, marching camps are very difficult to date 
and it is impossible to say when the clavicula, came into use. The fact that the 
dimensions of the ditch do not correspond with the literary evidence is not 
important; Caesar's orders may not have been carried out to the letter. 
141 
obstacle to any Belgic outflanking manoeuvreslo. Tacitus mentions that 
Suetonius Paulinus spent time preparing for the first battle of Cremona by 
filling in ditches etc. (Hist. II 25); on the difficulties of the terrain here see 
below (p. 142). 
Favourable Ground 
Ideally any general would wish to engage the enemy on favourable ground and 
concern about this is clearly illustrated in Caesar's commentaries. On several 
occasions a battle is avoided or delayed because of the unfavourable nature of 
the ground (eg: BG V 49; BC 11 34), and the Roman defeat at Gergovia is 
blamed on the unfavourable ground (BG VII 53). From Caesar's comments, it 
is obvious that for him "favourable ground" was either flat, open ground, 
which would also be suitable for cavalry (see above p. 136), or ground sloping 
down towards the enemy. Engaging an enemy which required climbing a hill 
was considered a definite disadvantage, and during the civil wars neither 
Curio nor Varus was eager to engage because it would have meant climbing 
steep slopes (E! C 11 34) ". The difficulties of unfavourable ground are 
illustrated at the 1st battle of Cremona: 
"the battle line was broken up by the nature of the ground which 
was full of trenches and pits, and in avoiding or going around 
these the men were compelled to engage their opponents at a 
disadvantage and in small groups" 
(Plut. Otho 12). 
No doubt before a battle started a great deal of marching and counter- 
marching would have taken place as the opposing armies aimed for the most 
advantageous terrain. 
"The newly recruited legions remaining in camp for use as reinforcements 
could have dealt with any concerted enemy attempt to cross Caesar's trenches 
and outflank his battle line. 
"Ostorius Scapula's troops faced a similar difficulty in Wales when they had 
to storm a defensive position on a hilltop (Annals XII 35). 
142 
As stated above, Onasander recommends avoiding battle until a suitable place 
is found (XXXI). Again it is from Caesar than an example of this strategy 
comes; one of Caesar's legates, Sabinus, wished to avoid battle with Viridovix 
because of Caesar's absence and the size of the enemy "unless he enjoyed the 
advantage of position or some particularly favourable opportunity presented 
itself. " (B G 111 17, in 56 BC )12 . Arrian, in addition, proposed to fight his 
battle in specific topographical circumstances (ektaxis 12). He intended to 
fight in a horned formation with both wings held by detachments stationed on 
rising ground. Arrian does not say what he intended to do if the Alans 
decided to fight him when there was not a convenient pair of hills that he could 
anchor his battle line on, but the terrain is important to the effectiveness of 
13 his dispositions . 
Disposition of Forces: Treatises 
Both Onasander and Vegetius mention the importance of planning the battle 
dispositions in advance, especiaUy deciding who is to oppose whom, for 
example, the cavalry should be deployed against the enemy cavalry 
(Onas. XVI), and of making these dispositions with great care (Onas. XXX; 
Veg. 111 14), because even with the best soldiers, a bad battle line will be 
broken up (Veg. 111 14). Vegetius advises his general to deploy his troops in 
battle line awaiting the enemy so that there will be no interference of 
obstructions from the enemy, and it will give the Roman troops a psychological 
12 This also reflects the advice given by Vegetius that a general should not 
engage "unless induced by opportunity or obliged by necessity" (111 25). 
"Rome's enemies also made use of terrain they knew would be unsuitable or 
difficult for Roman troops, eg: the Iceni made their stand in a restricted area 
where the Romans could not make use of their cavalry (Annals XII 31), and see 
also below p. 163. 
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advantage (111 11 & 17)" . Onasander, perhaps more shrewdly, states 
that 
sometimes it is an advantage to wait for the enemy to deploy first so the 
general can make his dispositions taking into account the enemy's dispositions 
(XXXIX). He adds that plans made at the time of battle are sometimes better 
than those made before the engagement because some things cannot be reduced 
to rules or planned beforehand (XXXII). 
Both Onasander and Vegetius state that there were many different types of 
battle formation depending on the type of soldiers the general has, their arms , 
the terrain and the strength of the enemy (XV). As far as the width and 
depth of the main body of troops is concerned, a compromise should be made 
between being too long and narrow so that the enemy can easily burst through 
the line and attack from the rear, and so compact that the line is easily 
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outflanked (Onas. XXI; Veg. 111 15) . Vegetius suggests two arrangements 
for the battle line (11 15; 11114), whereas Onasander is much less specific; he 
simply states that the cavalry should face the enemy cavalry (XVI) and that 
light troops should be posted in front of the main body of infantry to provoke 
the enemy to battle, then retire through intervals left within the ranks of the 
heavy infantry. The light troops should also carry out the pursuit 
(Onas. XIX). This sounds very much like the descriptions of the Roman legion 
by both Polybius and Livy, but Vegetius'two descriptions are also on the same 
lines. 
14 Perhaps this is related to the use of inexperienced or weak Roman forces in 
the late Empire. 
"The same consideration was necessary for the line of march (see above 
Chapter 5). 
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His first arrangement has the main infantry force of principes and hastati in 
two lines (5 cohorts each) 16 . Cavalry are stationed on either side of the 
battle line. A third line of heavy infantry (triarii) remain at the rear as a 
reserve. Light troops provoked the enemy to battle and pursued them if they 
fled. If not, the light troops retired through the ranks and the legions 
fought. If the enemy fled, they would be pursued by the cavalry and light 
troops. The second arrangement was fairly similar, with the front ranks 
composed of legionaries (principes and hastati) and cavalry, then two ranks 
of light troops whose duties were, as above, to provoke the enemy to battle 
and, with the cavalry, to carry out the pursuit. Behind these was a line of 
artillery and slingers, then a reserve force of scutati and triarii. Other 
reserve bodies of cavalry and infantry were to be kept in the rear. The 
similarities between this description and those of Polybius and Livy suggest 
that Vegetius may have used a Republican source such as Cato for this section 
as he does elsewhere (11 3; see below note 19,20). 
Vegetius goes into greater detail, explaining the intervals between each man 
in the line, 3ft, and each rank, 6ft (111 15), and later describes seven 
different arrangements for the force described above, depending on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the enemy (11120)'7 . Finally, Onasander states 
that in the absence of light troops the front ranks should form a tortoise 
(testud ) to protect themselves from enemy fire unt: U the enemy have 
discharged a. U their missiles (XXI). 
16 For discussion of these arrangements, see below p. 152. 
17 The last of these has a flank protected by a natural obstacle, cf : Onasander 
XXI and above p. 139. 
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Unlike Vegetius, who throughout books II and III concentrates on the legions, 
Onasander gives particular prominence to the role of light troops. He points 
out that by stationing archers in front of the line, they are able to fire with 
more force directly at the enemy whereas if they are behind the heavy infantry 
and have to fire over the heads of the infantry, their ndssiles will not be as 
forceful (XVII). These troops should also be used to attack the enemy's 
flanks, especially with missiles, as the flanks are more vulnerable than the 
front and the enemy line will be forced together and become confused (XIX - 
XX). Light troops should be used in broken country, and to dislodge enemy 
forces holding high ground (Onas. XVIII). 
Reserves should be kept at the rear of the main force (Onas. XXII; Veg. III 
The Vegetian line had three groups of reserves, one near the right to 
attack the enemy flank, one in the centre for carrying out manoeuvres in the 
line requiring more troops, such as forn-ting wedges and pincers, and one on 
the left of the wing to prevent the wing from being surrounded. Onasander 
states that the reserves are for emergencies and are particularly useful for 
carrying out a sudden attack on the enemy's rear. 
Disposition of Forces: Field Practices 
The literary evidence confirms the importance of the advance planning 
mentioned by the treatises. Caesar frequently held councils of war with his 
legates, tribunes and senior centurions (BG IV 13, VI 5, VII 45; Labienus 
holding councils of war, BG VI 5, VII 60) and Arrian s p----ý describes his 
proposed order of march and battle dispositions. The question of deploying 
troops before or after the enemy varies, as Onasander points out (XXXIII), 
on circumstances. The deployment of a battle line could take some time, and 
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this was a particularly vulnerable state for an army to be in; Lucullus' defeat 
of Mithridates was primarily due to his attack on the Pontic forces before they 
were fully deployed (see above p. 134)'8. However, the advantage mentioned 
by Onasander (XXXII), of deploying after the enemy, is well illustrated at 
Pharsalus. On studying Pompey's dispositions, Caesar saw that he had posted 
all his light troops and cavalry on his left wing. Since this seriously 
endangered his own right wing, Caesar took one cohort from each legion's 
third line and posted them all to his right, giving him an advantage (BC III 
89). 
Concern about the width and depth of the battle line (see above p. 144) is best 
illustrated by Agricola's hne at Mons Graupius (Agri . 35). According to 
Tacitus, Agricola was concerned about being outflanked so he opened out the 
ranks. There were suggestions that the line was too thin as a result of this 
manoeuvre, but this does not seem to have been a weakness during the actual 
battle. The construction of the fieldworks mentioned above (p. 140) may not 
have been simply to protect against flank attacks, but on some occasions may 
have served to restrict the line of battle as well. Caesar's attempts to 
"restrict the operational area" at Munda (B. Hisp. 30) may have involved 
digging trenches, as suggested above, and if so they may have been intended 
to keep the battle line within certain limits as well as to protect against flank 
attacks' 
9- 
18 cf: Caesar's difficulties against the Nervii when his army was taken by 
surprise BG 11 20. To guard against this, there had to be a relationship 
between the order of march and line of battle; see above Chapter 5 on The 
Order of March. 
"On the one occasion Caesar formed up a single line (simplex acies), he was 
forced to order his men not to advance more than 4ft from the standards, 
because the line had become too disorganized. 
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Although both Livy (VIII 3-18) and Polybius (VI 19-25) describe the 
deployment and tactics of the Republican legion in battle, they do not indicate 
where in the line of battle the socii fought - Since both historians, however, 
describe a number of set piece battles, including some comment on the 
dispositions of the Roman army and socii, it is possible to indicate a 
"standard" line of battle for a Roman army during the Republic. Using 
Caesar, Arrian and the limited information available from Tacitus and other 
historians of the Imperial period, some idea of military dispositions in the late 
Republic and early Empire may be obtained, and thus a comparison is possible 
between actual battle dispositions and those advised by the treatise writers. 
The similarities between Vegetius' first description of the battle line (11 15) 
and the "standard" battle line of the Republic have been noted above (pp. 144- 
145), and his information may well have come from one of the Republican 
treatises". 
The "standard" battle line of the Republic, according to Polybius and Livy, 
was as follows: 
1. A screen of light infantry (velites) to provoke the enemy to battle, then 
retire through the ranks of heavy infantry. The velites would also assist the 
cavalry in pursuing a fleeing enemy. 
The heavy infantry would take up the fight in the three lines of hastati, 
p ncipes and triarii. The latter acted as a reserve force in the rear and could 
also be used for outflanking manoeuvres (eg: Cynoscephalae 197 BC). 
3. The socii were stationed between the legions and cavalry and employed the 
same system of velites, hastati, principes and triarii as the legions (Livy VIII 
8). 
20 Webster (1985 231) suggests Vegetius obtained this information from 
Frontinus, but Vegetius also mentions Cato as a source (11 3), and perhaps 
this is a more likely source for Vegetius' description of the Republican legion. 
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The cavalry on the wings opposed the enemy cavalry, prevented 
outflanking manoeuvres and carried out the pursuit - 
The line of battle was intended to break the enemy line and cause the enemy 
to flee, when most casualties would be caused (see below p- 170) - 
This formation is used by the Romans on many occasions including the 
Trebbia, Cannae, the Great Plains against Hasdrubal Gisgo, Cynoscephalae 
(Polybius 111 72,113; XIV 8; XVIII 23-7), and Polybius describes it as the 
regular deployment of the Roman army (111 72; XIV 8). There were, of 
course, exceptions, usually for a particular tactical reason, for which 
Frontinus gives examples (Stra II iii 4,16,17 )21 . 
The adoption of a tactical system based on the cohort instead of the maniple 
does not seem to have had a great deal of affect on the general dispositions of 
the line of battle, with the exception of the velites. The evidence from Caesar 
and the "Caesarian corpus" shows that usually the legions held the centre of 
the line with the auxiliary infantry on either side, and the auxiliary cavalry 
on the wings. The major difference is the absence of the velites in the front 
of the line. In the late Republic it was usually the front ranks of heavy 
infantry engaged first, throwing their pila and then engaging in hand to hand 
combat (BG 1 52). Such light infantry that were used in this Period were 
usually placed on the wings, between the heavy infantry and cavalry, and 
were frequently "specialist" troops such as slingers and archers (eg: Caesar's 
line at Thapsus B. Afr. 7922) , or with the cavalry to 
improve their 
21 Strat. II iii 4; Scipio changed his usual battle line suddenly to confuse 
Hasdrubal, stationing his strongest troops on the wings and carrying out a 
flank attack. 
22 Caesar also on occasion stationed auxiliaries at the front of his own battle 
line, eg: B. Afr - 12, but these are archers rather 
than auxiliary infantry, cf 
Onasander XVII and below p. 154. 
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effectiveness (BG 1123; BC 1134; B. Afr. 69,72; B. Hisp - 14). The role of the 
cavalry remains the same throughout the Republic and early Empire; to oppose 
the enemy cavalry, prevent outflanking manoeuvres and pursue a fleeing 
enemy. 
In the early Empire there appear to be two types of disposition in regular use. 
The first was simply the continuation of the old Republican system with the 
legions holding the centre of the line and auxiliary infantry, then auxiliary 
cavalry on the wings. As with dispositions in the late Republic, there is little 
evidence of the use of light infantry in front of the main line of infantry (eg: 
Annals 1152; XIII 38, although there was no actual battle; XIV 34; two battles 
at Cremona, Hist. I 24; 11121-22). Arrian's proposed dispositions against the 
Alani are also a variant on this, though see below (p. 165). 
In the second arrangement the auxiliary infantry was deployed in front of the 
legions and cavalry were posted on the wings (eg: Hist. V 16; Agric. 35). 
This, however, is not a return to the system of the middle Republic with the 
light troops provoking the enemy to battle and then withdrawing; the 
auxiliaries acted as the principal striking force and the legions were held in 
reserve (Acfri . 35). The reason behind the use of this variant 
has generated 
much discussion and this will be considered below (p. 153). 
Legions 
Further details are available from Caesar on the deployment of his legions in 
battle. His usual formation was the duplex or triplex acies though on rare 
occasions a simplex or cruadruplex acies was used. These formations refer to 
the depth in cohorts of the battle line, the system providing sufficient 
flexibility for the general to compron-dse between a line that was too short or 
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too thin (see above p. 144). The triplex acies has been described as the 
standard for the late Republic, with the cohorts arranged in a 4-3-3 formation 
(Rice Holmes 1911587-99). In normal circumstances, this would appear to be 
tactically sound, especially with regard to the length/width compromise 
mentioned above. The middle line of three cohorts would act as the reserves 
mentioned by Vegetius and Onasander whilst the rear line could carry out 
outflanking manoeuvres and if necessary turn around to face an enemy 
attacking from the rear 23 . The duplex acies was presumably a 5-5 formation 
of cohorts which gives fewer reinforcements and reserves but a longer line to 
prevent outflanking manoeuvres 24 .A study of Caesar and the Caesarian 
corpus indicates that these two acies, and variations on them, are the most 
regularly used during this period. 
As stated above, the simplex and quadruplex acies were rarely used, and this 
was usually for a specific tactical reason. Caesar only once used a simplex 
acies (B. Afr. 13), and this was through concern that his small force might be 
outflanked by Labienus' cavalry, sacrificing prevention of the enemy bursting 
25 
through his thin line to avoid the greater danger of a flank or rear attack . 
Caesar states that Scipio's normal line of battle was the quadruplex acies, but 
his first line was made up of cavalry interspersed with elephants (B. Afr. 41), 
probably with a triplex acies of legionaries behind this. To oppose and 
outflank these elephants at Uzitta, Caesar sent reinforcements to each wing 
2 'Vegetius 111 18 and Onasander XXII discuss reserves at the rear of the line, 
and see below p. 160. At Pharsalus, as stated above, Caesar ordered one 
cohort from each legion's reserve third line to reinforce his right wing (BC III 
89). For the third line of cohorts turning to face attack from the rear, see BG 
124. 
24cf: Vegetius' description of legionary deployment 11 15, but see also below 
p. 152. 
25 When this did in fact happen, the flexibility of the cohort system allowed him 
to turn round every other cohort in the line to repulse this new attack. 
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to create a fourth line of cohorts (B - Af . 81). The manoeuvre 
is similar to that 
at Pharsalus mentioned above (BC 11189), and again illustrates the advantages 
of the cohort system. 
No details are available for the deployment of legionary cohorts in the battle 
line of the Empire before Vegetius' de Re Militari, though it would not be 
unreasonable to suppose that they were similar to those of the late Republic - 
Vegetius' descriptions of legionary deployment are, however, confused. His 
first (11 15) initially appears to be the duplex acies with two lines of five 
cohorts, but there is also the reserve line of heavy infantry, the triarii - 
Silhanek suggests that this represents Caesar's triplex acies (1972 167-8) but 
fails to indicate where the third line, the reserves, comes from (see below). 
A line similar to this was in use in the late Republic with two lines of 
legionaries and auxiliaries in the rear (eg: BC 183), but Caesar specifies that 
it is a duplex acies, it is not triplex, and indeed it is at this point that Caesar 
explains the 4-3-3 formation of the triplex acies. 
There seems httle doubt that Vegetius' triarii here are legionaries, and if the 
hastati and Principe represent all ten cohorts of the legion, there is no 
source for the force of reserves. It seems much more likely that Vegetius, in 
his confusion, has here combined elements of both the manipular and cohort 
systems. As far as the organization of the legion is concerned, Vegetius deals 
almost exclusively in terms of centuries and cohorts, and this suggests that 
he is using a late Republican or Imperial source for this. However, his 
systems of legionary deployment (11 15,11114) owe more to the mid Republic, 
Polybius, Livy and probably Cato (see above p. 145). Vegetius appears 
unaware of the change from the manipular to cohort system, or is using 
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sources relating to both types, and his battle line is therefore a synthesis of 
both. 
Auxiliaries 
As stated above (p. 146), Vegetius' main interest is in the legions whilst 
Onasander emphasises the role of light troops. Both writers, however, 
indicate that their principal role was to incite the enemy to battle before 
retiring through the lines of heavy infantry, and to carry out the pursuit with 
the cavalry. This was, indeed, their main role during the Republic, but well 
before Onasander was writing, the former role had declined and during the 
civil wars of the late Republic, auxiliaries were rarely posted at the front of 
the line. 
The general impression gained from the writers of this period is that the 
fighting abilities of many auxiliaries were suspect. Appian states that the 
auxiliaries at Pharsalus were more for show than for use (BC II 75ff) and 
Crassus' reasoning behind posting of his auxiliaries in the centre of the line 
between the legions was lack of confidence in them (BG 111 24). Domitius 
Calvinus placed the 'legions' supplied by Deiotarus in the centre of his battle 
line, with a small frontage, because he also lacked trust in their strength 
(B. Alex. 38-40). Rice-Holmes suggests that the auxiliaries would fight better 
if supported and encouraged by being near the legionaries (1914 124 
)26 
. 
Caesar may have had this in mind when he positioned his auxiliary infantry in 
between the legionaries entrenching camp (BC 173). He also used auxiliaries 
to guard his camp during battle (BG 124; 150, the former occasion along with 
2 6This is no doubt true, but in Crassus' case the auxiliaries may have been 
archers or slingers (unfortunately Caesar gives no details), and the placing 
of these in the centre of his battle line would have been tactically sound (cf 
BC 1 81-3). 
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recently recruited legions whose abilities he seems also to have doubted). The 
auxiliary infantry, however, was occasionally used as a reserve force, to 
carry out outflanking manoeuvres (cf: Uzitta) or deal with a new threat when 
the main legionary force was already engaged (BG II 8ff). Although the role 
of auxiliary infantry in the late Republic seems to have been fairly minor, 
there was a much greater role for slingers and archers and cavalry. 
Onasander suggests two positions for slingers, and archers; in front of the 
line, to fire directly at the enemy line, and on the wings to carry out flank 
attacks. Analysis of their dispositions in the late Republic and early Empire 
suggests that these were, indeed, the principal uses of these forces. At 
Pharsalus Pompey positioned archers on his left wing for the specific purpose 
of attacking the right flank of Caesar's line, and the emphasis of archers on 
Scipio's wings at Uzitta suggests this was the intention here as weJl. 
Unfortunately the lack of detail for Imperial dispositions prohibits similar 
analysis. Archers are illustrated in action on Trajan's Column (scenes 177-9; 
310) and in both cases they are depicted shooting from behind other auxiliary 
troops, a position which Onasander criticizes because the archers are unable 
to fire with such force. However, the Column may not provide an accurate 
representation of the use of these auxiliaries in the field. Arrian's mounted 
and foot archers are also positioned with the artillery at the rear of his battle 
line and on the flanks (ektaxis 12-13). 32 units of archers are attested during 
the Empire (Holder 1980 appendix 3), 4 alae, 6 cohortes equitatae and 22 
cohorts; two cohortes equitatae and two cohorts are known to have been 
milliary, indicating their continued importance 
27 
. 
27 Milldary cohorts of archers: Cohors I Ituraeorum, AE 1907 50; Cohors I 
Hemesenorum; cohortes equitatae: Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum AE 1924 81; 
Cohors I Damascenorum ILS 1998,2585. Artillery could take the place of 
archers positioned at the front of the line, eg: Cremona II. Onasander 
(continued... ) 
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Slingers are illustrated fighting along with the archers (Trajan's Column scene 
310) and in the historical literature slingers and archers very frequently fight 
together, sometimes with other missile throwing auxiliaries such as 
iaculatores". Livy and Tacitus both indicate two types of slingers, 
funditores, the more common type, and libratores (Livy 42 65; Annals 11 20; 
XIII 39). The differences between the two types are not known, but it is 
possible that the libratores may have used a sling staff. Unlike archers 
though, no units of slingers are attested epigraphically during the Empire, 
though the evidence proves that they still had a role in pitched battles - 
Hadrian's address to the army in Africa suggests that practice in the use of 
slings may have been a general requirement (CIL VIII 2532) and although 
auxiliary units were often identified by their weapons in the late Republic 
(Saddington 1982 140), this is not so common in the Empire. Cohorts made up 
exclusively of slingers may not have continued to exist during this period but 
slingers certainly continued to play a role along with archers and artillery in 
supplying the army's fire power. 
What Onasander does not mention is the vulnerability of these troops if 
surrounded by enemy infantry or cavalry, but this is clearly illustrated at 
Pharsalus. Pompey's archers were protected by his cavalry, but when these 
were driven off by Caesar's cavalry the archers and slingers were left 
exposed. These were massacred by Caesar's advancing infantry. At 
27 ( ... continued) 
recommends placing the archers here so they can fire at the enemy with 
greater force (XVII). The difficulties of the Flavian troops at the second 
battle of Cremona indicates how serious an obstacle artillery could be when 
sited here. 
"Slingers and archers are attested fighting together from the Punic wars, 
Ldvy 37 41; 42 58 (also fighting with iaculatores); Sallust Jug. 46,49,94,100, 
105; L. Cornelius Sisenna Frag - 19 1 (stationed behind the battle line); Caesar 
BG 11 7 (Balearic slingers with Cretan and Numidian archers), RC passim; 
B. Mr. passim . 
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Idistaviso, the auxiliary infantry had to go to the help of the archers who were 
attacked by the Cherusci (Annals 11 16). 
Cavalry 
At this point I intend to discuss the role of cavalry only with relevance to 
pitched battles. Their function in virtually every battle was to face the enemy 
cavalry on the wings, prevent or execute flank attacks, and to carry out the 
pursuit, as Onasander and Vegetius recommend (Onas. XVI, Veg. 11 15). For 
the most part, cavalry seem to have avoided direct confrontations with 
infantry in battle line, for sound tactical reasons; cavalry are usually unable 
to break such formations, hence the line of infantry proposed by Arrian 
against the Alan cavalry, and the square infantry formation both Crassus and 
Antony employed with varying degrees of success against the Parthian 
cavalry. The superiority of even 'barbarian' infantry over cavalry is 
illustrated by Caesar's battle against the Nervii (BG 1120). The Roman forces 
were taken by surprise, and when his cavalry counter attacked they were 
twice repulsed by the Nervian infantry. Caesar's picked infantry at Pharsalus 
29 
seem to have had little difficulty in forcing Pompey's cavalry to flee . Once 
the cavalry had been driven off , it left the flanks of the infantry unprotected 
and vulnerable to attack by infantry, especially archers, as Caesar's fourth 
line at Pharsalus illustrates. 
During the late Republic cavalry units frequently went into battle supported 
by light infantry, used to 'stiffen ' cavalry in circumstances when the 
commander doubted the strength of his cavalry. This seems originally to have 
been a German method of fighting, and Caesar expresses his admiration for the 
2 9Frontinus considers Caesar's orders to his infantry to lunge at the faces of 
the cavalrymen a stratagem, though it is impossible to tell whether this 
increased the effectiveness of Caesar's infantry (Strat. IV vii 32). 
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fighters' abilities (BG 1 48), although how the infantry and cavalry actua. Uy 
fought together is not explained - Since Caesar's cavalry was primarily 
Gallic 
and German, it is perhaps not surprising that he also interspersed his cavalry 
with infantry, either light armed auxiliaries or antesicinani (see below p. 158). 
However, the tactic seems to have been used more widely, by African and 
Spanish auxiliaries also. The African light troops are described as 'used to 
fighting calongside the cavcalry 
130 
. 
It has been suggested that this mixture of cavalry and infantry was the 
inspiration for the cohors equitata of the Empire (Keppie 1984 182). Because 
of the lack of detailed accounts of battles during the Empire, however, it is 
impossible to determine whether the cavalry and infantry of these units ever 
fought together in this fashion. Arrian's battle orders indicate not, for the 
infantry of his cohortes equitatae are arranged with the rest of the auxiliary 
infantry and the cavalry with the remainder of the cavalry on the wingS31. 
The proportion of infantry to cavalry also suggests that this was not the case 
(Keppie 1984 182). The role of the infantry in this situation was to support 
and strengthen the cavalry but with 120 cavalry to 480 infantry in a cohors 
equitata, the cavalry would be vastly outnumbered. Unfortunately Caesar 
gives very few details on the proportions of light infantry to cavalry, though 
the numbers were probably about equal since in his description of the German 
fighters he indicates that there was one infantryman to each rider (BG 148). 
The proportions for the Imperial cohors equitata therefore appear to be wrong 
for this type of fighting. 
"Cavalry and light infantry operating together: BG 11 24; VII 65; VIII 17 & 
19; BC 1 43; 11 34; 11175; 11184; very frequently in B. Afr., where it seems 
to have been the norm for light infantry to support the cavalry; B. Hisp. 14, 
21,23,30. 
3 'Cavalry and infantry of cohortes equitatae were separated when on the march 
- Vespasian (BJ 111 115-26) and Arrian (ektaxi 1). 
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The use of dismounted cavalrymen as infantry is not mentioned by the 
treatises and is usually condemned by writers both ancient and modern as 
tactically unsound (Livy 22 49; B. Hisp. 15; Davies (1971) 756; Hyland (1990) 
166), but there are examples of them operating as infantrymen under 
particular topographical circumstances, on ground unsuited to cavalry 
(Annals XII 3 1; Strat. II W 23) and neither author mentions any disadvantage 
of cavalry fighting on foot, indeed they are very successful in both cases. It 
is questionable as to whether all cavalrymen suffered a disadvantage when 
fighting on foot as some at least trained and fought on foot before transferring 
to a cavalry unit (Veg. I 18; Gilliam (1965) 781; the example of Ti. Claudius 
Maximus, Speidel (1970) 143). Thus most cavalrymen would have at least some 
training and experience at fighting on foot, even though their equipment 
under such circumstances would not be designed for this. As Davies points 
out though, they would be more suitably equipped than the heavily armed 
legionaries under such circumstances (1971 756). 
Antesignani 
These troops have already been mentioned as the light armed legionaries 
Caesar used as weU as auxiliaries to fight alongside the cavalry. The term 
literally means the men fighting in front of the standards, the front rank 
fighters who were first into battle and defended the standards (Stra . II iii 
17), often the bravest men in the legion 32 . However, as Carter explains, 
"Caesar had begun to use them, or some of them, as a special body of troops 
to operate with cavalry or otherwise outside the normal legionary formation" 
(1990 191). Caesar only mentions numbers on one occasion (300, BC 111 84) 
and does not indicate if this was the usual number but elsewhere it is 
"Cicero grudgingly admits Antony's bravery as an antesignanus at Pharsalus 
(Phil. II 71). Vegetius states that these men are the bravest in the legion, 
providing an example to others. 
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mentioned that Caesar customarily kept 300 men from each legion in light order 
(B. Afr. 78). At this point the men are not caUed antesicina but they are sent 
to assist Caesar's cavalry, a role taken on other occasions by the antesignani 
(BC 111 75), and they may weU be these troops. Since the term antesignani 
refers to all the front rank fighters, presumably Caesar could use as many or 
as few as he needed for special duties. Caesar is the only civil war general 
reported as using antesignani and his use of them may have been unique. 
Although Vegetius mentions antesignani (11 2,7,16), he gives very little 
information on their duties and role in battle, though he does say that they 
defended the standards and wore less armour, their helmets covered with 
bearskins (11 16). References to antesignani are extremely rare in the 
literature with no references other than the above and referring to the 
Imperial period. It is possible that with the expansion of the auxiliary forces 
in the early Empire and existence of light armed troops whose fighting abilities 
were not suspect, the principal role of Caesar's antesignani, as a small body 
of elite light armed troops, could now be given to the auxiliaries. 
Unfortunately the accounts of pitched battles in this period are too sketchy 
to provide any evidence on this matter. 
Epigraphic evidence suggests there were troops still called antesignani during 
the Empire (Cagnat 1913 495 and AE 1978 471) and although Speidel. is willing 
to argue that some ranks of the Imperial legion were armed and trained for 
different tasks, the evidence is slight and there is nothing to indicate that 
this was an Empire-wide situation and that all legions had a group of 
antesignani. Speidel argues for increased sPecialization within the legion from 
early in the Empire, perhaps even in the lst century AD (1992 14-15) and uses 
Arrian's 'phalanx' as his principal example of this. Parker, however, goes 
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even further and suggests a radical change in troop deployment in the 2nd 
century and a return to a phalangic system (1928 258), which will be discussed 
below. 
Artillery 
Onasander does not mention the use of artillery in pitched battles, and 
Vegetius only mentions them as being positioned behind the battle line with the 
slingers, or on a hill to increase their range (111 14). For the most part , 
artillery plays the same role in a pitched battle as the slingers and archers 
mentioned above and like them could be stationed at the front or rear of the 
battle line, or on the wings". 
Reserves 
The system of the triplex acies. provided groups of reserve cohorts at the rear 
of the battle line that could be used to reinforce a vulnerable point of the line 
(BG 150; Pharsalus), deal with an attack from the rear (RG 124) or carry out 
a flank attack (Pharsalus). Alternatively the auxiliaries or newly recruited 
legions could be kept as reserves (BG 124; 150; 118), and in the Empire the 
entire legionary force was on occasion held in reserve (Hist. V 16; Mons 
Graupius) - The account of Mons Graupius provides a good example of the use 
of reserves; the legions were held in the rear (Aqri . 35) and Agricola kept 
four alae for emergencies which he used to prevent a flank attack (cf : 
Onasander XXII). He may also have kept a further two cohorts in reserve, 
though Ogilvie and Richmond suggest this may have been because they were 
Britons and therefore not trustworthy (1967 274). There is no hint of the 
three groups of reserves mentioned by Vegetius (111 18). 
33 At the front of the battle line, 2nd battle of Cremona (Hist. III 23); on the 
wings BG 118, and both behind the infantry and on the wings, Arrian ektaxis 
19. 
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'Chanqes in the disposition of forces 
Very few changes in field dispositions are recorded in the period from Polybius 
to Vegetius. The writers of military treatises agree with the historians of the 
Republic that the heavy infantry of the legions would form the centre of the 
battle line, with the auxiliary cavalry holding the wings and to pursue the 
fleeing enemy. Light infantry would be stationed in front of the legions to 
provoke the enemy into attacking, and then they would retire through 
intervals left between the cohorts of the legions. This was not the case in the 
late Republic and early Empire where the light infantry were usually stationed 
between the legions and cavalry, but the legions still carried the brunt of the 
fighting. However, two changes in the dispositions have attracted a great 
deal of interest; the use of auxiliaries as the main striking force instead of the 
legions and the possible reintroduction of the Hellenistic style phalanx. The 
reasons behind the former are disputed, as is the evidence for the latter. 
Auxiliaries 
There is no doubt that in some pitched battles of the Empire the auxiliaries 
took the role usually given to the legionaries and the latter were held in 
reserve. The principal examples of this tactic are Idistaviso, (Annals 11 16), 
the battle against the Frisii (Annals IV 73), Cerialis' defeat of the Batavians 
(Hist. V 17) and Mons Graupius (Agri . 35-7). This method of disposition does 
not take over exclusively from the other Imperial system mentioned above; 
Suetonius' dispositions against Boudicca and Corbulo's against Tiridates are 
both of this type. At Mons Graupius, Tacitus claims the reason for Agricola's 
use of auxiliaries as the main striking force was to gain a victory without the 
loss of any Roman blood (Agric. 35). Some modern historians have also taken 
this view to explain the different disposition: 
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"It reflects the view that, at a time when there was still a clear 
division between the citizen legionaries and the non-citizen 
auxilia, it was desirable to preserve the lives of Roman citizens 
if possible. 11 (Campbell 1987 29). 
Hyland (1990 166) claims that Agricola used the auxiliaries at Mons Graupius 
as cannon fodder and that Caesar had the same attitude, frequently sending 
in cavalry prior to the infantry as shock tactics. This, however, does not 
appear to have been the case in pitched battles of the period; for the most 
part, as stated above, the cavalry fought the enemy cavalry and only attacked 
infantry in outflanking manoeuvres. There is a suggestion that Labienus was 
wilhng to use his auxiliaries in Africa as "cannon fodder", to wear down 
Caesar's troops simply by their numbers (B. Mr. 19), but the fighting abilities 
of some of these troops was probably suspect; a lot of them had recently been 
levied from locals, freedmen and slaves, and under such circumstances, 
simply swamping Caesar's troops in this fashion seems a valid tactic. Agricola 
was most definitely not using his auxiliaries in this fashion; they were 
outnumbered by the British forces and the general had sufficient confidence 
in their fighting abilities not to send in the legions. Agricola would not have 
deployed his troops thus had he not been certain of a favourable outcome. 
Tacitus gives no hint of this motive influencing the dispositions of 
Germanicus, Apronius or Cerialis, and Parker (1928 258) dismisses the reason 
for Agricola's tactics at Mons Graupius as "doubtless an invention of the 
historian". Both Parker and Cheesman (1914 104) state that if the enemy took 
up a defensive position on ground where the heavy armed legionaries could not 
operate successfully, the lighter armed auxiliaries would be sent in with the 
legions only engaging if the auxiliaries were driven back. The reason for this 
type of disposition is therefore tactical and due to the nature of the terrain. 
As stated above (pp. 134-142), the occupation of favourable ground for 
fighting was of great importance to any general and it is a frequently repeated 
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theme in the accounts of the Gallic and Civil wars. Analysis of the 
topographical circumstances of the four battles involved proves interesting - 
Idistaviso: The Germans were drawn up in front of woods whereas the 
Cherusci, who presented the stiffest resistance to the Romans occupied the 
hills. Furneaux (1896 306) suggests that the Cherusci "formed the key of the 
whole position, enabling them to fall on the flank of the Romans as they 
advanced". It was therefore important to deal with the Cherusci first. 
L. Apronius: The Frish made their stand on coastal marshes and the Romans 
had to approach across a ford. Apronius initially sent in German auxiliaries 
and cavalry, then other auxiliaries. 
Cerialis: The first day Cerialis' legionaries had particular difficulty fighting 
the Batavians on marshy land adjacent to the Rhine. Civilis had also dammed 
the Rhine to flood the land further and Tacitus describes the terrain as "a 
slippery, treacherous waste of flooded land" and states that the legionaries 
were at a disadvantage "laden with arms and frightened of swimming" whereas 
the Germans knew the land and were familiar with this type of fighting. For 
the battle of the following day on the same terrain, Cerialis engaged with his 
cavalry and auxiliaries first. 
Mons Graupius: The British army was occupying a defensive position on rising 
ground. 
The four battles involved are all fought on what was for the Romans 
unfavourable ground, marshes or hills, but they were willing to accept battle 
under these circumstances because a pitched battle was the only way to defeat 
the enemy, particularly one with no cities or towns to be captured (Luttwak 
1976 41 & 45). At Mons Graupius this was the first opportunity the Romans 
had to engage the retreating Britons in a pitched battle and Agricola could not 
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afford not to take it (Agric. 30). There seems little doubt that Parker and 
Cheesman were correct in their assumption that the use of auxiliaries at Mons 
Graupius was for tactical reasons. The auxiliaries were traditionally the light 
armed troops of the Roman army and in these battles are being used in 
circumstances that would be difficult for heavily armed infantry (cf : 
Germanicus' campaigns in the lower Rhine, Annals 164). Tacitus does state 
that there were some light armed auxiliaries at Mons Graupius (Agric. 37 r 
expeditas cohortes) and he may weU be referring to the Batavians, though 
possibly to cohortes equitatae. Since these auxiliaries were famous for their 
ability to swim rivers in full armour (Hist. IV 12; ILS 2558), their armour is 
unlikely to have been particularly heavy. 
The only detailed account of a pitched battle between mainly infantry forces 
after Mons Graupius is Issus, fought on level ground during the civil wars of 
the late 2nd century (Dio LXXV). The heavy infantry of the legions once 
again form the main battle lines with the light armed troops at the rear, firing 
n-dssiles over the heads of the front ranks. Thus the use of auxiliaries as the 
main strike force in battles of the Imperial period appears to be for a specific 
tactical reason, employed under certain topographical conditions. 
The legion as phalanx? 
Arrian's ficwEIC Icaf 'A; Lavwv is the most detailed description of a Roman 
army on campaign since the accounts of Caesar and others in the late 
Republic. The author's dispositions in preparation for an Alan attack are 
particularly interesting and have given rise to much discussion, including the 
suggestion that in the 2nd century the legion deployed as a phalanx. Parker 
sees a "definite change in the tactical employment of Roman troops in battle" 
(1928 258) and states that "the legions were no longer drawn up in lines of 
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cohorts, but recourse was had to the older formation of the phalanx" - 
Wheeler, who deals with the subject at length, sees hints of the phalanx in the 
lst century AD and indeed suggests that the Romans never got completely 
away from the phalanx of the Servian constitution (Wheeler 1979 304). 
Arrian's legionaries deployed in a formation 8 ranks deep with intervals of 1ý 
feet between each file, in contrast to the usual 3ft of the legion (Veg. 111 15). 
The front four ranks were armed with the icov-cor. and the front rank aimed 
these at the belhes of the enemy horses. The next three ranks, whose xov-cot 
would have extended beyond the front rank as in a phalanx, also used their 
weapons for thrusting whilst the rear four ranks hurled their Xoy yat at the 
enemy. Archers and artiRery were stationed at the rear and fired over the 
heads of the legionaries; cavalry and auxiliary infantry held the wings, and 
more archers and artillery on the hills which Arrian used to fix his line 
provided more fire power. 
Despite the initial surprise at these unorthodox battle plans, closer analysis 
suggests that they were not as radical as some historians have suggested. 
The positioning of the auxiliaries and cavalry on the wings is close enough to 
the standard deployment of the late Republic and early Empire, and the fire 
power behind the heavy infantry and on rising ground is both recommended 
by some treatises and visible in various pitched battles (see above p. 135). It 
is the deployment of the legions, their weapons and Arrian's proposed tactics 
that appear new - 
Wheeler cites many examples in his attempt to show the Republican forerunners 
of Arrian's disposition and equates the phalangic system with any tightly 
packed defensive formation (1979 307) such as the testudo. The testudo is 
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described in detail by Dio (XLIX 30) who states that one of the formation's two 
uses was to protect a body of soldiers surrounded by archers. Onasander 
recommends the use of this formation for the same purpose, to protect a battle 
line which lacked light armed troops (XXI). The testudo therefore appears 
simply to be a defensive formation against an enemy well equipped with missiles 
and does not indicate a phalangic tendency of the Roman legions. 
I see no indication of a legionary phalanx in operation during the lst century 
AD either, although some have suggested this formation for Suetonius 
Paulinus' dispositions against Boudicca (Parker 1928 258) and Agricola's at 
Mons Graupius (Parker 1928 258; Wheeler 1979 310-11). Paulinus does indeed 
draw up his army in a confined space, as does Arrian, but this was a standard 
procedure to prevent a flank attack, and there is nothing in the accounts of 
the battle to suggest the legions had deployed as a phalanx. At Mons 
Graupius the legions were held in reserve. The positioning of the legions to 
protect the camp as weU as provide the reserve force is a procedure well 
documented in military histories (Polybius 111 117; BG 1 50; 11 8). Wheeler 
argues that the vocabulary of Tacitus' account corresponds with some of 
Arrian's commands and he sees this as the immediate precursor of Arrian's 
phalanx (1979 310-13), suggesting that the next step would be removing "the 
veil of auxiliary infantry seen at Mons Graupius". However, the auxiliaries 
at this battle numbered 8000 and cannot really be described as a "veil". The 
legions are held in reserve while the auxiliaries form the main battle line for 
the tactical reasons mentioned above and again, there is no suggestion that the 
legions are being deployed as a phalanx. 
Arrian 's proposed dispositions are also for tactical reasons. As Wheeler notes, 
"the Romans modified their formations and tactics according to circumstances, 
166 
opponents and terrain. 11 (1979 304). Thus Agricola used auxiliaries because 
of the terrain; Arrian proposed his formation for use against the Alan heavy 
cavalry. It is based on the theory that cavalry will not charge a battle line 
bristling with spears. It is essentially a defensive formation, but Arrian's 
whole campaign was a defensive one and he planned to avoid an engagement if 
possible. According to Dio, he succeeded in this, scaring off the Alans (LXIX 
15). 
Although Parker suggests a radical alteration to legionary organization to 
accommodate the phalanx there is plenty of evidence to disprove this. The 
epigraphic evidence shows the continued existence of the cohort structure well 
into the 3rd century (see chapter 3 on The Organization of Units). Wheeler 
argues that Arrian's system could be based on the contubernium, with half the 
eight man contubernium armed with the rov-roa and the other half with the 
LoyXIQ to produce a single file of the phalanx (1977 270; 1979 312-13). 
The question of how the legions were armed in the phalanx formation has been 
considered by Wheeler in detail (1977) and more recently, though in less 
detail, by Speidel (1992 15). Wheeler attempted to identify the two different 
spears used by Arrian Is legions, but only from comparative literary evidence; 
there is no analysis of the archaeological or epigraphic evidence. Speidel 
attempted to use the latter and although there is some evidence for increased 
specialization and specialist units in the late Empire, there is very little 
evidence for this in the 2nd century, particularly within the legion (see above 
p. 159). There was experimentation in the design of weapons in the Roman 
army, particularly with spears (Plut. Marius 25; Suet. Dom. 10; on the wide 
variety of spear types, Marchant 1990) and it is difficult to tell precisely 
which types were used by Arrian's troops. What is certain is that they were 
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not using the Macedonian sarissa, and it seems likely that the spears were a 
standard type adopted or adapted for this purpose - 
The use of the term "phalanx" to describe this formation is, I believe, a 
m1snomer. Arrian uses the term to mean legion and this may have led some 
historians to suggest more extensive use of the phalanx (eg: Parker 1928 258 
n. 3). Historians have also attempted to find later evidence for the use of the 
phalanx (eg: Wheeler 1979 314ff). Alexander Severus' 30,000 men recruited 
for his Parthian war havt been used in this context as the Historia Augusta 
refers to it as a phalanx (Sev. Alex. 50 5) but the SHA points out that the 
phalanx was formed of six legions armed like the other troops. This sounds 
rather like Nero's Legion I Italica, the "Phalanx of Alexander" (Suet. Nero 19), 
recruited for a possible Parthian campaign, and there has never been any 
suggestion that this was armed and deployed as a phalanx. 
Various historians point out that the "phalangic" formation was used more 
frequently in the later Empire and Wheeler cites examples of the Romans using 
the avvacynicypoC or testudo formation, but this is frequently used as a 
defensive formation as it was by Crassus and Antony in the late Republic, or 
as a deployment against heavy cavalry, the type of enemy Rome had to deal 
with more frequently in the late Empire. 
Because the Ey. -ra EIc is the only detailed account of field dispositions between 
Caesar and Ammianus there is the danger that too much emphasis might be 
placed on the differences between this battle line and the standard 
deployments of earlier periods. Arrian was planning a defensive campaign 
against an enemy armed in a different way to Rome's usual enemies in the early 
Empire. Wheeler (1979 304) cites Marsden as suggesting that this is one of the 
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Stock battle plans of the 2nd and 3rd centuries (1969 190) but Marsden is 
referring to the positioning of artillery on the flanks and wings, not to the 
tactics of the legion. The dispositions Arrian used may also have been used 
elsewhere, but they were by no means the only type. Like Agricola's 
deployment at Mons Graupius and others in the lst century, Arrian's 
dispositions are for tactical reasons, because of the nature of the campaign 
and the enemy. For the most part, Arrian's dispositions correspond with the 
treatises and field practices of the Republic and early Empire (legions in 
centre, auxiliaries and cavalry on the wings; fire power on rising ground and 
behind the battle line). Frontinus would probably have described it as a 
stratagem like Antony Is use of the testudo (Strat. II iii 15) rather than a major 
change in legionary deployment. 
Pursuit 
The importance of the pursuit following a pitched battle is indicated by the 
prominence the subject is given by the treatise writers. As stated above 
(p. 144), both Onasander and Vegetius suggest the use of light troops to carry 
out the pursuit of a fleeing enemy (Onas. XIX; Veg. II 15,111 14). Both also 
stress the particular importance of keeping the battle line in formation 
(Onas. XXVII, XXXII; Veg. 111 14). Vegetius states that the line of battle is 
solely designed to repulse or, if possible, break the enemy (111 17). 
Onasander states that retreats and pursuits should be made in formation, to 
reduce casualties in the former case and to inflict greater injury on the 
defeated in the latter (and to be ready again in case the enemy turn, XXVII). 
Vegetius suggests that the defeated enemy should not be completely 
surrounded but allowed to flee so they would not turn and fight (111 21). 
Retreats should be made with great care not to demoralize the army and not to 
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fall into ambushes, but to delay the pursuing force with ambushes oneself (III 
22). 
Pursuit is invariably carried out by the cavalry, sometimes accompanied by the 
light infantry (eg: Arrian). The heaviest casualties in a pitched battle almost 
always occur to a fleeing enemy whose battle line has been broken, a fact 
acknowledged by Caesar who was unable to take full advantage of defeating 
the British because he lacked the cavalry for the pursuit (BG IV 26,35). The 
literary sources frequently refer to the heavy casualties caused by pursuing 
cavalry (Plut. Lucul. 28; BG 1 50; 11 20; VI 8; BC 11 40; Idistaviso; Mons 
Graupius). Arrian proposed that his pursuit of the Alani should be carried 
out by the cavalry and light infantry, but the heavy infantry, his "phalanx", 
was to remain in formation and advance slowly behind the pursuers in case the 
enemy should turn and renew the attack (ektaxis 29), which is exactly what 
Onasander recommends. This advice also corresponds with that of Vegetius 
on the purpose of the line of battle cited above; the assumption is that once 
this line is broken the killing of the defeated by the cavalry will finish the 
battle off and destroy the fleeing army. 
Casualty figures would appear to back up this general strategy; accounts of 
battles do not always mention the casualty figures, and when they are 
mentioned they may be exaggerated for political or literary reasons. Although 
the figures are probably fairly unreliable, the proportions of casualties on the 
two sides give some indication of the often very unequal losses, eg: Thapsus, 
5000 to Caesar's 50; Munda, 30,000 to c. 1000; Boudicca, 80,000 Britons to 400 
Romans; Mons Graupius, 10,000 Britons to 
36034. 
34 The casualty figures for the Roman campaign against Antiochus are even 
more disproportionate; Appian gives the figures for two battles; XI 20, Roman 
losses 200 to Antiochus' c. 10,000 including prisoners; Magnesia XI 36, Roman 
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Roman retreats during the late Republic and early Empire are usually made in 
formation, such as the testudo used by Crassus and Antony in Parthia and the 
circular formation Don-dtius' troops deployed to gain the high ground after 
their defeat by Pharnaces. But the principal reason for the construction of 
a marching camp near the battle site was to provide a defensible position to 
which defeated troops could retreat (eg: Cannae, Livy XXII 49; 2nd battle of 
Cremona, Hist. III 26ff). The importance of marching camps as a place of 
refuge is shown in Caesar's commentaries; he invariably constructed a camp 
before he offered battle (BG 1 43; 11 8; BC 111 94-5), and on one occasion 
battle was avoided because of the marching camps of both sides (BC 1 82). 
Caesar and Afranius had constructed camps less than two miles apart on the 
battlefield. Caesar wished to avoid battle because "the proximity of the camp 
would allow the beaten side to retreat and find refuge quickly", and a result 
would not be forthcoming. 
One of the more interesting recommendations Vegetius makes is that the 
defeated enemy be allowed to flee so they would not turn and fight (111 21). 
Arrian's plans for the pursuit seem to have the same idea and he certainly had 
no intention of surrounding the enemy. Frontinus devotes a section of his 
Stratagems to this topic on the grounds that if the enemy was totally 
surrounded he was more likely to fight to the death; this would result in 
greater casualties to the eventual victor. Frontinus includes Hannibal at Lake 
Trasimene and Caesar against the Germans as examples of callowing the enemy 
to escape to inflict greater casualties during the flight (Strat. II vi 4-5). 
losses of 24 cavalry and 300 infantry to c. 50,000 including prisoners. 
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The General 
Although Onasander tends to give more prominence to the position of the 
general, both he and Vegetius state that the general should fight a battle from 
the rear (Onas. XXXIII; Veg. 111 18); in Vegetius he should be at the rear, to 
the right of the infantry with reserves; in Onasander he is kept at the rear 
to stay alive and keep command of the troops. He is expected to ride by and 
encourage his men by his presence and move troops around the field when 
necessary. 
Emphasis is placed on the general staying alive. An army could be thoroughly 
demoralized by learning in the middle of a battle that their general had been 
killed, and even if he was just wounded the news could have an affect on the 
outcome of the battle. In a battle between Antony and Pansa the latter was 
wounded and as soon as his army heard of this they turned and fled (Appian 
BC 11169). Frontinus includes an example of an army losing confidence after 
learning that their general had been injured (Strat. II vii 11), and of how 
misinformation could be used, spreading the rumour amongst enemy ranks that 
their general had been killed (Strat. II iv 9-10)". Caesar was particularly 
aware of the importance of encouraging his troops in this respect; at Alesia he 
wore a distinctive red cloak which must have given the soldiers heart 
whenever they caught sight of it (BG VII 88) and at Munda he took off his 
helmet to assure his soldiers that he was still alive (Appian BC 11 104). 
35 Another example of the use of misinformation may have occurred at the 
second battle at Cremona; Tacitus hints that Antonius Primus may have 
deliberately spread the rumour that Mucianus' troops had arrived (Hist. Ijj 
25). 
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Despite advice to the contrary from the treatises, the general frequently took 
to the field with his troops; both Caesar and Sulla did so to shame their men 
into renewing the fight (Stra . II viii 12-13) 
"'. According to Tacitus Agricola 
fought on foot with the auxiliaries at Mons Graupius but this would have made 
it very hard for him to see the overa. U situation and decide when to send in the 
reserve cavalry. 
This illustrates another disadvantage of the general fighting as a foot soldier 
rather than directing the battle from the rear, that it left to someone else the 
responsibility of sending in the reserves. In his battle against Civilis, 
Cerialis remained at the rear with a reserve force of picked men for 
emergencies (Hist. V 16) which is exactly what Vegetius recommended. 
Caesar, on the other hand, fought with the right wing against Ariovistus and 
although his presence there greatly encouraged the legionaries, it meant that 
Crassus, the cavalry commander, had to order in the third line of the triplex 
acies to support the hard pressed left. The other officers were occupied in 
the line of battle and had Crassus not noticed the difficulties of the Roman 
left, or been engaged with the cavalry elsewhere, the battle might not have 
been such an overwhelming victory for the Romans. 
Apart from staying alive, one of the other principal duties of the general in 
battle was to encourage his men, which Onasander mentions. Traditionally 
generals spoke to their troops before a battle to encourage them and this gave 
the historians an opportunity to exhibit their rhetorical skills as they rewrote 
or composed these speeches for their histories. Indeed, these speeches are 
36It was not just generals who made use of this tactic to encourage their men 
to fight eg: the famous standard bearer of the Xth at Caesar's opposed landing 
in Britain (BG IV 25) and Frontinus Strat. II viii 1-6, variations on the same 
tactic. 
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often as important to the historian as the actual battle (see above p- 133 note 
Obviously if the general was fighting as a foot soldier he could not ride 
up and down the lines of troops encouraging them as Onasander suggests, 
although of course he would be a great encouragement to the soldiers he was 
actually fighting with. On one occasion Caesar did do what Onasander 
suggests, when his army was caught offguard by the Nervii when entrenching 
(BG 1120). The tactical situation was fairly serious and so Caesar rode round 
the different groups making speeches to encourage them. He then joined the 
weakest part of the line on foot. 
Conclusions 
The accounts of pitched battles in the Roman period for the most part 
correspond favourably with the recommendations and suggestions put forward 
by the treatises. Choice of terrain, disposition of forces, positioning of 
reserves etc. very often reflect the contents of the treatises, and concerns 
are the same, particularly regarding terrain and being outflanked. There are 
inevitable variants and occasions when what the treatises suggest does not 
reflect actual practices, but as Onasander points out, some things cannot be 
reduced to rules or planned beforehand. 
Onasander is much less rigid about military procedures than Vegetius. The 
earlier writer is content to leave the general to make many of the decisions, 
particularly concerning the details of dispositions. Vegetius, on the other 
hand, supplies his recommended 'standard' battle line, plus a number of 
variants depending on topographical circumstances and the nature of the 
troops on both sides. The later writer is also far more cautious than 
Onasander and Frontinus. All advise care when engaging, and Onasander 
suggests avoiding battle until a suitable place is found, but only Vegetius 
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recommends avoiding battle completely and only fighting when absolutely 
necessary or when the outcome was in no doubt (111 25). 
Failure to engage an army would mean keeping an army intact and this is more 
in line with the low risk defence of the later Empire (Luttwak 1976 192-3) than 
the more risky offensive strategies of the earlier period. It is perhaps not 
surprising after the Roman defeat at Adrianople. As in his book on siege 
warfare, Vegetius is more concerned with defence than attack. Arrian's 
campaign against the Alans is essentia)ly defensive, the author intending to 
engage the enemy only if necessary and under specific topographical 
circumstances. In a defensive campaign, such considerations are of equal 
importance to the actual deployments, especially since the evidence of 
Vegetius suggests that the latter had not changed a great deal since the 
Republic. 
Although the treatises and actual field practices correspond very well on the 
subject of pitched battles, it is impossible to tell whether the treatises had any 
influence at all on battlefield procedures. Roman battle tactics were very 
conservative; Caesar indicates that there were established military practices 
and dispositions in the Roman army (BG VI 34), and the treatise writers would 
of course have been aware of them. Caesar certainly was aware of the 
contents of the text books and indeed implies that they had some relevance to 
actual practices, although perhaps there is a slight criticism of them for being 
too rigid (BG 11 22), something which Onasander seems to have attempted to 
avoid (XXXII) 
37 
. 
37 Caesar states that his dispositions against the Nervii were dictated more by 
the features of the site, the slope of the hill, and the demands of the immediate 
situation than by the theories of any military rule book (BG 11 22). 
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Siege warfare 
Introduction 
Siege warfare played an important part in Rome's external and internal 
conflicts. The capture of towns and strongholds in enemy territory was often 
one of the principal objectives of an invading force; towns and strongholds 
could have great strategic importance; wealth could be obtained through the 
plunder of captured cities, and it could be the only way to attack an opponent 
who declined to accept a pitched battle'. 
The importance of siege warfare is indicated by the prominence it is given by 
both the treatises and other sources. Roman historians tended to give sieges 
prominence, partly no doubt because of their importance, but also because of 
the dramatic episodes they frequently involved. The treatises, however, tend 
to deal primarily, and often exclusively, with the construction of siege 
machinery rather than methods of attack and defence, and since this thesis is 
concerned with the practicalities of warfare and not military engineering which 
has already been considered in detail (Marsden 1969 & 1971), such machinery 
will only be considered when sufficient information is available in the treatises 
concerning their use. 
This chapter will therefore consider the advice of the treatises and the 
evidence available in historical and archaeological sources concerning the 
practicalities of siege warfare and the employment of the engines described in 
the more technical treatises. It will also survey briefly the precursors of 
Roman siege methods and discuss any changes that took place during the 
'The Jews seem to have realized they could not defeat the Romans in pitched 
battle so decided to defend selected strong points during the Jewish revolt. 
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Republic and Empire. A precis of Roman sieges discussed in the chapter is 
contained in Appendix 3; references to siege sites followed by a date in 
brackets indicates an entry in the appendix. 
The Treatises 
A number of the surviving treatises touch on the subject of siege warfare - 
Some of these are concerned almost exclusively with the subject and tend to 
be fairly technical, covering artillery and other military machinery whereas 
other more general treatises usually include sections of varying detail on the 
subject. The writers of both types seem to have made some use of earlier 
Greek and HeUenistic workS2. 
The two surviving Greek treatises on this subject are by Aeneas 'Tacticus' and 
Philo of Byzantium. That of Aeneas dates to the 4th century BC and is 
concerned only with methods of defence, though as stated above (Chapter 2, 
on the Literary Sources), originally there was probably a companion treatise 
on how to besiege a city'. The exact date of Philo's work is disputed, though 
it is generally agreed that it dates to the Hellenistic period 4. The treatise 
covers both sides of siege warfare, giving detailed instructions on how to 
fortify, provision and defend a city, and how to besiege one. 
As stated above, the treatises of the Roman period may be divided into two 
types, and the specific advice given by these will be discussed in the relevant 
2jt is because of the influence of earlier Greek and Hellenistic works on the 
Roman treatises that this chapter will include a discussion of earlier siege 
techniques . 
3 Lydus cites Aeneas as an authority on the art of besieging a city 
(TEo, Xjo, 2, CE-ct. Kq) rather than on defending one (de Maq. I 47). 
Lawrence (1979 69-71) summarizes the arguments; he suggests a date in the 
240s BC but a later 3rd century date is also proposed. 
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sections below. Of the more general writers, Onasander rarely touches on the 
practical side of siege warfare and is more interested in the moral issues 
involved such as the treatment of captured towns and their defenders (see 
below, Chapter 8 on Morality in Warfare). Frontinus covers the subject in 
Book III of the Strateqemata, but believed that the development of machines 
and engines for siege warfare had long since reached their limit (Strat. III 
Pref .), and so does not include them in his work. Instead he concentrates on 
ruses which he considers useful for the capture and defence of cities. 
Vegetius devotes a large section of his de Re Militari to siege warfare, treating 
it in the same way that Philo does, from the point of view of both attacker and 
defender, though with a pronounced emphasis on defence. Vegetius' section 
on siege warfare was, by his own admission, based partly on earlier sources 
(IV 30)5 . The book may be divided up into a number of sections on different 
subjects, and it is possible to see how indebted he was to earlier works: 
5 "1 believe I have arranged for convenient public use the information on 
besieging and defending cities that ancient authors have handed down, and 
that has been discovered more recently through necessity. 11 
178 
Veg. IV 1-6 How cities may be Philo I 
defended naturally and by Vit. de Arch Iv 
fortifications. On fortifications of 
cities. Vegetius may 
have followed 
Vitruvius to some 
extent (Johnson 1983 
31) but would appear 
to be more indebted to 6 Philo . 
Veg. IV 7-11 The supplies a city Philo II 
should gather in case of 
siege. 
Veg. IV 13-25 Combination of Philo's Philo III, on 
individual sections on withstanding a siege. 
withstanding a siege and Philo IV, on besieging 
besieging a city. a city. 
eg: 
Veg. IV 18-19 On heightening walls and Philo 111 12-13. 
firing incendiary devices 
to counter advance of 
siege towers. 
Veg. IV 23 Semicircular concave wall Philo 111 18. 
to cover breach in outer 
wall 
Veg. IV 28 Brief mention of Philo 111 5-6. 
circumvallation 
Vegetius makes no mention of Philo in his list of sources (1 8); they are all 
Roman. However, since Roman siege techniques were closely derived from 
those of the Greek and Hellenistic periods, it seems likely that the Romans 
would have used Hellenistic treatises or based their own very heavily on 
earlier works. Thus Vegetius might be using a Greek source such as Philo or, 
perhaps more likely, a Roman treatise which was itself a direct descendant of 
the Greek and Helienistic tradition. 
'Vegetius is often not as detailed as Philo; for example, although he points out 
that right angled towers are vulnerable to rams (IV 2) he does not prescribe 
any particular shape for towers as Philo does (11 2-6). 
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Vitruvius touches on certain aspects of siege warfare in his capacity as a 
military architect. When describing the construction of a town's fortifications, 
he takes into consideration the possibility of a siege and his walls, towers and 
gates are designed with this in mind (de Arch. I v). Book X includes fairly 
detailed descriptions of artillery and other assault machines such as rams and 
siege towers, along with other machinery such as lifting devices (X ii), mill 
wheels (X v) and water screws (X vi) - Vitruvius, however, feels it 
unnecessary to say much about the defence of cities "because the enemy do not 
make use of our manuals when they besiege a city" (de Arch. X xvi 2)'. 
The three surviving treatises of the Roman period that are more technical in 
nature were written by Greeks, and in some cases the authors make 
considerable use of their Hellenistic predecessors. The nEpt pnXqvjjjiq-c(A)v of 
Athenaeus 'Mechanicus' and artillery treatises by Heron of Alexandria have 
been discussed above and will not be considered further (see Chapter 2 on 
The Literary Sources). The latest of the Greek technical treatises is that by 
Apollodorus of Damascus, written at the request of the Emperor Hadrian. On 
the whole, Apollodorus' work is less technical than the artillery manuals and 
in his opening note to the Emperor he claims to have made no use of ancient 
authors because they were out of date. The treatise describes a variety of 
equipment needed in assaulting a stronghold and is generally more practical 
than Vitruvius' work on the subject. Whereas the latter simply describes the 
7A very interesting comment suggesting that manuals on siege warfare were 
available in Vitruvius' day and could have a practical application. The author 
does not consider the possibility of Romans besieging Romans as had happened 
in the recent civil wars. Perhaps Vitruvius, a supporter of Caesar and 
Octavian, felt that this was unlikely now the latter had secured himself in 
power. 
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different pieces of equipment, Apollodorus gives at least some information on 
how they should be used and can be adapted for different purposes'. 
Pre-Roman Siege Warfare 
A gradual evolution in siege techniques may be seen from the Assyrian period 
onwards, and the evidence for most of these periods is for the most part 
extremely good. Assyrian and other early sieges are described in literary 
records and are graphically illustrated in the 9th century BC palace reliefs 
from Nimrud and elsewhere in Assyria9. The reliefs show besiegers using 
siege ramps, mobile siege towers, scaling ladders, rams, and possibly mines 
whereas defenders are depicted firing or throwing missiles from city walls and 
employing an anti-ram device, catching it with chains and upending it. Both 
sides used archery and incendiary devices. The Assyrians also blockaded 
cities, setting up a fortified camp outside the city walls and starving the 
besieged into surrender". 
Persian siege techniques are illustrated at Palaepaphos; Paphos had 
participated in the Ionian revolt and the Persians besieged it in c. 497 BC, 
destroying a sanctuary outside the city for materials for a siege ramp. 
Missiles found around the ramp probably represent attempts to halt its 
8 eg: Apollodorus includes a section on the different uses of ladders whereas 
Vitruvius does not think it necessary to give any information on them (de 
Arch. X xiv 1). 
'Saggs (1944) 260-261 quotes from a description by the Assyrian king 
Esarhaddon of a siege he carried out; sieges are also mentioned in the Old 
Testament eg: Deuteronomy 28 52; Joshua 2-6 on the capture of Jericho 
including the sending out of spies and massacre of the population and 
destruction of the city. 
"cf: Oppenheim (1955) who quotes documents mentioning children being sold 
for money in order to buy food. Another document mentions a woman in 
Babylon who sold herself into slavery to receive food from her master and so 
survive a famine while the city was besieged. 
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construction, and the besieged also undermined the ramp and fired it, causing 
part of it to collapse. The Persians may have entered the city following a 
violent assault on one of the gates, but this is not certain - 
Plataea provides a good example of a major development in siege warfare. The 
city was besieged in c. 427 BC by the Peloponnesian army which tried a number 
of different techniques, including building a ramp and direct assault; the 
Plataeans heightened their walls and undermined the ramp. When direct 
assault failed, the Peloponnesians built. a line of circumvallation with a ditch 
and two brick walls which were roofed to provide shelter for the garrison; 
towers were set at regular intervals. This is the earliest reference to such an 
investing work (T hucydides XI 8ff ), though its sophistication suggests it may 
not have been the first physical line of blockade. 
Torsion artillery, supposedly invented for Dionysius I in the early 4th century 
BC (Diodorus Siculus XIV 42 1), came to be used widely in sieges for both 
offence and defence, particularly as an anti-personnel device; its use in 
providing covering fire for Alexander's troops at Halicarnassus seems to have 
been a major factor in the success of the assault (Arrian Anab. 1 20-23). In 
the late 4th century BC siege warfare seems to have become a very large scale 
affair with the use of massive artillery and huge mobile siege towers. The best 
example of this was the helepolis, built for Demetrius Poliorcetes' sieges at 
Salamis in Cyprus and Rhodes and which Diodorus describes in detail (XX 48; 
Unfortunately Demetrius had little success with his towers; the one at 
Salamis was burnt and he was unable to bring that at Rhodes into action 
properly, so their effectiveness cannot be judged. 
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The essential techniques of siege warfare changed little from the Assyrian 
period through to the Middle Ages and, as stated above, the Romans were able 
to benefit from the developments that had taken place before them, and from 
the Greek and Hellenistic textbooks that were available. 
Roman Sieqe Techniques 
As stated above, none of the textbooks actua. Uy describes how to carry out a 
siege from start to finish, not even Vegetius. Instead they tend to 
concentrate on machinery, as Vitruvius and Apollodorus do, or on particular 
ruses that can be used to capture a city, and defences against them 
(Onasander and Frontinus). It is, however, possible to obtain some advice, 
albeit sometimes very brief, about most aspects of attacking and defending 
cities and strongholds. 
There were two ways of attacking a fortified position; by direct assault or by 
blockade. These tactics could be used individually or together; a violent 
assault could be sufficient to capture the objective (eg: New Carthage (210 
BC); two oppida in Britain (54 BC); Volandum (AD 58)), whereas if the 
general did not wish to risk this, the stronghold could be blockaded to induce 
surrender through starvation (eg: Numantia (133 BC); Alesia (52 BC); 
Uxellodunum (51 BC)). Alternatively, the stronghold could be immediately 
blockaded whilst preparations were made for an assault (eg: Ambracia (189 
BC); Pindenissum (51/50 BC); Masada (AD 72/73)). The most common 
method, however, was to attempt an initial assault and, if this failed, to 
blockade the stronghold whilst preparations were made for an assault with 
siege machinery (eg: Syracuse (214-12 BC); Carthage (147-6 BC); Marseilles 
(49 BC); Jotapata (AD 67)). 
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Initial Assaults 
Onasander's advice is concerned more with the violent assault of cities than 
with blockades; he suggests that the general should make a sudden assault to 
give the defenders less time to react (Onas. xxxix), dividing his army to 
weaken the besieged by continuous attacks at different parts of the walls, and 
he also advocates the use of feint attacks to divide and confuse the defenders 
(xlji). Frontinus illustrates the advantage of surprise attacks (Strat. III i), 
and attacks from an unexpected quarter (III ix), and Vegetius warns that this 
initial assault is frequently the most dangerous for defenders because of its 
violence and the determination of the attackers (IV 12). 
Corbulo's attack on the Armenian city of Volandum (AD 58) provides an 
excellent example of the type of violent assault recommended by Onasander. 
Having made a reconnaissance, Corbulo divided his force; whilst half provided 
a highly effective covering fire from artillery and slings, the other half 
attempted to undermine the walls under the protection of a testudo formation, 
and to scale them with ladders. The defenders were overcome by the violence 
of the assault, and Corbulo took the city in a few hours with no casualties. 
Scipio's attack with two divisions simultaneously at New Carthage was initially 
unsuccessful, but he made another immediately, with one group attacking from 
a lagoon at low tide. The defenders were taken by surprise and caught 
between the two forces (210 BC), again illustrating the effectiveness of a 
surprise attack - 
Although Onasander (x1ji), Frontinus (Strat. III ix 3) and Vegetius (IV 26) 
all recommend or warn the defenders about the use of stealth to capture 
citadels or very well defended points, this rarely happened. Frontinus 
provides only one example, from the Jugurthine war (Stra III ix 3; Sallust 
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Jug . 93-4) 
". Another way to encourage a citadel to surrender seems to have 
been to sack the captured part of the city until any defenders holding out in 
the citadel surrendered (this will be discussed in greater detail below, 
Chapter 8). 
Advice on countering an assault of this type is very limited. Vegetius 
suggested building up supplies of missiles (IV 8& 29) in preparation for a 
siege, and these could be used against an initial assault. Although he 
mentions that this was a particularly dangerous time for the defenders, he 
fails to give any advice on what they might do. 
Roman fortifications coming under such an assault were also defended by 
soldiers with pila muralia, a particular type of spear. These were used by 
Cicero's soldiers when his winter camp came under attack (54 BC; BG V 40) 
and when Sabinus' troops were defending the Roman circumvallation during 
a sortie by the defenders of a Thracian hillfort (AD 26; Annals iv 51). Pila 
muralia may also have been represented on Trajan's Column (scenes 77-79); 
Roman soldiers are shown defending a stone fort and thrusting at the Dacian 
attackers, presumably with some kind of spear. The shafts of ordinary pila 
would probably not have been strong enough to withstand such treatment and 
Pila muralia would have required thick, heavy shafts so they could be dropped 
or thrust down on attackers with greater force 12 . Connolly has suggested 
that a spear Mustrated on the Praeneste ship relief in the Vatican is a pilum 
murale because of the thickness of the shaft. 
"Although the Gauls attempted the same with the Capitol in 390 BC, they 
failed because of some vigilant geese and Manlius (Livy v 47). 
12 These were not the palisade stakes, mistakenly called pila muralia, 
examples of which have been found at the sites of Roman forts (see above, Tt*)Cvkd Chapter 4 on Marching Camps). A 
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Assault Machines 
If the initial assault failed, or one was not attempted, the besieging general 
was expected to prepare various machines and shelters for attack, often 
building a circumvallation as well to protect his troops and enforce a blockade 
(see below p. 183,199 ff ). Apollodorus and Vegetius both describe some of 
these devices, the former in more detail, whilst only the latter explains how 
to counter them. Onasander avoids the subject altogether, stating that it is 
not his duty to tell the general to use a particular piece of equipment under 
certain conditions (xhi); a general will use the different types of siege engines 
as the opportunity arises, and his decision will be based on luck, the strength 
of the defenders and the skill of the military engineers present 13 .T his 
statement perhaps helps to explain why the treatises do not prescribe how to 
carry out a siege in the way they do with other aspects of warfare (see below 
205). 
Shelters 
Shelters (vineae, pluteii, crates and testudines) provided protection for the 
attackers to approach the walls for assaults or mining purposes, and the 
different types are described by ApoHodorus (140.9-144.2; 153.8-155.7) and 
Vegetius (IV 13-16). The shelters were generally made from a framework of 
stout timbers with planks and wicker hurdles on the sides and roof as 
protection against n-dssiles. The whole structure would then be covered with 
uncured hides or some other fireproof material to protect it from incendiary 
devices (Apollodorus 142; Veg. IV 15). 
"Vitruvius (de Arch. X xvi 1) also makes this last point, a fact apparently 
confirmed by Josephus' statement that the artillery of Legion X at Jerusalem 
was superior to that of any other legion (BJ V 269). Perhaps this legion had 
better engineers than the others. 
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Shelters of all these types were regularly used in sieges (eg: Noviodunum 57 
BC, Avaricum 52 BC, Pindenissum 51/50 BC, Marseilles 49 BC, Vetera, AD 69, 
Amida AD 359) but although Vegetius suggests different uses for the different 
types of shelter (the testudo for the ram, vineae for sappers, pluteff for 
archers etc. ), the other literary sources do not seem to make these 
distinctions; Caesar, for example, seems to use the term vineae for shelters 
of all types. Vegetius does not suggest any specific defences against these 
shelters, though he does later against the ram testudo (IV 23) and presumably 
the missiles he recommends at this point, and incendiary devices, would be 
equally effective or ineffective against other types of shelter. At Marseilles, 
for example, the attackers were working behind vineae made of four layers of 
hurdles because of the power of the defenders' artillery, and even these were 
pierced. Such was the strength of the artillery in Marseilles that eventually 
Caesar's troops were forced to build a gallery from brick and timber to allow 
them to approach the walls. These shelters were to allow the attacking troops 
access to the walls for attempted assaults, the use of a battering ram, or 
undermining operations. 
Cie% 
Sie-ge towers 
The construction of siege towers is covered by Apollodorus in some detail 
(164.5-178), and by Vegetius more briefly (IV 17), whilst both Josephus (BJ 
14 
V 291 ff) and Ammianus (xix 7; xxiv 2) describe such towers in use . Siege 
towers had to be well protected by uncured hides against adssiles and 
incendiary devices and were generally supposed to include rams and boarding 
bridges along with artillery and archers to keep the defenders off the walls 
whilst the tower was brought into action. 
' 4Ammianus (xxiii 4 10-13) also describes a siege tower as part of his excursus 
on siege machinery. However, since this considers only the construction of 
the tower and not its use, it will not be included here. 
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Descriptions of siege towers are often more detailed in the historical sources 
than the treatises, and it is in these sources that evidence for the practical 
use of towers can be found (eg: Cirta 116 BC; Avaricum 52 BC; the sieges 
during the Jewish revolt; Amida AD 359; Pirisabora AD 363). One is also 
illustrated in action on the Arch of Severus in Rome (Panel iv)'5; the tower 
here contained a ram on one of the lower levels and troops on the top levels 
waiting to storm the city whi-Ist others hurl missiles to keep the defenders off 
the walls. The siege tower at Masada also contained a ram, though on a higher 
level, and Josephus comments on its effectiveness against the stone wall of the 
fortress. This tower, like those at Jotapata (AD 67) and Amida (AD 359) are 
described as being protected from incendiary missiles by hides as advised by 
the treatises, whilst Ammianus makes no mention of the towers on wooden rafts 
at Aquileia (AD 361) having any kind of protection, and they were burnt by 
incendiary devices fired by the defenders. 
Vegetius suggests several defences against the advance of siege engines (IV 
18-20); sorties could be made, sections of the wall could be strengthened or 
heightened to prevent siege towers dominating the walls, mines could be dug 
where the tower would approach so it would subside before it reached the 
walls, and when a tower was moved up, the defenders could attempt to drive 
it away from the walls using long iron-bound beams. 
Onasander warns the besieging general about the dangers of sorties (xl) and 
they are reported during a large number of sieges, meeting with varying 
degrees of success; at Athens (87 BC) the defenders were able to burn the 
siege engines, and at Marseilles (49 BC) the defenders sortied during a truce 
15 The contents of the friezes on the Arch of Severus are discussed by BriDiant 
(1967). 
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to burn the Caesarian siege works. At Amida (AD 359), however, the 
defenders got into difficulties during over-optimistic sorties and eventually 
the gates of the city were blocked up to prevent sorties rather than to provide 
additional security for the besieged city. 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest the strengthening and heightening of 
walls in preparation for an attack, or during a siege, was a fairly common 
practice. At Dura (AD 256) long mounds were built by the defenders inside 
the walls to strengthen them against attack from rams and outside presumably 
for added protection and to hinder the approach of siege towers . 
Archaeological evidence suggests the walls of Veii were strengthened at some 
point before the siege there (396 BC), possibly because of the prospect of a 
siege, and those of Syracuse (214-212 BC), Placentia (AD 69) and Cremna (AD 
278) were also strengthened at some point soon before they came under siege - 
These were preparations made either with the possibility of a siege in mind or 
before a siege had actually begun. At Avaricum (52 BC) and Jotapata (AD 
67), Dura (AD 256) and Amida (AD 359) sections of the wa. U were heightened 
when they came under threat from the attackers' siege operations, in reaction 
to the attackers' actions rather than in preparation for them, and at Haliartus 
(171 BC) the defenders rebuilt the wall with rubble as the attackers 
demolished it. 
The undermining of siege ramps seems to have been a common practice in this 
type of warfare since early times (eg: Palaepaphos, see above p. 181), and was 
frequently done to prevent the approach of siege towers (eg: Sotiates 56 BC 
and Avaricum 52 BC, both without success; Jerusalem (AD 70) and Dura (AD 
256), successfully). Vegetius, however, never mentions the use of siege 
ramps, and the example he gives of undermining a siege tower is from Rhodes 
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in the 4th century BC, perhaps another indicator that he was using a Greek 
treatise for this section of his work or, as suggested above, a Roman treatise 
that was itself based heavily on a Greek work. 
It was possible to drive away siege towers with long beams as Vegetius 
suggests, and the Romans did this at Vetera (AD 69) to counter the advance 
of a two storey siege tower bujit by the Batavians. The tower was demolished 
by blows from the poles. 
Battexing Rams 
The ram is one of the few items of siege equipment which can be properly 
discussed from the point of view of both offence and defence and with 
reference to the advice of the treatises and actual field practice. The ram 
(aries) would usually be suspended in a mobile shelter or tortoise (testudo) 
for protection and ease of movement, and according to Vegetius both the ram 
and the shelter got their names from their similarities to the two animals (IV 
14). The ram is described in detail by Vitruvius (de Arch X xv) and 
Apollodorus (153.8-164.4), briefly by Vegetius (IV 14), and in the histories 
of Josephus. (BJ 111214-221) and Ammianus (XXIII 4 8-9). Apollodorus points 
out that a ram in several pieces must have several hanging points to keep its 
strength and solidity (161.6-8), and although the principles behind the use 
of a ram were fairly basic, Apollodorus recommends its use against gates, 
angles of towers, and any other weak points in the walls (157). 
Rams could vary in strength, and two of the more powerful seem to have been 
the Roman ram nicknamed Victor by the Jews at Jerusalem (BJ V 299) and the 
hundred year old Persian ram used at Bezabde (AD 360). This latter ram was 
made up f rom several pieces, presumably for easy transportation, and this 
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does not seem to have affected its strength. Whilst it seems most likely that 
reconnaissance would be made to discover weak sectors of the walls against 
which the ram would have more effect, this is only specified in a couple of 
cases. At Singara (AD 360) the Persians used the ram against the still damp 
mortar in the joints of a newly built walls and forced an entry at this point, 
whilst at Bezabde (AD 360) they attacked the parts of the walls which were 
unstable and falling down. 
Rams are one of the few pieces of siege equipment illustrated frequently in 
Roman sculpture (eg: Trajan's Column scene 79; Arch of Severus, panels ii 
and iv). Most of these, and those described in the literary sources, were 
suspended in testudines with wooden frames and the steeply pitched roofs 
recommended by Apollodorus (154.1-5) so missiles thrown down would roll off. 
The heads of a1l the rams depicted in illustrations are actua. Uy in the shape of 
the animal they are named after, but it is difficult to tell whether they would 
actually have been this shape; Apollodorus states that the head of the ram 
should be in the shape of an anvil (4-Kpwv; 161.4), and the Greek ram head 
from Olympia is this shape, though it does have a decorative ram's head on 
either side (Winich 1972 101). 
Vegetius makes several suggestions for countering rams (IV 23); heavy 
missiles could be thrown down from the walls, even pieces of column and 
stone, onto the shelters and rams in an attempt to break off the ram heads; 
padded mats (centones) could be lowered to cushion the blows of the ram, or 
the defenders could catch the ram head in a noose and haul it up the wall. 
These are fairly obvious suggestions to make, and other sources show that 
such defences had been in use since Assyrian times (see above p. 181). 
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Missiles thrown down from the walls often included chunks of masonry, 
millstones or column drums (Bezabde AD 360; Adrianople AD 378), and the 
very large rounded stone from Cremna (AD 278) may have been used for this 
purpose rather than as an artillery shot. At Haliartus (171 BC) the defenders 
used stones and lead weights to destroy the rams whilst at Ambracia (189 BC) 
cranes were used to drop the weights. Josephus was able to protect the walls 
of Jotopata (AD 67) for a while using sacks filled with chaff. until the Romans 
cut them down using reaping hooks attached to long poles. At Marseilles the 
defenders caught a ram in a noose and wound it up with a windlass (Vitruvius 
de Arch. X xii) and the Persians did the same at Bezabde (AD 360). 
The treatise of Apollodorus may provide a clue to the identification of three 
devices illustrated on Trajan's Column (scene 308) which have been the object 
of much discussion" - Apollodorus states that all movable pieces of siege 
equipment, particularly those with wheels, should also have wooden or iron 
pegs to secure them into the ground while they were in use (140.12; 157.1-6). 
Each of the devices depicted on the Column appears to have two attachments 
near the ground on the 'axle' which may be pegs, indicating that they may 
have been mobile engines for offensive actions. 
Apollodorus describes one ram which is particularly usef ul against the 
defenders on the walls (188.2-9), and the arm of the ram itself is compared to 
that of a single armed stone throwing catapult (jj()oj3okoC povayKwv). This 
might look very similar to the representation on the Column, and the barrel- 
shaped objects shown at the end of the arms may be the iron ram heads 
mentioned by Apollodorus. The shape of this is fairly similar to the ram heads 
shown in illustrations of later texts of the treatise. Unfortunately, as with 
16 See Frere & Lepper 1988 165-167 for a synopsis of the different theories. 
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most of the equipment he describes, Apollodorus does not explain how this 
particular type of ram is used, and it is difficult to see exactly how it would 
work, though the arm of the right hand machine may be drawn back to a 
suitable position for swinging against the wall or the defenders on it. 
However, it is possible that the three machines on the Column may show the 
type of ram described in the treatise. 
Mines 
Much advice is given in the treatises concerning the construction of n-dnes by 
both attackers and defenders, and some on how they could be countered. 
Both Apollodorus and Vegetius (IV 24) describe the use of mines in the 
destruction of defensive walls, undermining the walls and underpinning them, 
then firing them, and the latter also mentions how tunnels could be used to 
17 
enter a city secretly . Vegetius suggests that cities should have a wide 
deep ditch filled with water to prevent any mining attempts (IV 5) but 
provides no other advice on countering them. 
As stated above (p. 181), mines, like rams and siege towers, were in use from 
the Assyrian period, and there are examples of mines in Roman sieges dug for 
both the purposes mentioned by Vegetius. Veii (396 BC) supposedly, and 
Maozamalcha (AD 363) were both taken through mines dug into the towns, 
though in the former case the Romans are supposed to have entered the citadel 
through a cuniculus or drainage channel. At Ambracia (189 BC), Athens (87 
BC), Marseilles (49 BC) and Dura (AD 256) attempts were made to undermine 
17 Interestingly, Vegetius notes that the Bessians were particularly good at 
mining because of their experience with mineral mining (IV 24). Caesar notes 
that the Sotiates and the Gauls at Avaricum were particularly skilled at 
digging mines because they were experienced copper and iron rniners. 
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the walls with varying degrees of SUCCeSS". Vitruvius describes how the 
defenders at Marseilles created a water-fiUed basin inside their walls so when 
Caesar's sappers opened their mines they were flooded (de Arch X xi), an 
action similar to Vegetius' suggestion of a deep moat, but a reaction to the 
Caesarian raining operations rather than a precaution made before the siege. 
Wall breaches 
Should the walls succumb to any of the methods of attack described above, 
then another line of defence could be provided by the construction of a 
concave semicircular wall to cover that part of the original wall that was about 
to be breached (Veg. IV 23), and this would also leave the attackers open to 
fire from the flanks as well as the front if they tried to attack the inner wall. 
This was done at Athens (87 BC), and because Sulla's soldiers were coming 
under such heavy fire when he tried to assault the newly built wall, he was 
forced to retreat. When he later renewed his attack on this section of the wall 
and succeeded in breaching it, he found that the defenders had already 
anticipated this and built several others like it. The same happened at 
Jerusalem (AD 70) when the Romans tried to attack the fortress of Antonia, 
and the Romans made no concerted effort to assault the new wall because of the 
dangers 19 . The Sicarii at Masada 
(AD 72/73) built a wall of earth and timber 
inside the stone wall of the fortress and this absorbed the blows of the ram 
is At Ambracia the Romans were driven out of their mine by poisonous fumes 
pumped in by the defenders, at Athens the walls collapsed but the defenders 
had already built an inner wall, at Marseilles the attackers' mines were flooded 
and at Dura two sections of the defences were collapsed by firing the mines 
but the attackers appear to have been unable to gain entry as a result. 
"'The fortress was eventually taken by a 'stratagem' when a small group of 
Romans entered the fortress secretly and sounded their trumpets; the main 
Roman force attacked at this point but the Jews fled, believing the fortress 
already captured. 
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which had breached the outer wall. Later fortifications went a step further 
and had bastions specifically designed with inner walls and retrenchments that 
could be easily defended if the outer wall was breached (eg: Lucca, 16th-17th 
century). 
Artillery and missiles 
Vegetius (IV 6) states that attackers used artillery to keep the defenders off 
the walls whilst an attack was made, and later stresses the role of artillery in 
the defence of fortified positions, against both men and machines (IV 22). 
Elsewhere he describes two types of incendiary missiles which were intended 
for use against siege engines (IV 18). Other writers provide very little 
information on the actual use of artillery and limit themselves to very detailed 
descriptions of their construction - 
The effectiveness of artillery during an attack to keep the defenders off the 
walls has been mentioned above (p. 183,184,186). Marcellus placed artillery 
on his ships to provide covering fire for his troops at Syracuse (214-212 BC) 
and the artillery in the Persian siege towers at Amida (AD 359) drove the 
defenders off the walls during an abortive attempt to take the town by storm. 
It was also used to protect troops working near the walls; at Bezabde II (AD 
360) Roman artillery covered attacks with rams whilst at Jotopata (AD 67) it 
provided protection for soldiers building a ramp against a vulnerable section 
of the wall. Josephus takes great delight in describing the effectiveness of 
a particular ballista which knocked off a man's head and flung it more than 600 
yards (BJ 111 257). At the same point, he states that the Roman machines 
were able to knock off battlements and corners off towers. Artillery used by 
defenders could be equally effective as Vegetius suggests (IV 22); at Amida 
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the Roman onaqrj'L were used with great effect against the Persian siege towers 
and destroyed them - 
However 
, although both attackers and defenders used artillery against 
fortifications and siege engines, it seems to have been used most often as an 
anti-personnel device. Various exceptionally powerful catapults are reported 
in the literary sources, eg: Archimedes' artillery at Syracuse (214-212 BC), 
the catapults at Marseilles (49 BC) which could fire spiked wooden beams 12 
feet long, the artillery of Legion X at Jerusalem (AD 70, and see above note 
13), and some of the catapults at Hatra (AD 199/200) which seem to have fired 
two missiles simultaneously. 
Finds of both catapult bolts and ballista balls are common at siege sites such 
as Carthage (Marsden 1969 78) and Numantia (Marsden 1969 82), both of which 
have produced quantities of ballista balls. 67 catapult bolts were found in the 
excavations at Hod Hill and their locations have led Richmond to postulate the 
position and height of an artillery tower f rom which at least two catapults were 
fired (Richmond 1968 32-33). 
In addition to artillery, lead or clay slingshot could also be used as an anti- 
personnel device and for incendiary purposes. Corbulo's assault on Volandum 
(AD 58) included covering fire from two types of slingers (libratores and 
funditores) who fired qlandes from a hill. As with artillery missiles, lead and 
clay glandes have been found at a number of sites including Burnswark, 
Beththera (AD 135), Cremna (AD 278), and particularly Perugia (41 BC) and 
Asculum which was besieged by Pompeius Strabo in 90-88 BC (Appian BC 147; 
EE VI 1885). Many of these glandes were inscribed with the names of legions , 
officers, commanders, and derogatory comments and illustrations as part of 
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an airborne propaganda campaign. According to Appian, Sulla was kept 
informed of the situation in Athens (87 BC) by traitors firing c1lande 
inscribed with messages towards the Romans. As a result of information 
received in this way, Sulla was able to ambush and capture a supply train. 
Incendiary devices 
Artillery, slingers and archers could also be used to fire incendiary devices 
and missiles, or they could simply be dropped on attackers. Vegetius (IV 8) 
states that tar, sulphur, pitch and liquid oil should be prepared for burning 
the enemy's engines, and incendiary devices were frequently used in siege 
warfare (see above p. 181). At Uxellodunum (51 BC) the Gauls rolled down 
burning barrels filled with incendiary materials onto the Roman siege engines; 
Josephus poured boiling oil onto a Roman testudo formation at Jotapata (AD 67) 
to break it up, and the Hatrenes fired burning naphtha at the Romans (AD 
199/200 )20 - The use of sulphur (Dura, AD 256) and pitch (Bezabde I, AD 
360) is also attested, and in the latter case the Persian defenders may have 
fired their pitch and bitumen filled baskets from artillery". 
Vegetius describes two types of incendiary missile which could be fired by 
archers or artillery, the maUeolus and the falarica. (IV 18). The malleolus was 
like an arrow, and this corresponds with the description given by Ammianus 
(XXIII 4 14) who states that it should be shot slowly from a loose bow to keep 
the fire alight. The falarica, however, is not mentioned by Ammianus, but 
Vegetius states that it was fired by catapult and could pierce solid iron or the 
"The same happened to Lucullus in Parthia in 69 BC (Dio xxxvi 1). Dio, states 
that naphtha was full of bitumen and was almost impossible to extinguish. 
2 'Both sides at Actium in 31 BC fired pots full of charcoal and pitch at each 
others' ships by means of artillery (Dio ji 34 2). 
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protective layers of a siege engine, allowing the burning material to reach the 
wooden structure. 
Incendiary arrows fired by archers were frequently used in siege warfare; the 
Epirote relieving army attacked the Roman besiegers at Ambracia (189 BC) 
with torches, tow, pitch and maReoli; the Nervii attacking Cicero's winter 
quarters (54 BC) fired incendiary darts Qacula fervefacta. ) as we]l as red hot 
clay glande to burn the camp. Malleoli are also mentioned at Singara (AD 
360), the two sieges at Bezabde (AD 360), Aquileia. and Maozamalcha (both AD 
363), particularly by the defenders trying to destroy assault equipment. The 
heads of maUeoli have been found at Wroxeter and Bar Hill on the Antonine Wall 
(James 1983 142-3), so they need not be associated exclusively with sieges, 
though they do seem to have been most commonly used under these 
circumstances - 
Historians do not generally refer to incendiary missiles fired by catapults as 
falaricae, but do specif y that they are shot from artillery. These are the 
nj)p(ýopoj of the Greeks, used at Tyre, Salamis and Rhodes in the late 4th 
century B 
C22. One of the earliest recorded uses of these missiles by the 
Romans was in 156 BC when Marcius Figulus was besieging the town of 
Delminium in Dalmatia. According to Appian, he fired wooden shafts two 
cubits long and covered with flax, pitch and sulphur into the town using 
catapults (Appian Illyrian wars 11). At Marseilles (49 BC) a siege ramp was 
set on fire by red hot iron bars fired from catapults; Corbulo's missile barrage 
at Volandum (AD 58) included firebrands shot from catapults, and the Romans 
defending Vetera (AD 69) destroyed the Batavians' shelters with fire bolts 
22 Tyre, 307 BC (Arrian Anab. II 21 2); Salamis, 307 BC (Diodorus Siculus XX 
48 6); Rhodes, 304 BC (Diodorus Siculus XX 88 2). 
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shot from catapults (ardentes hastae). James (1983) has identified the head 
of an incendiary catapult bolt from Dura and although it is not certain which 
side was firing them, the bolt is most likely the falarica mentioned by Vegetius 
and not the malleolus which is only ever referred to as being fired by archers - 
Blockade and circumvallation 
As stated above (p. 183,199), if assault on a stronghold failed, or the 
attacking general did not wish to attempt an assault for some reason, like 
Scipio at Numantia (133 BC), the alternative was to blockade the place and 
attempt to induce surrender through starvation. Usually this took the form 
of a line of circumvallation, a physical barrier preventing the defenders from 
escaping or obtaining supplies, and protecting the besieging army from sorties 
by the defenders. 
The military treatises say little about the blockade of strongholds, though 
Vegetius details the supplies a city should obtain in case of blockade (IV 7- 
11). Circumvallations are mentioned by Apollodorus and Vegetius, the former 
providing some details (140.1-3). He states that the besieging force should 
dig a V-shaped ditch at least five feet deep (1.52 m); the debris from the 
ditch should be used to build a rampart, and this should be buttressed with 
stones. Vegetius mentions that the circumvallation or loricula should be 
beyond weapon range of the besieged and consist of a ditch and rampart with 
palisade and turrets (IV 28). Vegetius seems to imply that a physical barrier 
of the type he has mentioned was no longer used by besieging forces, an 
observation which appears to be corroborated by the archaeological and other 
literary evidence; the latest recorded Lines of circumvaRation date to the 
sieges at Beththera (AD 135), possibly Hatra (AD 199/200) and Cremna (AD 
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278), although this was a line of blockade, a full circumvallation being 
unnecessary because of the topography of the site. 
Because circumval-lations usually indicated large-scale operations were being 
undertaken, Roman historians usually mentioned their construction and 
frequently gave details about the various components which formed the work. 
In addition to this information, the archaeological remains of a circumvallation 
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are often one of the few physical features of a siege to survive . 
Although Apollodorus stated that the spoil from the ditch should be used to 
construct the rampart, this was not necessarily the case. The materials used 
in the construction of ramparts varied according to what was available; in a 
particularly rocky area, or where a ditch was unnecessary or impossible to 
dig, a stone wa. U inight be constructed instead; the circumva-Uation wall at 
Masada (AD 72/3) was of stone because that was the only material available. 
Although Vegetius suggests attaching the additional defence of turrets to the 
rampart, he gives no indications as to their possible use, though the literary 
sources suggest these included for signalling and artillery (Numantia, 133 BC) 
and observation (Carthage, 146 BC). Towers along the rampart are recorded 
at a number of sites (eg: Carthage, Numantia, Alesia (52 BC), Machaerus and 
Masada (AD 72/3)). 
"The traces of a circumvallation can lead to the identification of a siege site, 
such as Beththera (AD 135), and can vastly increase knowledge of a particular 
siege mentioned in the literary evidence; at Machaerus (AD 72/3) and 
Beththera (AD 135) for example, no mention is made in the literary sources of 
a circumvallation, and at Cremna (AD 278) recent archaeological discoveries 
have shown that operations were on a much larger scale than suggested in the 
literary sources. 
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The towers at Machaerus and Masada did not extend all the way round the 
circuit of the wall. At Machaerus they appear only to have been built on the 
south west sector whilst those at Masada are along the eastern side. These 
sectors, however, are more open to attack by the besiegers and it is possible 
that towers were considered an extra defence for potentially vulnerable 
sectors of the circumvallation. The distances between towers varied 
considerably between different sites (25-35 m. at Machaerus, 50-75 m. at 
Cremna and 80-100 m. at Masada), and also between individual towers. If 
towers were for the siting of artillery, they could be some distance apart, for 
the effective range of a catapult was up to c. 300 m. (Marsden 1969 chap. iv) , 
and the siting of towers was probably affected more by topographical 
considerations than a desire for regularity of intervals, as long as any 
artillery in them could cover the area between towers. 
Apollodorus recommends a V-shaped ditch at least 5 feet deep in front of the 
rampart, which is comparable with the depth of marching camp ditches 
according to Josephus (6 ft, BJ 111 84) and Vegetius (7 ft, 1 24). As 
suggested above, not all ramparts were accompanied by a ditch, especia. Uy 
where the nature of the soil made this difficult, as at Machaerus and Masada 
(AD 72/3). Most ditches seem to have been V-shaped, though the outer of the 
two ditches at Alesia was found to be flat-bottomed as Caesar states. The 
depth of ditches varied considerably, and were usually deeper than the 
minimum 5 feet (1.52 m. ) specified by Apollodorus (eg: Alesia (52 B C) 2.4-2.6 
m.; Perugia (41 BC) 8.8 m. according to Appian, though this seems rather 
unlikely) . 
No ditch was found at Numantia although the literary sources state there was 
one, and as with marching camps, the defences of circumvallations may have 
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been in accordance with the potential threat of a sortie or the arrival of a 
relieving army. Caesar's very elaborate defences at Alesia (52 BC) included 
a contravallation to protect his troops from the Gallic relieving army as well as 
a circumvallation to blockade the Gauls in the hillfort and protect his soldiers 
from sorties. 
The distance between the circumvallation wall and the stronghold under siege 
was important, according to Vegetius (IV 28), who states that the loricula 
should be beyond weapon range of the besieged. This distance varied from 
site to site as well as at individual sites (Numantia (133 BC) 250-1000 m.; 
Alesia (52 BC) 660-1800 m.; Machaerus (AD 72/3) 330-570 m.; Masada (AD 
72/3) 275-650 m.; Cremna (AD 278) 125-180 m. ). In most of these cases the 
investing line would be out of range of the defenders' n-tissiles. 
At Numantia, Alesia, Machaerus and Masada the distance between the 
circumvallation wall and the besieged town was increased when the ground 
between them was open and more easy, probably for the same reason as the 
positioning of towers on blockade lines; that those sections of the siege lines 
were the most vulnerable and the greater distance that a sortying party would 
have to cover, the longer the besieging force would have to react and in 
particular to train missiles on the enemy - 
Since the effective range of a catapult was up to c. 300 m. (Marsden 1969 
chap. iv), the walls of Numantia, Alesia, Machaerus and Masada were in many 
places out of the artillery range of the Roman besiegers, any artillery on these 
sections of the circumvallation was probably intended primarily as a defence 
against sorties by the besieged. The blockading wall at Cremna (AD 278) was 
well within artillery range of the town and this short distance would tend to 
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back up Mitchell's claims that some of the towers on the besiegers' first wall 
held artillery, and that this was for use as an offensive weapon rather than a 
defensive one, as was 
circumvcaUations 
24 
. 
probably the role of most artillery on 
Although Onasander does not mention the use of circumvallation during a 
blockade, he does advocate the starving out of the besieged, and even 
suggests that the besieging general aggravate the scarcity of food in the town 
by sending AU prisoners except men of military age into the town (xlji 23 
)25 
. 
These new arrivals would be useless in action but would consume the supplies 
more quickly. Caesar may have had this intention when he refused to allow 
the Mandubji through his lines at Alesia (52 BC) after they had been expelled 
from the town by the Gauls precisely because of the lack of supplies. A 
similar incident occurred at Cremna (AD 278); when the townspeople Lydius 
had expelled from the town because of food shortages were sent back by the 
Romans . Lydius is supposed to have hurled them into the ravines surrounding 
the town. Onasander's rather ruthless suggestion would appear to contradict 
a lot of his advice concerning the conduct of generals (see below, Chapter 
on Morality in Warfare), but that deals almost exclusively with the behaviour 
of generals after the capture or surrender of cities. The implication is clear; 
once the war was over the general could afford to be magnanimous, but as long 
as the war continued, any method of inducing defeat or surrender was open 
to him. 
24 Since the loricula mentioned by Vegetius was for the defence of the besieging 
army, it would make sense to provide the additional defence of artillery against 
sorties which could be very dangerous (see above p. 188). 
25 Frontinus lists a few stratagems on preventing supplies arriving (III iv), 
and obtaining supplies in time of blockade (III xiv-xv). 
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Conclusions 
The treatises cover siege warfare in a rather different way to the other 
subjects discussed above. Although Vegetius can list the precautions that can 
be taken in case of siege, and writers can describe the various pieces of 
equipment available for both attack and defence, there is very little advice on 
the practicalities of besieging a city or defending one under siege. The two 
authors who give their reasons for not covering the subject of siege warfare 
comprehensively are Onasander and Frontinus, though their justifications are 
different. Frontinus did not deal with siege machines because be believed 
they had already been developed to the limit (Strat. III Pref .), and Onasander 
because it was not his place to tell the general what equipment to use when so 
many variables were involved (xlff). 
The techniques of siege warfare developed little from the Assyrian period to 
the late Roman; the equipment was essentially the same, as were the methods 
of countering it. Thus Assyrian reliefs show defenders catching the heads of 
rams in nooses which Vegetius also recommends over a thousand years later 
(IV 23). The major changes appear to have been the introduction of torsion 
artillery in the 4th century BC and the use of circumvallations, neither of 
which was a Roman development, though the circumvallation does seem to have 
become particularly popular in the Roman period. 
This lack of development in siege techniques may account for Frontinus' lack 
of interest in the subject, and although there were improvements and changes 
in torsion artillery, since his Strategemata is fairly general, the inclusion of 
such details would have been out of place. It also explains why for the most 
part there is a very strong relationship between the methods described in the 
treatises and actual field practices. 
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Analysis of siege techniques suggests that although both attackers and 
defenders had more time to react and devise defences and methods of attack, 
actions were more likely to be counter-reactions, depending on what the enemy 
was preparing or doing. Thus the defences Josephus devised at Jotopata (AD 
67) were in reaction to the Roman techniques, although some were very well 
known by that time: increasing the height of the wa. U opposite the Roman siege 
ramp; lowering chaff-filled sacks in front of the ram head (and the Romans' 
use of reaping hooks attached to long poles to cut the sacks down was a 
reaction to this); pouring boiling oil on the Roman testudo formation; and 
pouring boiled fenugreek on the gangway boards. Equipment and supphes 
could be prepared, as Vegetius advises (IV 7-11), but Onasander is correct 
when he says that a general will use the available equipment as the 
opportunity arises, and this depends on luck, the strength (and actions) of 
the defenders, and the skill of the engineers (xlii). 
Technical treatises were available for detailed descriptions of artillery, and 
more general works such as those by Apollodorus and Vegetius for information 
on other equipment such as siege towers and battering rams. Vegetius 
provides a little information on the use of these devices and defences against 
them, but the general seems to be expected to know when to use them. The 
'instructions for use' are very scanty compared with the details Vegetius, for 
example, gives on the order of march or line of battle. This may be for a 
number of reasons: siege techniques had changed so little that detailed 
instructions were considered unnecessary as they were well known anyway; 
Greek and Hellenistic treatises by writers such as Aeneas Tacticus and Philo 
were still relevant and may have been available, or similar Roman works that 
are no longer extant may have covered the subject; and as suggested above, 
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many of the actions taken in siege warfare were in reaction to the enemy's 
operations. 
As stated above (p. 178) the emphasis in Vegetius' book on siege warfare is on 
defence, whereas earlier works were concerned with both defence and offence, 
particularly the latter. Like Vitruvius (de Arch. I v), Vegetius' suggestions 
for the defence of a city (IV 1-8) are made bearing in mind the possibility of 
a siege. Onasander, on the other hand, does not touch upon the defence of 
fortified positions at all, and this may be because his model general of the 1st 
century AD would have been concerned primarily with attacking the enemy at 
a time when the Empire was still essentially expansioniSt2 6. Vegetius, 
however, writing probably after the Roman defeat at Adrianople in AD 378, 
may be stressing defence because of the insecurity of some parts of the Empire 
at this time, and because now more than ever Roman towns were facing attack 
by both barbarians (eg: Adrianople, AD 378) and other enemies with siege 
techniques as sophisticated as those of the Romans (eg: the sieges during the 
wars between Rome and Persia, AD 359-363). 
"Successful offensive actions were also just about the only way for a general 
to gain recognition and glory at this time as well (cf: Corbulo's complaints 
when recalled from Germany by Claudius, Annals xi 20). 
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Mo-rality in Warfare 
Introduction 
Most ancient military treatises dealt not only with the practicalities of warfare 
but also touched upon the personal and moral qualities of the general - 
Onasander, for example, seems almost more concerned with the character and 
behaviour of the general than with what strategies and tactics he should be 
employing. Cicero in addition mentions some of the established traditions 
concerning the conduct of war. Westington (1938) has dealt comprehensively 
with the issue of morality in warfare up to 133 BC. After this date there is 
much less evidence for atrocities and behaviour in war, and the treatises 
themselves deal primarily with morality in the field of open engagements and 
siege warfare. Because of these factors this chapter will consider the subject 
of morality only the two situations mentioned above and will generally avoid 
examples discussed by Westington. In addition, the behaviour of non-Romans 
will not be discussed unless it is directly relevant to that of the Romans, for 
example Roman revenge for native atrocities. 
The Treatises 
Cicero states that the Fetial code included humane laws concerning the 
declaration and conduct of war (de Offic. I 36), and elsewhere mentions the 
customs of war (mores belli, Verr. iv 116), though these are probably 
established traditions rather than the actual laws of the Fetial code 1. The 
advice given by Polybius and Onasander may also be considered as fairly 
obvious hints or established military conventions rather than laws. 
'Since the declaration of war was a matter for the Senate or Emperor in Rome 
and not the general on campaign, the subject of just and unjust wars will not 
be considered here. 
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Cicero gives some general advice on behaviour and morality in the de Officiis 
(134-36), and when describing the qualities necessary for the perfect general 
(Pro Leg Man. 10-16); a general should control his troops strictly, not let them 
plunder for his personal gain, and to show mercy to those who surrender (Pro 
Leg Man. 13); protection (presumably from Roman soldiers) must be granted 
to those who surrender; in the destruction and plundering of cities nothing 
should be done without good cause or with excess cruelty, and it was the 
general's duty to punish only the guilty and spare the rest (de Offic. 1 82). 
Connected with this is a statement that those who have not been cruel and 
barbarous in the conduct of war should be spared. Polybius also emphasized 
the importance of showing generosity to the defeated (V 115), and urged that 
punishment should not be excessive because it was better to conquer the 
enemy by generosity than by force (V 12 2). 
Onasander puts forward several points on the subject, some of which echo 
Cicero's comments; the besieged were more likely to surrender if they knew 
they would not face slaughter, and generals who destroyed and massacred 
made the war more difficult as cities were less likely to surrender (xxxviii). 
Thus acts of desperation from an enemy with nothing to lose should not be 
encouraged (vi); the enemy's country should not be ravaged until the enemy 
had been informed of the general's intentions, to allow them time to surrender; 
plundering should be strictly controlled (vi) and prisoners of war should not 
usually be killed while the war was still in progress (though enemy allies 
could, if it was in the general's interest). In the same way, in sieges, the 
general should prevent a massacre especially if the defenders seemed likely to 
hold out or seize the citadel because if they expected to be killed they would 
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fight more fiercely and desperately 
(Xlii)2 
. These suggestions are all useful 
but fairly obvious; the idea was to encourage the surrender of cities and 
armies by demonstrating that this was preferable to continued resistance - 
While Cicero's admonishments tend to be rather abstract and sometimes of a 
purely moralistic nature, those of Onasander, though containing these 
moralizing overtones, also include suggestions for their application. He is not 
above some rather cold-blooded comments about which prisoners could be 
killed off , even suggesting that prisoners spared in order to encourage 
surrender could later be executed, if it was in the general's interest to do so 
(xlii). 
Other, perhaps more formalized, conventions involving the treatment of cities 
under siege are mentioned only briefly by some of the sources but are well 
illustrated in the historical sources. These relate to the method of sacking a 
city and the distinction shown between towns which have surrendered and 
those taken by assault. These conventions will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
The general impression one gets from the treatises is that the treatment of 
prisoners and cities should be varied according to the situation and what the 
general hoped to gain from it; both leniency and severity could be used to 
encourage the surrender of the enemy, which the military writers suggest was 
preferable to defeating an enemy by force. 
2 cf : Vegetius' advice concerning a fleeing enemy following a pitched battle (III 
21); flight should be facilitated because an enemy that is surrounded with 
nothing to lose will fight more ferociously (see above Chapter 6, on Pitched 
Battles) - 
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Mercy and Brutality 
Cicero implies that the general should show mercy on every occasion though, 
as stated above, Onasander suggests that mercy should be used along with 
brutality when necessary. Tacitus describes how Corbulo used the panic 
created by the demolition of Artaxata in order to capture Tigranocerta (Annal 
xiv 23), "for if he destroyed it, he would increase the enemy's terror; if he 
spared it he would be praised as merciful". Corbulo apparently varied his 
treatment of the enemy, showing lenience to those who surrendered and 
harshness to those who resisted, flushing out fugitives by fire. Agricola also 
combined the use of terror tactics with mercy during his second year of 
campaigning in Britain (AcIri . 20), which supposedly encouraged the 
surrender of many tribes who preferred to experience the governor's mercy. 
Caesar had a wide reputation for clemency which does seem to have been 
justified (eg: BG vii 40; BC 1 75; Vell. Pat. II 87), but his use of clementia 
reflects Onasander's statements rather than those of Cicero. Thus he was 
merciful towards the Aedui who were planning to join the revolt of Vercigetorix 
(BG vii 40), but this was to retain the tribe as an ally, and when Petreius 
executed some of Caesar's soldiers during a period of fraternization in the civil 
war, Caesar made sure that aU his enemy's men were sent back unharmed (BC 
1 75). As a result of this several of Petreius' officers deserted to Caesar. 
According to Caesar, his reputation for mercy encouraged the surrender of 
enemy forces and cities such as native cavalry in Africa (B. Afr. 92) and the 
city of Utica following the defeat of Cato (B. Mr. 88). Aulus Hirtius also makes 
this claim for Caesar in the case of the Bituriges who had revolted but then 
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surrendered (BG viii 3 )3 . In spite of his reputation, Caesar was quite ready 
to act very harshly, if it was in his interests to do so (cf: Onasander vi and 
above, p. 209). However, these examples usually involve exceptional circum- 
stances such as revolts and civil war, and these will be discussed below. 
Having a reputation for mercy or cultivating one was not the only method of 
encouraging the enemy to surrender. Magnanimous behaviour and various 
forms of psychological warfare are suggested by Frontinus and well illustrated 
by the author and by other historians. The tale of the schoolmaster of Falerii 
is frequently quoted not only by historians as an example of traditional Roman 
magnanimity (Livy v 27; Val. Max. vi 5; Plut. Cam. 10), but also by military 
4 
writers as stratagems, to illustrate the effect such behaviour might have 
Another similar stratagem is given in Book IV of Frontinus' Stratagems; 
during the revolt of Civilis a city of the Lingones had gone over to the rebels 
and as the author was advancing with an army the citizens feared their land 
would be plundered. When the inhabitants remained unharmed and lost none 
of their property they abandoned Civilis' cause and handed over a large 
number of armed men (Strat. IV iii 14). Similarly, when Octavian took the 
town of Terponus which the Myrian tribe of the Iapydes had abandoned, he 
did not destroy it in the hope that the tribe would surrender, which it did 
(Appian Illyrian Wars 18). 
3 Caesar seems to have achieved similar results in Gaul at least by his success, 
building up such a reputation among the Gauls for his ability to capture 
hillforts that Vellaunodunum surrendered in 52 BC as soon as he had built a 
circumvallation (BG vii 11). 
4 When Camillus was besieging Falerii he refused to accept the young hostages 
the traitorous schoolmaster presented him with and instead sent them back to 
their parents. The Faliscans were so impressed with their enemy's action that 
they immediately surrendered. 
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Cicero and Onasander do not advocate the use of terror tactics in warfare but 
Frontinus does, and gives several examples of their effectiveness (Strat. II ix 
2-5). Sulla is supposed to have broken the resistance of the besieged at 
Praeneste by fastening on spears the heads of Praenestine generals who had 
been killed in battle and displaying them to the defenders (Strat. II ix 3), and 
Corbulo encouraged the Armenian city of Tigranocerta to surrender in a more 
dramatic fashion; he executed a captured Armenian noble and shot his head 
out of a ballista, into the town. It fell in the middle of a council meeting and at 
the sight of it the besieged immediately surrendered (Strat. II ix 4 
)5 
. 
However, Tacitus reports that Ostorius Scapula's intention to wipe out the 
whole tribe of the Silures only encouraged them to resist even more strongly 
(XII 38), illustrating the dangers of taking severity too far. 
Surrendered and captured cities and forces 
The sources suggest that it was better to encourage the enemy to surrender 
rather than to have to resort to the uncertainties of military action (cf : 
Veg. 1119 and above p. 209). Thus the treatises include advice on encouraging 
surrender and the subsequent treatment of both cities and field forces which 
surrendered, but tend to concentrate on the former. Despite the obvious 
importance of this subject in the treatises, none of the writers make the 
suggestion that a commander might offer a city or a field army the opportunity 
to surrender before engaging his forces. The implication seems to be that the 
initiative had to come from the enemy, usually in the form of ambassadors 
requesting to surrender (eg: BG 11 13; VII 11). 
5Displaying the heads of those killed in battle or firing them into besieged 
towns with shngs or artillery was an aspect of psychological warfare also 
employed in later periods and particularly during the crusades: Christians 
hurled the heads of Turks killed in battle into the town of Nicea to terrorize 
the garrison (Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosalimitanorum viii). Corbulo, 
however, seems to have gone one step f urther by actually executing a captive 
rather than simply decapitating corpses. 
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The historical sources, however, suggest this was by no means the case; 
besieging generals did request the cities they were attacking to surrender, 
particularly before or during a long or hard siege, to prevent loss of life and 
waste of time and supplies, though this is generaHy not the case with large 
field forces. Thus when Julian wished to avoid spending time and losing lives 
besieging the Persian fortress of Anatha, he persuaded the defenders to 
surrender, thereby avoiding a dangerous siege (Amn-danus xxiv 1 8). The 
fortress was destroyed but the defenders were treated well. Titus made 
several attempts to persuade the defenders at Jerusalem to surrender, making 
one particularly impassioned effort when he had failed to take the strongest 
parts of the city by storm and was about to resort to circumv&Uation and 
blockade (BJ V 36ff). Had the Jews surrendered, it is doubtful that a large 
scale massacre would have taken place as happened when the city was 
eventually stormed. Similarly, Severus offered the Hatrenes the opportunity 
to surrender after his troops had breached the outer of Hatra's two walls (AD 
198). 
Invitations to surrender were often made after the failure of the initial assault, 
as in the case of Jerusalem and Hatra above, and in the cases of Q. Cicero's 
winter camp (54 BC), Vetera (AD 69) and Adrianople (AD 378), where the 
barbarian besiegers had also been frustrated in their attempts to take their 
objectives by storm. 
It is possible that by the 4th century AD the matter of invitations to surrender 
may have become more formalized; the defenders were usually invited to 
surrender at the beginning of a siege and sometimes given several days to do 
so (eg: Singara, Ammianus xx 6). This is particularly evident in the wars 
between Rome and Persia (AD 359-363) which involved a number of sieges, but 
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it was not just the case in external warfare; during the civil war between 
Constantius and Julian in AD 361, Aquileia was held by supporters of 
Constantius. Julian's supporters gave the defenders an opportunity to 
surrender before beginning the assault (Ammianus xxi 12). However, these 
requests to surrender at the start of a siege seem to have been as much a 
formality as a realistic expectation; although the cities mentioned by Ammianus 
were asked to surrender they rarely did so. According to Ammianus, Sapor 
believed that the defenders at Amida would be so terrified at the sight of his 
army that they would immediately surrender, and at the very least to 
surrender when invited to do so (Ammianus xix 13). 
Whether or not to surrender was an extremely important matter for any city 
under siege. On the whole, though with a few exceptions which will be 
discussed below, cities which surrendered usually fared much better at the 
hands of their captors than those taken by storm. This seems to be some kind 
of rule of warfare and is mentioned by Livy when describing the capture of the 
rebel Latin colony of Pometia in 502 BC (1117 2). The colony surrendered just 
as the Romans were about to storm it but its fate "was no less horrible than if 
it had been taken by storm". It is this convention on the treatment of 
surrendered cities, rather than any reputation a particular general might have 
for mercy, that is likely to have encouraged cities to surrender. As seen 
above, some cities surrendered at the very start of a siege, though many more 
did so when the defenders realized that the city was certain to be taken, as 
at Marseilles, or when faced to do so through starvation like Numantia. 
When Caesar was besieging the Gallic tribe of the Atuatuci in 57 BC, during 
the siege the defenders enquired about terms of surrender - Caesar stated 
that he would be merciful provided that they surrendered before the battering 
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ram touched the wall of the oppidum (12riusquam murum aries attigisset, BG 
1132 )6 . Josephus mentions the despair of the Jews when the Romans brought 
their rams to bear on the walls at Jerusalem (BJ V 277), and although various 
skirmishes had taken place before this point, this seems to represent the 
moment when the siege proper started. The implication is that there may have 
been some kind of formal convention concerning this matter, and this is 
confirmed by Cicero's statement that mercy should be shown to those who have 
surrendered "even though the battering ram has hammered at their walls" 
(quamvis murum aries percusserit, de Offic. I 35). 
Theoretically then, once the siege had formally begun, the general may have 
been entitled to treat the city however he wanted whether or not it surren- 
dered. In practice, though, because it was usually in the general's interest 
to be merciful and so encourage other places to surrender, virtually all cities 
which surrendered, at whatever stage of a siege, fared far better than those 
taken by assault. This is the case even with cities that had revolted and 
during civil wars when the treatment of defeated enemies was likely to be 
harsher and more violent (see below pp. 218 & 221). In the catalogue of sieges 
(Appendix 3), there are only two examples of the inhabitants of a city which 
surrendered being massacred (Locha, Appian Punica 15; Capsa, B. Jug. 91). 
In the first instance this was against the wishes of Scipio, according to 
Appian; the Roman soldiers ref used to obey the recall following the surrender 
of Locha, scaled the walls and began an indiscriminate slaughter because the 
siege had been a hard one, an excuse made elsewhere to explain excessive 
violence following the capture of a city (Capsa B. Juq. 91; Avaricum, BG VII 
28, though in the latter case there were other reasons for the behaviour of 
'Interestingly, when the Atuatuci did surrender, Caesar shut them up in their 
oppidum overnight for their own protection (cf: Cicero de Offic 82). 
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Caesar's troops, see below p. 220, and also Annals iv 25, for actions of troops 
at the end of the revolt of Tacfarinas) . Capsa also surrendered but the town 
was fired anyway, the men massacred and the rest of the population sold into 
slavery. Sallust (B. Jug. 91) describes this as a violation of the rules of war 
(contra ius beW). 
Cicero's statement, that mercy should be shown to those who have surren- 
dered "even though the battering ram has hammered at their walls" does, 
therefore, seem to be realistic and a generally accepted rule of war, at least 
by the 2nd to lst century BC. 
Paul (1984 226-7) notes that from the 2nd century BC there was an increasing 
tendency to treat those who surrendered more leniently, or at least to condemn 
those who insisted on severe punishment. He suggests that this was to 
protect Rome's long term interests and due to the belief that lenience would 
further Rome's military aims. This tendency is noted in Cicero's fourth 
Verrine oration where he accuses Verres of committing outrages that would not 
be done "in these days when the city was taken (capta), however much the 
passions of war-time, military licence, the custom of war and the right of the 
conqueror might provoke them. " (in Verr. iv 116). The statement also 
suggests that, even though the treatment of captured cities might be more 
lenient than in the past, those taken by storm (capta ), would still suffer. 
Cities which were taken by storm almost invariably fared badly; the assault 
was usually followed by the indiscriminate slaughter of the population, though 
occasionaIly this was confined primarily to men of military age (eg: Volandum) . 
However, in the confusion following the storming of a city, it is debatable how 
discriminati, 1the victorious soldiers would have been - Towns would also be 
216 
plundered and occasionally razed to the ground (eg: Numantia, 
Jerusalem, Maozamalcha )7 . Those who managed to survive the slaughter 
might be sold into slavery or simply dismissed. The treatment of the different 
groups of prisoners at New Carthage by Scipio is interesting; citizens of the 
city were released, artisans were reduced to slavery for the duration of the 
war and male non-citizens and slaves were sent to the fleet (Polybius X 16). 
Very occasionally the defenders of a town were spared even though it was 
taken by storm. At Syracuse, Marcellus allowed his soldiers to plunder the 
city but ordered them not to kill any of the free inhabitants (Livy xxv 25). 
Archimedes seems to be the only reported casualty (Plut. Mar. 19). However, 
Westington doubts that the general's order was very strictly obeyed and 
describes the plunder of the city as particularly thorough (1938 93ff). Healso 
points out that slaves were not exempt from the general's order about 
clemency. No casualties are reported at Thala (B. Jug. 76), but this might be 
because Sallust is more interested in describing the destruction of the loot by 
Roman deserters before its capture and their subsequent suicide. The case 
of Syracuse illustrates that even though the majority of the inhabitants might 
be spared, the a city might still suffer badly. 
The capture of New Carthage provides evidence for another possible "conven- 
tion " of Roman warfare. Here the Carthaginian general Mago attempted to 
defend the citadel and only surrendered when he realized that the city had 
been completely overrun. Until this final surrender the Roman soldiers had 
been carrying out an indiscriminate massacre of the population on the orders 
7 Razing a town seems to have been a very severe punishment, and in the cases 
of Carthage, Numantia and Jerusalem, the cities represented particularly 
strong resistance to Rome; their total destruction was probably to set an 
example. 
217 
of Scipio, according to Polybius . When the citadel surrendered, Scipio 
sounded the order to stop the slaughter and turn to plunder. Polybius claims 
that this was the Roman custom and was to inspire terror on the taking of a 
town by storm through the indiscriminate slaughter of both inhabitants and 
animals (X 15). In the case of New Carthage it was also no doubt intended to 
encourage those in the citadel to surrender. This treatment would appear to 
contradict Onasander's advice about showing mercy to the population if the 
defenders seemed likely to hold out in the citadel (xIii). However, there is a 
clear implication in Polybius that once the citadel surrendered, the massacre 
would stop and this method may have been considered as effective as the use 
of mercy in inducing the surrender of defenders. 
The mass graves at Maiden Castle provide a vivid example of the violence of 
such a massacre following the assault of a fortified settlement (Wheeler 1943 
351-2). Several of the skulls show multiple injuries, some of which "must have 
been inflicted after it was quite clear that the victim was dead". 23 adult 
male, mostly 20-35 years old, and 11 female skeletons are associated with the 
"war cemetery", with 14 of the surviving 25 skulls showing evidence of 
mutilation, either from sword cuts or other blows. Wheeler cites one example 
in particular, the skull of a young man with at least nine sword cuts as well as 
evidence of other blows (1943 63). Whilst the blows on some of the skulls no 
doubt represent the battle itself, this one, Wheeler claims, is clear evidence 
of the massacre. 
laý 
. r-. =belUorlS and Revenge 
The treatment of those who had rebelled against Rome tended to differ from 
those of those newly conquered by the Romans. In the latter case the 
conquered enemy would not normally be treated too harshly, but rebels were 
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usually dealt with very severely pour encouraqer les autres. In addition, if 
the enemy had committed atrocities towards Romans during the course of a 
war, they might be treated more harshly whether they were rebels or not - 
Under these circumstances the distinction between surrendered and defeated 
towns and forces was not so great. 
Thus when Numantia was forced through starvation to surrender the entire 
population was sold into slavery except for the few who were to appear at 
Scipio's triumph, and the town itself was razed to the ground. This harsh 
treatment was probably for a number of reasons; the Romans had taken ten 
years to capture the town, they had suffered embarrassing defeats during 
that time and, perhaps most significantly, the defenders were the last to hold 
out from the revolt of Viriathus in 153 BC. At Uxellodunum, Caesar wanted 
to make an example of the defenders to prevent further outbreaks of rebellion 
in Gaul (BG viii 44), so he cut off the hands of all who had carried weapons. 
Again, at Jotapata and Jerusalem, the massacre of the population was 
particularly severe because they had revolted, though also because of the 
difficulties of the sieges. 
Tacitus makes an interesting comment on the treatment rebels could expect as 
well as giving several examples of their treatment; he claims that the Iceni in 
c. AD 47/48 fought with great bravery because they "had rebellion on their 
consciences" (conscientia rebellionis, Annals xii 31), and so knew they could 
not expect mercy. The battle resulting in the defeat of Tacfarinas' rebels was 
particularly bloody, though as with Numantia this was partly because the war 
had been a difficult one and the Roman soldiers had suffered hardships, 
according to the historian (Annals iv 25). The slaughter following the defeat 
of the Britons in the Boudiccan revolt was exacerbated by the atrocities 
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committed by the Britons on the inhabitants of Camulodunum, London and 
Verulamium (Annals xiv 35), and Agricola supposedly exterminated almost the 
whole tribe of the Ordovices following their brief rebellion before his arrival 
(Aqric. 18)'. 
The sources clearly make the connection between rebellion and harsh 
treatment, but it is also clear that revenge for atrocities could be exacted at 
the same time. The murder of Roman merchants at Cenabum (BG vii 3) 
encouraged the bloodshed following the storming of Avaricum (BG vii 17 & 28), 
even though that had been carried out by the Carnutes and not the Bituriges. 
When the individual responsible for inciting the Gallic revolt and the massacre 
at Cenabum was eventually captured (BG viii 38), Caesar was 'forced' by his 
soldiers to execute him even though he was opposed to harsh punishments. 
The Veneti, however, conquered by Caesar in 56 BC, were harshly treated 
even though they surrendered (BG iii 16), but this was because of their 
detention of Caesar's envoys (BG iii 8). Caesar wished to make an example of 
them so the Gauls would respect the rights of envoys, and executed the tribal 
leaders and sold the rest into slavery. 
One occasion where this desire for revenge seems to have had little affect on 
the treatment of the defeated was at Carthage where Hasdrubal tortured and 
executed Roman soldiers in full view of their colleagues to destroy any hopes 
of surrender. Even though the city was taken by assault there was not the 
f ul-I scale massacre there might have been. Appian states that by committing 
these atrocities Hasdrubal was depriving the Carthaginians of all hope of a 
pardon (Punica 118), and the implication is clear; atrocities on Roman soldiers 
"Since they had attacked a Roman unit stationed in their territory the 
Ordovices can be classed as rebels. 
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and civilians would lead to savage treatment whether the enemy surrendered 
or not. 
Civil War 
Towns and field forces during civil wars could suffer as badly as those which 
rebelled. Tacitus states that troops could not be controlled as tightly during 
civil war as at other times (Hist. 11 29; 111 7), and since during a civil war 
money could not be made from the ransom of prisoners (Hist. 1144; Plut. Otho 
14), the slaughter of fellow Romans following a pitched battle or the capture 
of a town could be particularly bloody9. Failure to control troops led to the 
attacks on civilians by Otho's troops on the coast of Gaul and N. Italy (Hist. II 
13; Agric. 7), and by those of Vitellius after their successes at Cremona 
(Hist. 11 56). 
Despite the suggestions in the treatises that the commander should control his 
troops strictly (Cicero Pro Leg. Man. 13), this was not always the case, as at 
Syracuse (see above p. 217). After Caesar's defeat of the Scipionic forces at 
Thapsus, his soldiers went on the rampage and massacred all their opponents 
despite Caesar's entreaties to his men to spare them (B. Afr. 85). However, 
Caesar does not seem to have punished his soldiers in any way, suggesting 
that he was not particularly angry at their actions". One of the most famous 
examples of complete failure to control troops occurred following the Flavian 
9Plutarch (Otho 14) mentions the huge pile of dead by a temple after the first 
battle of Bedriacum. 
10 Examples of strict punishment of troops following disobedience of orders 
concerning the treatment of the defeated are rare; Scipio executed three 
officers who failed to control their troops at Locha (see above p. 215); 
Sertorius supposedly executed an entire cohort following the ill treatment of 
a woman during the capture of the Roman town of Lauro (Appian BC 1 109), 
and Cassius threatened with death any soldier who plundered following the 
surrender of Rhodes (BC IV 73). 
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victory at Cremona in AD 69. The victorious troops stormed the city which 
had supported Vitellius and sacked it for four days, although it had 
surrendered (Hist. 111 33-34). The Flavian commander seems to have made 
little effort to prevent his troops from sacking the town, though in the light 
of Tacitus' comment on the control of troops during civil war perhaps he would 
have been unable to do so anyway". 
The treatment of captured towns during civil war varied but could also be 
very severe. Marseilles ndght have suffered badly because of the length and 
difficulty of the siege but when it surrendered Caesar claims he spared both 
the city and its inhabitants because of its antiquity and reputation. However, 
Marseilles was an important strategic town and it would not have been in 
Caesar's interests to sack the place or ill-treat its citizens, though he did 
leave a garrison. Political and n-dlitary interests also influenced Octavian's 
treatment of the defenders of Perugia in 41 BC; he released Lucius Antonius, 
the brother of his ally Mark Antony, and so the blame for the city's opposition 
fell on the city officials whom he executed - 
However, a general's interests could also result in the ill-treatment of towns; 
Gomphi in Thessaly had originally sided with Caesar but following his setback 
at DyrAchium went over to Pompey, possibly under coercion. The town was 
A 
rich and well-supplied and would be a useful supply base for either side. 
Caesar took the town by storm and allowed his men to plunder it, then paraded 
captives before the walls of another town that had acted similarly (BC 11180- 
81). Caesar intended his treatment of Gomphi to act as an example and terrify 
the other towns in Thessaly, and it seems to have worked because they all 
"Since the troops would have been unable to profit from the taking of 
prisoners, plunder was the only source of money from the campaign. 
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surrendered. These towns seem to have been in a no-win situation, forced to 
support the different factions. In the case of Gomphi, Caesar could perceive 
the inhabitants as rebels and treat them accordingly. Political and military 
interests, therefore, could have a significant influence on the treatment of 
towns in particular during civil wars, though in the case of open engagements, 
civil war often made the outcome as bloody as in rebellions. 
Conclusions 
The advice contained in the treatises and Cicero about behaviour and morality 
in warfare is for the most part reflected in the other literary sources. With 
the few exceptions in "accepted" behaviour discussed above, mercy was 
usually shown to those who surrendered, generals were not excessively cruel 
or severe and, again with a few more exceptions, troops were kept under 
control. It is also clear that whatever the legal formalities concerning warfare 
and the conduct of war, there was a series of generally accepted conventions 
which can be reconstructed from the range of literary sources. 
Thus if a town surrendered, at whatever stage of the siege and even after the 
battering ram had touched the walls, the defenders would usually be treated 
mercifully. If, on the other hand, a town was stormed, it faced plunder and 
destruction, and the survivors of a massacre might face slavery. Although 
most evidence relates to besieged towns, there seems to have been a similar 
contrast in the treatment of field forces. The example of New Carthage 
suggests that there was a more formalized convention concerning the sacking 
of towns, though this may only have been applicable to towns in which 
resistance continued in the citadel after the capture of the town. 
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The exceptions to these 'conventions' occurred for the most part during 
periods of civil war, rebellion and for revenge, so under abnormal conditions . 
In civil war, because troops could not be as tightly controlled as at other times 
and prisoners were worthless, atrocities might be committed which would not 
happen under other circumstances. Tacitus states that rebels could not 
expect to be treated mercifully (Annals XII 31), and Appian that those who 
committed atrocities could not either (Punica. 118). These statements are 
certainly borne out by the evidence and so can be considered 'conventions' in 
themselves. 
The various 'conventions' on conduct listed above might have had some 
influence on the commander's treatment of his surrendered or defeated enemy, 
but the interests of Rome and, or, the commander himself, probably had more 
affect. As Paul points out (see above p. 216), it was in Rome's interests to be 
lenient to newly conquered peoples. Leniency under these circumstances 
might encourage other towns or forces to surrender. On the other hand, 
those who resisted might be severely dealt with to serve as an example (eg: 
BG 111 16), and this is particularly so with revolts. 
By advocating the widespread use of mercy on humanitarian grounds, Cicero 
is probably being unrealistic. The suggestion in Onasander that brutality 
could be used when it was in the general's interest is far more pragmatic, and 
Roman commanders appear to have used brutality and leniency as a tool of 
conquest. Thus Caesar punished the defenders of Uxellodunum to serve as 
an example to all who contemplated revolt (BG VIII 44), and his treatment of 
the town of Gomphi (see above p. 222) was also to serve his interests. His 
clementia, however, was well known and he used this to his advantage too (see 
above p. 210). Corbulo and Agricola likewise applied a mixture of ruthlessness 
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and mercy to encourage surrender and serve as examples - By providing 
examples of how both terror (Strat - II ix) and mercy (Strat. II xi) could be 
used to bring about surrender, Frontinus perhaps best illustrates the role of 
morality in Roman warfare - 
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Conclusions 
With most of the topics discussed above there is a definite and very clear 
correlation between the advice of the military treatises and actual field 
practices. This is especially evident in the advice given on the siting of 
marching camps and the arrangement of the marching column. Much of the 
advice has been shown to be realistic and therefore practicable; it would have 
been possible to acquire a basic military knowledge from the treatises. Thus 
the claim of most of the treatises to be giving practical advice is not just a 
literary topos as Campbell suggested (1987 19), though this does seem to be 
the case with the 'Greek phalanx' treatises; in many cases the claim was 
justified; they do give realistic and practical advice. 
A concluding section follows the discussion of the individual topics considered 
above, and I do not intend to repeat the analyses here. Two factors in 
particular are clear: the strong correlation between Roman military theory as 
presented in the treatises and field practices, and the very conservative 
nature of Roman warfare. 
Two of the subjects discussed above however, do raise problems; the strength 
and organization of units, and siege warfare. In the first case, the admittedly 
fairly limited information in the treatises implies a regularity in the 
organization of the Roman army that is not corroborated by any of the other 
contemporary evidence on the subject -A reasonable explanation for this 
would seem to be the distinction between the theoretical paper strengths of the 
various units, which the textbooks report, and the fluctuations to the actual 
unit sizes depending on circumstances since they might be left understrength 
in peacetime and increased to or above theoretical strength in reaction to an 
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emergency or in preparation for war. The evidence of Polybius and Livy 
indicates that Republican legions were flexible in this way, and Vegetius (II 
suggests that this was possible during the Empire too. There seems no 
reason why this should not be the case for both legions and auxiliary units 
during the Empire. 
The lack of practical guidance on siege warfare, as opposed to descriptions of 
siege equipment, has been discussed above, and it has been proposed that this 
has to do with the nature of siege warfare which was more a case of action and 
reaction, and the fact that techniques changed very little. Onasander is 
shown to be right when he states that the general "will use the various pieces 
of equipment as the opportunity arises and ... this depends upon the luck 
and the power of the combatants, and the skill of the military engineers" 
(xliii). 
Evidence for the actual use of treatises is a problematic area and raises the 
'chicken and egg' question; do the treatises reflect actual field practices so 
strongly because they are simply describing contemporary or past procedures, 
or did commanders follow their advice, as the writers seem to imply they 
should, and so the field practices reflect the advice of the treatises? 
Certainly there is evidence that implies treatises could and indeed would be 
used under certain circumstances; Vitruvius states that there were textbooks 
on siege warfare (which fortunately Rome's enemies did not use; de Arch. X 
xvi 2)). Caesar (BG 1122; VI 34) states that one could follow the textbooks 
of military institutions and standard practices, and perhaps hints at a little 
criticism of these in BG Il 22 for their rigidity when he says that his troop 
deployments were "dictated more by the topography of the site, the slope of 
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the hill and the demands of the immediate situation than by the theories of any 
military textbook"'. 
Onasander seems to be aware of the dangers of too rigid a textbook. Whereas 
Vegetius provides fairly inflexible advice, that of the earlier writer is not. 
He is prepared to provide the basic instructions but leaves it to the general 
himself to add the details depending on the individual situation, because of the 
number of variables in play. Like Caesar, Onasander was aware that the 
immediate situation, the topography and the nature of the enemy would have 
more influence on dispositions than anything he might say in his treatise (xv), 
and the general must resolve the situation himself (xxxii). He does admit that 
"things... cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand" (xxxii), and so 
is aware that his textbook alone is not sufficient; experience and insight are 
also necessary. 
Polybius (XI 8) claimed that there were three ways to learn the art of 
generalship; through exempla, treatises and practical experience. Whilst 
there might be a place for military treatises in the education of potential 
officers and generals, as Polybius, Caesar and Onasander imply, and one 
could pick up the basics from the treatises, these alone were not enough, and 
this is why Onasander takes his reader to a certain point and then leaves it up 
to the individual. 
A lot of the advice given in the treatises is fairly obvious common sense, but 
a large part of ancient warfare was a matter of common sense. Since the 
'The "Fighting Instructions" of the 18th century Royal Navy were similar. 
According to the Enclyclopaedia Britannica, they provided valuable 
instructions based on sound principles, but limited the opportunities for 
tactical skill (Enclyclopaedia Britannica 1962, vol. 16 272). 
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treatise writers wished their treatises to be comprehensive, they did point out 
the obvious, such as camping on raised ground near water and not overlooked 
or near gullies, or anchoring a wing of a battle line on a natural obstacle to 
hinder or prevent outflanking manoeuvres. These are fairly obvious schemes 
but potentially very important, so they had to be included in a textbook on 
warfare. 
The textbook general 
Let us consider briefly the actions of the 'textbook general' of the early 
Empire, an ideal commander created from the pages of the various manuals 
diScussed above. 
Having gathered his army and received intelligence, the general will set out. 
At night he will persona. Uy decide where to pitch camp, on rising ground away 
from gullies and forests, and not overlooked by higher ground. The camp will 
not enclose any marshy ground but will be within easy reach of a river. It will 
probably face in the direction of tomorrow's march, towards the enemy. The 
strength of the camp defences will depend on the proximity of the enemy. If 
the area is secure the general may decide on a simple palisade or a ditch. If 
not, he will order a rampart six feet high and eight feet wide, topped by a 
palisade, and a ditch three feet deep and five wide. Since his textbook 
advises him that it is better to be safe than sorry, he prefers the latter. The 
size of the camp is proportionate to the size of his army. 
The following day the general sets off after his enemy. He sends scouts ahead 
to reconnoitre, and these are followed by the mass of his army. At the start 
of his campaign, inteUigence reports no sign of the enemy so his marching 
column is fairly long, though he does ensure there are cavalry at both van and 
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rear, and the legions and baggage are in the centre with himself. The general 
occasionally rides up and down the marching column ensuring everything is 
in order, encouraging and admonishing his men when necessary and punishing 
those who fall out without permission. 
When his scouts report the enemy are nearby, or there is danger of an 
ambush, the general orders his army to continue the march in an aqmen 
quadratum, a more compact formation with cavalry flanking the legions, 
baggage and auxiliary infantry. Having already considered his potential line 
of battle, the general has ensured that there is a close correlation between 
these two formations so the army can deploy from one to the other with minimal 
delay. The general himself rides in the centre of the column, surrounded by 
his equites singulares, and with auxiliary cavalry on the flanks. 
Once the enemy accepts a pitched battle , the general will make various 
preparations before engaging: he orders the construction of a marching camp , 
having first chosen the site for it himself, and studies carefully the enemy's 
dispositions and the topography of the battlefield. If the latter is unsuitable, 
he will not engage, or will employ a stratagem derived from his book of 
exempla, or made up himself. 
The general deploys his army according to his strengths and weaknesses and 
those of the enemy, possibly anchoring one wing of his battle line on a hill or 
a river. He ensures that his line is deep enough to prevent it being pierced 
by the enemy, and long enough to prevent a flank attack on his unsecured 
wing. The legions are situated in the centre of the line, formed up in a duplex 
or triplex acies, flanked by the auxiliary infantry, and the cavalry on the 
wings. Since one wing is anchored by a natural obstacle, he may strengthen 
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the other wing in the hope of outflanking the enemy. He will retain some 
reserve forces in the rear - 
After addressing his troops he will tell them to get on with it. His textbooks 
will give him no further guidance on fighting pitched battles. The general 
himself will command his army from the rear to avoid being killed or wounded, 
but will ride around encouraging his troops and sending in reserves when and 
if necessary. When the enemy is defeated (for a textbook general of the early 
Empire, this is virtually the only possible result), the cavalry will pursue the 
fleeing enemy while the infantry may advance, still in battle formation, in case 
the enemy turn and renew the fight. 
Should the general find himself besieging his enemy (textbook generals of the 
early Empire are not themselves besieged), he can use his manuals to learn 
what devices and machines may be used, and how the besieged might counter 
them, but he will have to decide how to use these machines himself. 
For the most part the textbook general will show mercy to his defeated enemy, 
as long as it is in Rome's (or his) interests to do so, and the enemy has not 
committed any atrocities against Romans. If the enemy had rebelled, he may 
treat them harshly to teach them, and others, a lesson - 
By following the advice of his textbooks, the general ntight conduct a 
successful campaign, provided, among other things, that his enemy behaved 
in a fashion that the military theorists expected. 
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Use of treatLses 
Campbell (1987 24) was concerned about evidence relating to the practical use 
of treatises; he argued it would be impossible to say for certain whether a 
general using a particular tactic or stratagem had read or was influenced by 
military theory or previous exempla. However, I believe it does not matter 
even if true that it is impossible to argue for the actual use of treatises; we 
know from Caesar and Vitruvius that they could be used to a certain point. 
Unless a manual is advocating a new technique or theory, like the de 
munitionibus castrorum, it is undoubtedly going to reflect current practices . 
Onasander, Frontinus and Arrian are not trying to introduce new techniques; 
they are simply writing textbooks describing and explaining current field 
practices (and past practices in the cases of Frontinus and Arrian). Since 
Roman warfare was a very conservative enterprise anyway, field practices and 
therefore the advice in the treatises would have changed very little. The most 
notable changes in field practices, the use of auxiliaries as the principal 
striking force in pitched battles and the supposed reintroduction of the Greek 
style phalanx, have been shown to be strategies used because of particular 
topographical circumstances or because of the nature of the enemy, and these 
are precisely the variables that Onasander admits treatises cannot cover. 
Despite the limitations of the treatises in only going so far with their advice, 
they provide a great deal of valuable information concerning basic field 
practices. A mediocre general might get by with this essential knowledge and 
the advice of his officers; a great general, as Caesar was aware and 
Onasander implies, would know when to move beyond the recommendations of 
textbooks and trust to his own experience and inspiration. 
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Avvendix 1: Translation of the De Munitionibus Castrorum' 
1. We will now explain the way in which the cohorts described above pitch 
their tents. One tent occupies ten feet; this length is increased by two feet 
for the pitching, and it shelters eight men. A complete century has 80 
soldiers, so there will be ten tents which will run in a line 120 feet long. 
Because the width of the hemistriqa is 30 feet, 10 feet are assigned to the 
tents, 5 feet to the weapons and 9 feet to the pack animals. This makes 24 
feet; twice this is 48 feet. So when two centuries camp opposite each other, 
a strip (striga) of 60 feet will be made; there remains 12 feet which will 
provide sufficient space for those coming and going. This space is calculated 
for a complete legionary century. Since 16 men from each century are on 
guard duty at any one time, they do not pitch more then eight tents per 
century. In this way their centurion has a place to pitch his tent on the same 
area as those tents would have been. Otherwise it would have been necessary 
to allocate more space. 
2. Because they are the most trustworthy of the provincial units, the legions 
should camp next to the vallum, to guard it and by their number to hold inside 
a human wall the army raised from foreign tribes. However when there are 
more reinforcements (non-legionary troops), when it is necessary to increase 
the allocation to the cohort, the width of the hemistriga is retained, the area 
remains unchanged, and we will alter the following: the area which was 120 x 
180 feet will be 90 x 240 feet according to the diagram below, or 60 x 360 feet, 
as is also shown on the diagram. For one cohort occupies a space of 30 x 720 
feet. Now, whenever the width is doubled, the length is lessened by the same 
proportion. But if we receive more legions and fewer reinforcements, as it will 
be necessary to camp the cohorts more tightly round the ramparts, we will 
alter the site thus: that which is assigned to the standards will be at the far 
end, and we will not change the method of pitching tents in hemistrigae. We 
have attached a plan of the arrangement below. Sometimes it is customary to 
assign an area 150 x 150 feet to a cohort, but although this can be done, it 
should be avoided, because the centuries cannot pitch their tents in the usual 
order and in one corner the area of the cohort's allocation will be left 
uncovered, as indicated below on the diagram. 
'This translation is based on the 1977 Teuber text of Grillone and the 1979 
BudO, text of Lenoir. 
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3. The first cohort camps inside the via sagularis, because of the standards 
and eagles and, as it is of double strength, it will have a double assignment 
of space; for example, 120 feet for the lines, 360 feet for the camping space, 
or 180 feet for the lines and 240 feet for camping; the arrangement of the plan 
will be the same for the other cohorts. Therefore if there is an uneven 
number of legions to be camped, in this case three, two of the first cohorts 
should pitch camp on the sides of the praetorium in a line next to the via 
sagularis, and the third in the praetentura, also on the sides of the via 
sagularis, on the left hand side as one is entering through the porta 
praetoria; one cohort camps on the right, opposite it so that the army can be 
led out in its usual order. 
4. However, when there are five or six legions, two first cohorts should camp 
on either side of the praetorium and two in the praetentura above the hospital 
tents, then vexillations (or a second cohort). If the situation calls for it, a 
quingenary infantry cohort may be placed instead of the vexillations, and if 
the space is even more restricted, it should be assigned to a legionary cohort, 
but this should be calculated exactly, so that 120 feet are assigned to the 
hospital and other departments which camp above (the first cohort), namely 
the veterinary hospital and the workshops, which ideally should be placed at 
a distance from the hospital so that there may be peace for those convalescing 
in the hospital. The area assigned to each of these departments is usually 
calculated as that for 200 men. 
5. Legionary vexillations should be assigned the same space as a legionary 
cohort, which is calculated at 600 men, because of their baggage. They 
should camp above the praetentura or on the sides of the praetor-ium as stated 
above, above the first cohorts. If possible, they ought not to camp near to 
the rampart, because their legate would not be of equal rank and if the 
rampart happened to be overrun by the enemy, the legion and its legate will 
allege that the vexillations there are responsible. 
6. The Praetorian cohorts should camp on the sides of the praetorium and 
should be assigned a double space because they use larger tents. The 
primipilares and re-enlisted veterans should also be assigned a place in the 
same area. 
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7. The Praetorian cavalry should camp on the right side of the praetorium, the 
emperor's equites, singulares on the left. If there is a greater number of the 
latter, for example 600 equites singulares and 300 Praetorians, 150 of the 
equites singulares should camp in the lines of the Praetorians. It should be 
so arranged that there is an equal number stationed on each side and the 
decurions and other principales who have two horses each, will have more room 
to camp. If the number is less and there is enough room in the hemistriclae for 
100 cavalry there should be no hesitation in assigning the area to the 
headquarters staff who are nearest there on the left side. 
8. If there should be an uneven number of Praetorian cohorts, Praetorian 
cavalry are camped in place of one of the cohorts, since the number and 
arrangement of the cohorts on the right and left sides of the praetorium should 
be the same. If the equites singulares should number 800 or 900 they should 
camp in equal numbers and in complete lines on either side of the praetorium; 
if they number about 500 one line will be sufficient for them. 
9. We must be particularly careful that not more than 720 feet is assigned to 
the length of the praetorium. Thus the Praetorian cohorts and the other unit 
which camps on the side of the praetorium will be assigned complete lines in a 
very satisfactory way. For although 140 to 220 feet may be assigned to the 
total width of the praetorium, 720 feet must be assigned to the length, as 
stated above. 20 feet of the length of the praetorium should be given to the 
guard post but if necessary ten feet is enough. 
10. In the same way an area from 50 to 70 feet can be assigned to the 
companions of our emperor, and in this area a space should be assigned to the 
Praetorian Prefect immediately adjacent to the via Principalis. Then when a 
road has been inserted, the Praetorian cohorts and the rest of the units 
should be assigned space proportionately as we have indicated in our 
pamphlet. 
11. The altars are set up at the end of the praetorium; we will assign the 
auguratorium to the right side of the praetorium next to the via Principalis, 
so that the general can observe the omens there correctly; the tribunal is set 
up on the left side, so that having observed the omens, the general can ascend 
the tribunal and address the army on the favourable auspices. 
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12. At the entrance to the praetorium and in the middle next to the via 
Principalis is the spot named groma, called this because the troop assembles 
here or because when the measurements are being fixed the iron-footed groma 
is put over the same place, so that by sighting from this point the gates of the 
camp form a star. For the reason written above, those who practise this 
technique are known as gromatici. 
13. Access roads are provided running parallel to the via Sagularis so that the 
army can advance quickly for a sortie. 
14.1 will now describe the arrangement of the praetentura. The via 
Principalis, which runs between the right and left gates, and which gets its 
name from the principia, should be 60 feet wide, the same width as the work 
which separates the vallum from the legions and for this reason it is known as 
the intervallum. Likewise the road which leads to the porta praetoria (the via 
praetoria is no doubt named after the praetorium) should be 60 feet wide, as 
stated above, and because of the orientation of the tents, the lines situated 
above this in the praetentura should not run parallel to it, since the standards 
should look down the via praetoria. 
15. And so below the via Principalis we will assign the legates their space, 
which is termed scamnum and does not have the fixed measurements of the 
common lines because the number of legions is variable; but a space of 50 to 
80 feet wide should always be kept for it, according to the number of legions 
present. The tribunes of the Praetorian cohorts usually camp in this area. 
In the same way an area below this should be assigned to the legionary 
tribunes, which is similarly termed scamnum. Separated from these by a road 
are the milliary or quingenary alae one after the other; we have shown below 
on the plan how each unit should camp. 
16. As I have come to a suitable point, I will now describe the milliary ala. It 
consists of 24 turmae, in which there are decurions, duplicarii and 
sesquiplicarii, one of each in every turma. The decurions each have 3 horses, 
the duplicarii and sesquiplicarii 2. Thus there are 96 horses over the 1000, 
which is the number calculated when the extra horses are discounted. A 
quingenary ala. has 16 turmae, decurions and other NCOs and so there are 64 
additional horses - For this reason 3 feet are calculated for each trooper; their 
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number is established at 1000 so that the prefect of the ala can be assigned an 
area in the space and their principales can camp in a more spacious way; for 
the rest, each trooper is assigned 2h feet. 
17. This, however, concerns the retentura: the road above the praetorium, 
through the extension of which, when the army is larger, ie: 5 or more 
legions, the portae quintanae are usually placed, should be made 40 feet wide; 
if the gates are placed there it should be 50 feet wide, and it is known as the 
quintana because of the forces. 
18. The quaestorium is so called because the quaestors were sometimes 
assigned their places there; this is above the praetorium in a line with the gate 
called decumana because the 10th cohorts camp there. The quaestorium should 
be narrower than the praetorium so that the lines of the guard will be 
immediately behind the praetorium. In particular, the enemy's ambassadors 
and hostages should camp there, and if any booty has been captured, it is 
placed in the quaestorium. 
19. The centurions of the guard should camp on the sides of the quaestorium 
close to the via quintana so that the rear of the praetorium is protected and 
they are right next to the praetorium; we will assign a double space to them 
because they use the same tents as the Praetorian cohorts. A quingenary 
infantry or part-mounted cohort should be placed above these, because of the 
size of the line. Infantry or part-mounted cohorts should camp in the other 
lines, looking towards the via quintana; the allies and other allied tribes 
should camp above these; it should be arranged in such a way that the allied 
tribes are held in all sides, as stated above. 
20.30 feet will be wide enough for the via sagularis; if there are five legions, 
however, it ought to be 40 feet wide. The offices of the first cohort, where 
the orders are given to the legion, should be placed in the scamnum of the 
legates opposite the eagle. 
21. As far as possible, the camp should be 3x2 in proportion so that a 
blowing breeze can refresh the army. I said above a3x2 ration, for example, 
2400 feet long by 1600 feet wide. If it is longer the trumpet call can be 
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sounded, but in a disturbance the horn cannot be easily heard at the porta 
decumana; if it is wider, the outline is too near being a square. 
22.1 think we have dealt carefully enough with everything that is necessary, 
and if explanations on some matters become necessary, I will deal with them in 
their place. In addition, lest I seem to be passing over the fortifications of 
camps, the choice of site, the fixing of measurements and the art of avoiding 
unfavourable sites, I will deal with them briefly at the end. 
23. Meanwhile, I will explain the beginning of measuring and we shall review 
the units to be placed in the plan. We will also advise on where they should 
camp. The Praetorian cohorts and cavalry, the emperor's equites singulares 
and the milliary or quingenary alae should camp on the sides of the praetorium 
if the space permits; then vexillations and second cohorts or quingenary 
infantry units above the first cohorts. 
24. Milliary or quingenary alae, Moorish cavalry and Pannonian light horsemen 
camp in the praetentura. All the marines camp there as well because they are 
the first to go out in order to construct roads, and so that they are safer 
whilst working, they are protected by the Moorish cavalry and Pannonian light 
horsemen; they should camp next to the cohorts. In the same way the scouts 
should camp in the line of the first cohort just like the legionary vexillations. 
25. The milliary or quingenary part-mounted units camp in the retentura; I 
have explained their organization below. Each provincial (auxiliary? ) soldier 
is assigned one foot plus a fifth of the total length of the hernistriga; each 
cavalryman however receives 2ý, feet and the fifth. Now when we have 
received the units, in order to calculate the area of the retentura, we 
transform, as it were, the part-mounted units into infantry units so that we 
can assign the space to the cavalry with their cohorts more easily. 
26. So a milliary part-mounted cohort has 240 cavalry which I shall transform 
into infantry, and to which I shall assign the 1 foot the infantryman gets and 
the 23ý feet which is assigned to the horse. Then, taking half the number, it 
should be multiplied by five. We will deal with the number of cavalry in this 
way; this makes 120, multiplied by 5, this is 600. Therefore minus the 
cavalry, 760 feet is assigned to the remaining infantry of the milliary part- 
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mounted cohort; added to the above number, the total is 1360. So let us 
remember that a space for 1360 men should be assigned when calculating the 
space for a milliary part-mounted cohort. 
27. A quingenary part-mounted cohort contains the same organization but half 
the numbers of a milliary part-mounted cohort. So a milliary part-mounted 
cohort has ten centuries of infantry, 240 cavalry, (? ) turmae and ?6 decurions; 
they camp in 136 tents and from this number, the centurions and decurions 
use one each. A quingenary part-mounted cohort has 6 centuries, and half 
the rest of a milliary unit. 
28. A milliary infantry unit has ten centuries and camps in 100 tents, of which 
the centurions use one each. In the same way a quingenary infantry cohort 
has six centuries and the rest of its organisation is as above - 
29. We will place the tribes, Cantabrians, Getuh, Palmyrenes, Dacians, 
Britons, the centuries of guards and any others among the allied forces, in 
the retentura. We will assign five feet to each of the camels with their 
drivers. If they are to be used against the enemy they should camp in the 
praetentura next to the marines, but if they are there to carry booty, they 
should camp in the quaestorium. 
30. And so we may calculate the numbers of the units which I have listed 
above: 3 legions, 1600 vexillarii, 4 Praetorian cohorts, 400 Praetorian cavalry, 
450 of the emperor's equites singulares, 4 milliary alae and 5 quingenary; 600 
Moorish cavalry, 800 Pannonian light horsemen, 500 marines from the fleet at 
Misenum and 800 from Ravenna; 200 scouts, 2 milliary part-mounted cohorts 
and 4 quingenary; 3 milliary infantry cohorts and 3 quingenary; 500 
Palmyrenes, 900 Getuli, 700 Dacians, 500 Britons, 700 Cantabrians and two 
centuries of guards. 
31. After receiving the numbers we should always do the calculations for the 
retentura. so that we know how many hemistrigae to put up in each half of the 
retentura. Now, the number that will camp in the retentura is 13640. The 
number is halved, so that an equal number camps on each side, that is 6820. 
Now we shall organize the sides of the praetorium and calculate likewise for the 
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praetentura just as we did for the retentura so that we know where we should 
assign space for the tents and standards of the legionary cohorts. 
32. So we should notice that when 3 legions with their reinforcements are to 
camp, the half part of the camp is 720 feet wide and we assign 90 feet for the 
tents and 240 feet for the standards on the sides of the camp to the cohorts so 
that, having deducted the space for the cohorts and the width of the via 
sagularis, 600 feet remain. Thus milliary alae should camp in an area of the 
praetentura. Now to establish the assignments for the rest of the 600 feet 
space, we shall fill one side of the praetorium so that we know how many alae 
may camp in the praetentura. 
33.420 feet on the side of the praetorium is occupied by units of soldiers, 60 
feet by the Praetorians, 20 by the guard picket, 60 feet by the emperor's 
companions and 40 feet by the roads; this is approximately the distribution on 
this side of the praetorium; that is 600 feet. 
34. Now to organize the praetentura we must compute the number of cavalry 
from alae which are left. This is 4000, half of which is 2000. A milliary ala 
should be assigned 150 feet for the standards and 600 feet for the tents. By 
this method 150 feet makes 5 hemistrigas. A cavalryman is assigned 3 feet in 
a length of 600 feet; I will take a third of this so that I have the number of 
cavalry who will camp in the length; that is 200 so this will be one hemistrig . 
And now we calculate 5 heniistriqae; 5 times 200 is 1000, the correct space for 
a milliary ala. 
35. However, we must calculate the remainder of the force, as on the 
retentura, so that we know similarly how many hemistrigae should be set up. 
This number together with space for the hospital, veterinary hospital and 
workshops, which are calculated together at 600 men, is 8000. Half of this is 
4000; this will be the number of half the part; it is 600 feet wide, which will 
hold 500 men; as we have said, an infantryman receives I foot and a fifth. So 
there is no difference between adding a fifth part to the number that has been 
calculated and taking away a 6th part, in this case 600 feet. There remains 
500 which is the number of men held in a hemistriqa. 
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36. But we have a force of 4000; we may see how many times 500 1 have; it is 
8. This is the number of hemistriqae to be made. This makes 240 feet, and 
the assignment of the alae calculated above was 300 feet, making a total of 540. 
3 cohorts can pitch their tents here which will take up 720 feet from which the 
amount the unit occupies is subtracted, that is 540 feet; there remains 180 feet 
in which 6 hemistrigae can be set up. Like the one above the lst cohort, 
access roads are made in the same way for the units, each one being 4- 10 feet - 
60 feet is assigned for the roads. This leaves 120 feet which we assign to the 
tents of the tribunes and legates at the rate of 60 feet each. 
37. Now if the surveyor assigns to the place 1000 extra men in the same area, 
we will have the following. Since half of this is 500, which is assigned to a 
hen-dstriq , we deduct 10 feet from the scamnum and build a road between the 
alae, which is given if the space permits. There will be 30 feet; this will be 
a hemistriga which will be assigned to the remaining 500 men. 
38. Now on the opposite side in the same way we deduct from the total force 
1000 men whose lines will be in a space of 60 feet. We will assign 80 feet to the 
scamnum of the legates, 70 feet to those of the tribunes and place roads 
between the alae. 
39. It is the same for the sides of the praetorium and retentura, if there 
should be a greater or smaller force, and we also look out so that we increase 
or decrease the area of the praetorium and allocation to the emperor's 
companions, and likewise for the quaestorium, so that the proportion of the 
width of the camp is retained. If, however, the space is more restricted, the 
roads between the Praetorian cohorts and cavalry units can be left out because 
if they observe military discipline, as I stated above, the soldiers will each 
gather in their own units. 
40. In the retentura the men are accustomed to camp 50 per line closely or 
more widely, and since it happens that the units often change, they may have 
to pitch more tents although the lines run in the same area. No more should 
be taken away from these except quingenary infantry cohorts above the first 
cohorts and if there should be more units, but not enough to fill a linel it will 
be necessary to camp more closely in the remaining lines, as stated. Similarly 
it should be organized in such a way that they camp more spaciously whenever 
241 
the remaining numbers permit so that the organisation of all the measurements 
is not thrown into confusion. So that they may camp in the lines of the 
retentura, in equal numbers, it is useful if the numbers in the retentura have 
already been calculated, as in the case of the praetentura. 
41. If there should be more or fewer reinforcement troops than we have 
shown, everything changes and the cohorts camp round the rampart in a 
different way - 
42. Now we have spoken about the 6820 troops in the half -part of the 
retentura. As this is 600 feet wide, I will see how many hemistriga there can 
be. In the present case this will be 17 and enough space can be assigned to 
the quaestorium. And so I take a 17th part of the force which is as we have 
said, the number of hemistriqae. This is 400, and so this will be the number 
of soldiers. They should camp in one hemistriga plus a fifth part of the length 
which is 80 feet; so this makes 480 feet f rom which it emerges that two cohorts 
camp on the side of the retentura. 
43. We should distribute the allies and other tribes in the lines, but they 
should not be in more than three groups, nor far from each other so that they 
can hear the watchword in their own tongue more quickly. We should observe 
that the standards are assigned the first line, the same as those of the first 
cohorts, so that the access roads can run through the camp. 
44. There will be 16 legionary cohorts along the sides, 6 in the praetentura 
and 4 in the retentura, each one being assigned 60 x 360 feet; the other four 
cohorts camp inside the via sagularis. 
45. As far as I am able, brother Lord, on account of my inexperience of 
military affairs, I have followed briefly all the authors and whatever they 
wrote about the organization of summer camps, and I have explained 
everything in a logical system in this pamphlet before arranging the troops. 
To this day no author has explained in written instructions all the measuring 
from the beginning, and because of this I hope that our care will be rightly 
approved by you. 
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46. So we have explained the disposition of the legions and assigned the whole 
army to their places; we have also shown which units should be moved if 
necessary. If the alae should be placed in the retentura and infantry or part- 
mounted cohorts in the praetentura, for no particular reason, it is without 
doubt a sign of an inexperienced surveyor. It is obvious that if there are no 
part-mounted cohorts at all in the army, we should place quingenary alae on 
the sides of the quaestorium so that the retentura has some cavalry. 
47. It concerns the arrangement of the legions and the division of the units, 
it shows the difficulties even to those skilled in camp organization relating to 
the number of legions. So if you should condescend to use it I will be the first 
to carry to your magnanimity this new method of measuring which I hope will 
please you if you first examine the usual method of measuring. 
48. Now we shall deal briefly with the fortifications of camps and other matters 
on which a number of authors have written. Five types of fortification of 
summer camps may be noted: ditch, rampart, stakes, stockade and weapons. 
49. In a more secure place, the ditch is used for the sake of discipline, and 
the types are V-shaped or Punic. It is called V-shaped when the sides, 
sloping in from the top at the same angle and becoming narrower, reach the 
bottom. A ditch is Punic when the outer side is laid out vertical; the other 
side is inclined as in the V-shaped. They should be at least five feet wide and 
three feet deep. A similar ditch should be dug 60 feet in front of the gateway, 
and the same width as the gate. Because of its shortness, it is known as a 
titulum. 
50. In less secure places a rampart of turf, stone, rocks or rubble should be 
thrown up. Eight feet wide and six feet wide will suffice, and a little parapet. 
There should also be a rampart before the gates along the titulum as along the 
ditches; because of the construction it is known as "sanctum". 
51. The stakes are trunks with their branches. They are resorted to if the 
nature of the soil is too friable causing the turfs to break, if a thick enough 
rampart cannot be built because of the looseness of the stones, or if a ditch 
cannot be dug without the sides collapsing. 
243 
52. When there is a shortage of stakes and the place is insecure, they protect 
the camp with four rows of armed men so that in each row guards are stationed 
frequently; cavalry should make a circuit of the camp by turns. If the camp 
is in a peaceful country, one row of arms will suffice for the sole purpose of 
maintaining discipline, and the guards are stationed more widely. 
53. However, the same happens with the stockade as with the rampart if the 
place is rocky or sandy, because without doubt a stockade provides sufficient 
fortification for a camp. 
54. The angles of the camps should be rounded because they make the 
projections and weaken the work which protects the defences. They should 
be rounded from the angle of the cohorts which make the sides of the work 60 
feet and until the line rejoins the outside line of the rampart, and this makes 
an angle of 90'. 
55. In the same way the clavicula is traced round a circle from a line on the 
inside of the rampart from a point in the middle of the gate, the compasses 
wide open to the edge of the gate; from this centre point you draw an arc in 
front of the road following the same line which is fixed at the centre of the 
gate. Then with the compasses in the same place you add the width of the 
rampart and draw another arc on the same line so that those going in are 
always unprotected and those coming in a straight line are kept out; and it 
gets the name clavicula. from this effect. 
56. Concerning the choice of terrain for the establishment of the camp; first 
they choose a site which rises gently above the plain, on a distinctive rise and 
the porta decumana is set at the highest point so that the area is dominated by 
the camp. The porta praetoria should always look towards the enemy. The 
second place is situated on a flat plain, the third is on a hill, the fourth on a 
mountain, the fifth in whatever place is necessary, from which it is called an 
"unavoidable camp". 
57. It should be particularly noted that a road should be built which is longer 
than the sides of the camp. Whatever the position of the camp there should be 
a river or spring on one side or the other. Unfavourable positions, which 
were called mothers-in-law by our ancestors, should be avoided at all times: 
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the camp should not be overlooked by a mountain from which the enemy could 
attack or see what is going on in the camp; there should be no forest nearby 
to conceal a hidden enemy, nor gulleys or valleys through which the enemy 
may secretly approach the camp; nor should the camp be near a fast-flowing 
river which might flood and overwhelm the camp in a sudden storm. 
58. In hostile territory one must remember to construct numerous double width 
access ramps up to the rampart and to build artillery platforms around the 
gates, on the projections at the corners and in places on towers. In particular 
the rampart should be fitted out with artillery on any side which is a mother- 
in-law if this cannot be avoided. 
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Appendix 2: cataloclue of Pitched BatUes of the late Republic and Earl 
Empire. 
This catalogue contains only precis of pitched battles in the late Republic and 
Empire discussed in chapter 6; it does not include skirmishes or minor cavalry 
engagements outside pitched battles. The various sources have only been 
used when they make some contribution to understanding the dispositions and 
tactics involved. 
Caesar vs Helvetii 58 BC BG 1 24 
The Helvetii attacked the Roman rearguard on the march; Caesar withdrew his 
troops to a nearby hill and sent his cavalry to check the enemy attack. 
C. drew up his four veteran legions in a triplex acies. His two newer legions 
and all the auxiliary were drawn up on top of the ridge where entrenchments 
were dug to protect the baggage train. 
The Helvetii drove back the Roman cavalry, formed a phalanx and advanced. 
The Romans threw their pila from higher ground, easily breaking the phalanx, 
then drew their swords and charged. The Helvetii were driven back. 
The Boji and Tulingi attacked the Roman right; the rear cohorts of the battle 
line turned to deal with this assault while the front two lines defeated the 
Helvetii. 
The Romans captured the Helvetii's camp and the Helvetii fled. 
Caesar vs Ariovistus 58 BC BG 1 50 
Caesar formed his troops in a triplex acies with a legate or quaestor in 
command of each legion. The auxiliaries were left guarding the small Roman 
camp. 
The Germans were formed up in a massed phalanx and C. took station on the 
right wing, to face the weak German left. 
There was no time for throwing pila because of the suddenness of the German 
charge. 
The German left was defeated and put to flight but the right was pressing 
hard on the Roman left. 
Crassus, the cavalry commander, noticed this and as he could move more 
freely than the other officers who were occupied in the line of battle he 
ordered the third line in support of the Roman left. 
The Germans fled, pursued by the Roman cavalry. 
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Caesar vs Belgae 57 BC BG Il 8ff 
Both sides had camped, Caesar on a hill suitable for drawing up his battle 
line. 
C. had trenches dug from his camp at 90 " to his proposed battle line. Fortlets 
and artillery were sited at the ends of these trenches to prevent his right wing 
being outflanked. 
The two novice legions remained in camp; the six others were drawn up before 
the camp, but C. gives no details about the battle line. 
In a cavalry engagement, the Romans come off better. C. engaged with his 
light armed Numidians, slingers, archers and cavalry to prevent the Belgae 
moving against the Remi. 
The cavalry pursued the survivors and the following day attacked the Belgic 
rearguard. 
Caesar vs Nervii 57 BC BG 11 20 
Caesar's army was approaching the enemy so he had his line led by six legions 
in light marching order, then the baggage train, then the two novice legions 
as rearguard. 
The six legions began entrenching camp. 
The light troops and cavalry engaged the Nervian cavalry and forced them to 
retreat, but their infantry then charged C. 's cavalry and threw them into 
disorder. 
Nervian infantry attacked the entrenching legionaries. These were separated 
by thick hedges and the soldiers joined the nearest standards. 
The Roman left and centre were successful but the right wing was in danger 
of being surrounded. The Roman cavalry and light infantry were driven off 
again. 
C. went round his legions encouraging them, then joined the right wing which 
was in difficulties. 
With the arrival of the two novice legions and the Xth from the successful left 
wing the tribes were driven off, suffering severe casualties at the hands of 
the pursuing cavalry. 
Crassus vs Aquitani 56 BC BG 111 24 
Crassus formed a duplex acies with the auxiliaries massed in the centre 
because he had no great confidence in their fighting abilities. 
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Labienus, vs Gauls 53 BC 
Labienus enticed the Gauls into a poor position. 
BG VI 8 
No details of his battle line, but the cavalry were posted on the wings, and to 
protect the baggage train. 
The Gauls were routed as soon as the lines met. 
The pursuit was carried out by the cavalry who killed and captured many. 
Labienus vs Parisii 52 BC 
No details of the Roman battle line. 
BG VII 62 
The Roman right drove back the enemy left but there was resistance on the 
enemy right where the Parisian chieftain was stationed. 
The victorious Roman right attacked the Parisian rear and slaughtered them - 
Caesar vs; Bellovaci 51 BC BG VIII 14 
Caesar formed up his legions in front of the hill on which the Bellovaci were 
positioned and set up artillery. 
The Bellovaci did not attack, so C. ordered 20 cohorts to entrench camp. 
When the camp was complete, C. lined up his troops with the cavalry on the 
wings. 
The Bellovaci withdrew behind a smoke screen. 
Caesar vs Afranius 51 BC BC 1 81-3 
Caesar wished to avoid battle for the moment but Afranius drew up his battle 
line to prevent further work on C. 's fieldworks. 
Afranius drew up a duplex acies with two lines of five legions; his third line, 
of reserves, was composed of auxiliaries - 
Caesar used a triplex acies in 4-3-3 formation, with archers and slingers 
posted in the centre and cavalry on the flanks. 
There was no engagement; because of the confined area of the battlefield, a 
routed enemy could easily attain the safety of his camp and therefore any 
battle would be indecisive. 
Curio vs Publius Attius 49 BC BC 11 34 
Both sides were eager for battle and drew up their lines with a valley between 
them. Each waited for the other to attempt to cross the valley so they could 
join battle in a more favourable position. 
The cavalry and light infantry from Attius' left wing began to approach. 
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Curio sent his cavalry and two cohorts of Marrucini to meet them. 
Attius' cavalry fled, leaving the exposed infantry to be surrounded and 
massacred. 
Taking advantage of the enemy's low morale, Curio ordered his troops to 
attack. Attius' troops fled. 
Curio vs Saburra 49 BC BC 11 40-2 
Saburra ordered his troops to feign retreat, enticing Curio down onto level 
ground. 
There are no details of battle lines. 
Saburra attacked first with his cavalry which began to outflank Curio's troops 
and attack them from the rear. 
Cohorts which advanced beyond the battle line were quickly surrounded and 
cut off by the much faster light armed Nunddians. 
The whole force of Curio was pinned down by cavalry and massacred - 
Pharsalus 48 BC BC 111 88-99 
Appian BC 11 75 ff 
Pompey's line: Triplex acies, according to Appian. Pompey was on the left 
wing with two legions; Scipio in the centre; strongest troops on the right. 
The right wing was protected by a stream with steep banks so he placed all his 
cavalry, archers and slingers on his left. Appian suggests that many of 
Pompey's auxiliaries were stationed outside the line of battle to attack Caesar's 
flank or camp. 
Total of 45,000 + 2000 veterans. 
Caesar's line: Triplex acies; Xth legion (his most reliable) on the right wing 
with Sulla, the depleted IX and VIII on the left with Antony. The remainder 
of his troops were in the centre with Domitius. C. took up position opposite 
Pompey, with the Xth, according to Appian. 
After observing P. 's dispositions, C. took one cohort from each legion's third 
line and formed them into a fourth line (quadruplex acies) on his right 
opposite P. 's cavalry. He also placed 3000 of his bravest infantry in ambush 
on his right wing with orders to lunge at the faces of the cavalrymen 
(According to Appian, though this might actually refer to the fourth acies). 
Appian states that Pompey transferred some of his best cavalry to his left wing 
to face the Xth legion. 
Total of 22,000 men. 
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Pompey ordered his troops to stand fast while Caesar's charged. The latter 
noticed this and stopped to catch their breath before renewing the charge. 
Both sides threw their pila then drew swords. 
P. 's cavalry charged and his archers rushed out, forcing C. 's cavalry to 
withdraw. P. 's cavalry pressed more closely to attack the right wing's flank. 
C. sent in his fourth line which repelled P. 's cavalry, leaving the archers and 
slingers exposed. The fourth line massacred these before surrounding 
Pompey's left wing and taking it in the rear. 
C. then sent in his third line which was fresh. The Pompeians turned and 
fled, though Appian describes it as an ordered retreat. 
Because of his troops' high morale and the enemy's panic, C. ordered his men 
to storm P. 's camp. This was fiercely defended but taken. 
Later C. intercepted P. Is retreating troops and cut them off from water 
supplies with an earthwork. 
Pompey's troops surrendered. 
Domitius Calvinus vs Pharnaces 48 BC B. Alex. 38-40 
Pharnaces dug two straight trenches 4 ft deep and not far apart from the town 
of Nicopolis to the point he had determined as the limit for deploying his 
troops. He drew up his line of battle within the trenches and the cavalry on 
the flanks, outside them. 
Domitius stationed his Roman legions on the wings and the two provided by 
Deiotarus in the centre with a very narrow front. The remaining cohorts were 
posted as reserves. 
The Roman right drove off the cavalry on Pharnaces' left and began attacking 
his infantry in the rear. 
The Roman left attempted to surround Pharnaces' right but was pinned down 
trying to cross the trench. 
Deiotarus' legions in the centre were defeated. 
The victorious Roman right was forced to form a circle and withdraw to high 
ground, suffering only very light casualties. 
Zela (Caesar vs Pharnaces) 47 BC B. Alex. 74-6 
Both sides held positions on opposite sides of a valley. 
Pharnaces made a surprise advance up the steep slope against an unsuspecting 
Caesar. His troops were caught entrenching and had to form up line of battle 
in a sudden. 
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Pharnaces attacked with scythe bearing chariots, throwing the disordered 
Romans into confusion. 
The chariots were driven off by n-dssiles but Pharnaces' infantry then 
attacked. 
The Romans were greatly helped by the nature of the ground (they were 
facing troops climbing uphill). 
The right wing began forcing Pharnaces' troops back down the hill and the left 
and centre followed. 
Pharnaces' troops were thrown down the WE and Caesar's, exhilarated by 
their success, charged up the slope and captured Pharnaces' camp. 
Ruspina (Caesar vs Labienus) 46 BC B. Af r. 13-18 
Labienus' line was very long and closely packed cavalry interspersed with 
light infantry and dismounted archers. 
Caesar, believing the line to be infantry, deployed in a simplex acies as best 
he could in view of his small numbers. He posted his archers at the front of 
the line and cavalry on the wings to ensure he was not outflanked. 
Labienus' cavalry on his wings threatened to outflank Caesar. 
When the two lines engaged, the cavalry in the centre of line fled but the light 
infantry remained until the cavalry should charge again. 
Caesar's infantry broke ranks to engage the cavalry, only to be surrounded 
by the light infantry. C. therefore ordered his men not to advance more than 
four feet ahead of the standards. 
C. 's troops were driven into a circle and forced to fight in a confined space. 
C. ordered the line to be extended as far as possible, and alternate cohorts 
to turn about to face the enemy. 
C- split the enemy's cordon and his infantry renewed the fight, falling back 
on his defences and causing heavy casualties to Labienus' troops. 
The arrival of Labienus' cavalry reinforcements forced Caesar back onto the 
plain. Eventually, Caesar urged his men to drive back the enemy and seize 
the high ground. Once this objective had been achieved, the Caesarian troops 
retired to their own defences. 
U2itta 46 BC B. Afr. 59-61 
Scipio: Centre held by his own & Juba's legions with a reserve of Numidians 
behind. On the wings were elephants with light infantry and Numidian 
auxiliaries behind them. The cavalry was stationed on the right wing as the 
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left was protected by the town of Uzitta and there was no room to deploy 
cavalry there. Large force of Numidians and light infantry on his extreme 
right. His intention was to outflank Caesar's smaller force and surround it. 
Caesar: His right wing was protected by fortifications so his battle line here 
was a duplex acies. He concentrated his reserves on his left with a 4uplex 
acies here, stretching as far as his centre, to counter the large cavalry force 
on Scipio's right. He stationed his cavalry on his left wing and, as he lacked 
confidence in them, he interspersed them with light infantry and sent up the 
Vth legion in support. Detachments of archers were stationed at various parts 
of the line, and especially on the wings. 
There was no battle. 
Thapsus 46 BC B. Mr. 80-6 
Scipio: legions were drawn up in front of his rampart with elephants on both 
wings. 
Caesar: drew up a triplex acies with five cohorts from the Vth legion on each 
wing to form a quadruplex acies facing the elephants. Archers, slingers and 
cavalry interspersed with light infantry were posted on the wings. 
The elephants on the right wing were forced back by volleys of missiles and 
Scipio's cavalry fled with them. 
With the right wing gone, C. 's infantry easily captured the enemy's rampart. 
Scipio's forces were routed. 
Munda 45 BC B. Hisp. 29-31 
The plain between the two camps of Pompeians and Caesarians was very 
suitable for cavalry operations. 
Pompeians: 13 legions; cavalry with light infantry and further auxiliaries on 
the wings. 
Caesar: Legions in the centre (Xth held the right wing as usual), auxiliaries 
and cavalry on the wings. 
C. began to restrict the operational area but his men argued against this. 
C. 's troops charged uphill. The Xth was initially so successful on the right 
that, to prevent the Pompeian left being surrounded, a legion was despatched 
from the Pompeian right. 
Immediately Caesar's cavalry pushed hard against the left wing. 
The Pompeians were driven back and escaped into the town of Munda. 
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Idistaviso AD 16 
Germans and Cherusci: no details 
Annals H 16 
Germanicus: Few details of battle line, but the Roman troops were alert and 
ready to deploy from line of march to battle line. 
The Germans were massed in front of a forest whilst the Cherusci on top of a 
ridge. 
The Cherusci charged; Germanicus sent part of his cavalry to attack their 
flank and the remainder to take them in the rear. 
The Roman infantry attacked and put to flight both Germans and Cherusci. 
The Cherusci attacked Germanicus' archers but were held off by auxiliary 
infantry. 
The Germans fled and were massacred. 
M. Furius Canifflus vs Tacfarinas AD 17 Annals 11 52 
Romans: Camillus' one legion held the centre of the line, with auxiliaries and 
an ala on each wing. 
No details of Tacfarinas' dispositions. 
There was no battle. 
L. Apronius vs Frisji AD 29 Annals IV 73 
The Romans were crossing a ford into territory defended by the Frisii in line 
of battle. 
Apronius sent in the Ala Canninefatum and auxiliary infantry to attack the 
enemy's rear but these were repulsed, as were the legioniary cavalry he sent 
in next. 
3 light armed cohorts, then two more, then all the auxiliary cavalry were 
thrown in. These troops were sent in at intervals and were caught up in the 
panic of troops sent in earlier. 
The remainder of the auxiliary infantry, under the command of a legionary 
legate, was sent in and drove back the enemy in a sharp engagement. The 
defeated auxiliaries and cavalry were brought off in a state of exhaustion. 
lst revolt of Iceni AD 47 Annals XII 31 
The only troops Ostorius Scapula had with him were auxiliary cavalry and the 
Iceni defended an earthwork with an approach too narrow for cavalry. 
Ostorius therefore ordered his cavalry to dismount and fight on foot. They 
defeated the Iceni - 
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Corbulo vs Tiridates AD 58 Annals XIII 38 
Corbulo, drew up his legionaries in the centre and auxiliaries outside them, 
presumably with his cavalry on the wings, though Tacitus does not mention 
this. 
There was no battle. 
Suetonius Paulinus vs Boudicca AD 60/1 Annals XIV 34 
Suetonius drew up his line in a valley with a wood behind him to prevent 
ambushes or outflanking manoeuvres. His legionaries held the centre of the 
line with auxiliary infantry outside them and cavalry on the wings. 
The horde of Britons fled and was massacred. 
2nd Battle of Cremona AD 69 Histories 111 21-5 
Antonius Primus agreed to battle despite the absence of the main force under 
Mucianus because the morale of his troops was so high. The legions of both 
sides held the centres with auxiliaries and cavalry on the wings, but Tacitus' 
account lacks detail here. 
The battle, a rare night action, was confused and indecisive until the moon 
rose and shone in the faces of the Vitellian troops, making them excellent 
targets for the Flavians. The Vitellian troops fled when it was rumoured the 
main Flavian force under Mucianus had arrived. 
Cerialis vs Batavians AD 71 Histories V 16 
The front Roman line consisted of cavalry and auxiliary infantry, with the 
legions drawn up behind. Cerialis remained at the rear with a picked force for 
use in emergencies. 
Mons Graupius AD 73/4 Agric. 35-7 
The Britons were drawn up in ranks on a hillside; the charioteers filled the 
ground between the hill and the Romans. 
Agricola drew up his auxiliaries in the front line, with the cavalry on the 
wings. 2 alae were held in reserve on each wing and the legions were held in 
reserve in front of the camp. 
The main force of cavalry drove off the charioteers and Agricola sent in 6 
cohorts of auxiliaries. 
The reserve cavalry alae drove off an attempted flank attack by the Britons. 
The Britons fled, pursued by the cavalry. 
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T4=cz 
. us AD 194 Dio LXXV 
The battle was fought on a plain with mountains on one side and cliffs 
descending to the sea on the other. 
Both generals drew up their heavy infantry in the centre with artillery, 
archers, etc. in the rear to fire over the front rankers. Since the flanks of 
both sides were protected, no cavalry were stationed on the wings. Instead, 
An ullinus sent his cavalry over the hills to attack Niger's rear. 
When the battle came to close quarters, the Severans formed a testudo to 
approach the enemy under fire. 
The battle was indecisive for a long time but finally Niger's troops proved 
numerically superior. 
A storm blew up in the faces of Niger's troops and they were forced back. At 
this point the Severan cavalry attacked and Niger's troops fled with heavy 
casualties. 
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Appendix 3: Cataloc 
_ es 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 lue of Sieq 
This catalogue is highly selective and is not intended to be an exhaustive 
catalogue of all Roman sieges. The various literary and archaeological sources 
have only been included when they add to the understanding of the account; 
thus the references themselves are also selective. 
Date: 406-396 BC 
Place: Veii 
Refs: Livy IV 40 -v 21 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus XII 10 
Plutarch Camfllus v 
Ward -Perkins "Excavations beside the N. W gate at Veii 1957-58" 
PBSR 1959 
Ward Perkins "Veii, the historical topography of the ancient city" 
PBSR 1961 
A: Veii lies on a large plateau virtually surrounded by steep sided valleys and 
the Veint Pas had strengthened the city's fortifications. As a result, it could 
not easily be taken by direct assault. The siege was traditionally supposed 
to have lasted ten years and was compared with that at Troy, but siege 
operations may not have been particularly strenuous for the whole time. The 
first recorded action after the start of the siege was in 403 BC when the 
Romans constructed a line of circumvallation round Veii, a contravallation 
against threats of a relieving army from Etruria, and kept troops there 
throughout the winter. The following year the Roman force suffered a severe 
setback when one of the camps was attacked simultaneously by a relieving 
force of Capenates and Faliscans, and the besieged Veientas . The Romans, 
however, soon recovered their losses and were able to hold off the Veientas 
and their allies when they made a second attempt to raise the siege in 399 BC. 
This time they were attacked in the rear by Roman forces from another of the 
siege camps. The relieving force was routed and the besieged driven back 
into Veii. Finally in 396 BC Camillus was appointed dictator and given 
command of the siege. He strengthened the Roman siege works and had a mine 
dug up to the citadel. While Camillus made diversionary attacks on the walls 
of Veii, Roman forces entered the citadel through this mine. The town was 
sacked and the populations slaughtered or sold into slavery. 
B: Despite extensive fieldwork in the area around Veii, no traces of any 
siegeworks have been found, and no traces are visible from aerial photogra- 
phy. However, most of the fortifications of Ved appear to date to the period 
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immediately preceding the destruction of the city which corresponds with 
Livy's statement that the Veientines had strengthened their defences before 
the siege. 
Date: 214-212 BC 
Place: Syracuse 
Refs: Livy XXIV 34; XXV 23-31 
Polybius VIII 3-7 
Plutarch Marcellus 
Lawrence 1979 
A: Syracuse was very strongly defended by a wall extending for the most part 
along high ground, and by the artillery and other engines prepared by 
Archimedes. The Romans initially attempted a direct assault from land and sea 
simultaneously. The land forces were equipped with wicker screens and 
scaling ladders to attack part of the wall by the Hexapyla gate on the eastern 
side of the walls. However, whilst the troops were still at a distance, they 
came under the fire of Archimedes' artillery and suffered heavy casualties. 
When the Romans did get close to the wall, they came under heavy fire from 
arrows and artillery fired through narrow loop-holes in the walls, were 
attacked by grappling hooks which could lift men up and then drop them, and 
their shelters were crushed by stones and wooden beams. 
The sea-borne assault fared no better; it consisted of 60 quinquiremes filled 
with archers, slingers and javelin men to drive the defenders off the 
battlements, and 8 more quinquiremes grouped in pairs to support sambucae 
(scaling engines). The galleys came under the fire of long and short range 
artillery, while the men were fired on by artillery shooting through the loop- 
holes. In addition the ships were destroyed by machines firing heavy stones 
or lead shot and by machines grappling the bows and sinking them. The 
Romans realized they could not take Syracuse by assault because of 
Archimedes' engines and resorted to blockade, which was rather ineffective. 
Despite the presence of Carthaginian reinforcements in Sicily, Marcellus 
continued the Roman blockade and in 212 BC he made a surprise night attack 
with scaling ladders and captured the outer defences of the city. The 
remaining areas of Syracuse were finally taken when the Romans captured one 
by storm following a diversionary attack and the other surrendered. The city 
was given over to the soldiers to plunder and although there was no massacre, 
Archimedes was killed by a Roman soldier. 
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B: No archaeological evidence for the siege has been discovered, but the 
defences were strengthened and redesigned particularly for the use of 
artillery in the period preceding the siege. 
Date: 210 BC 
Place: New Carthage (Cartagena) 
Ref s: Livy XXVI 42-47 
Polybius X 8-16 
Appian Spanish Wars vi 20 
A: New Carthage was situated on a spur of land in a lagoon, connected to the 
mainland by a ridge only 250 yards wide. The city was particularly important 
as it was the main base for supplies coming in to Spain by sea from Carthage, 
so Scipio was eager to take it as quickly as possible. Appian states that Scipio 
enclosed the town with trenches, but Polybius and Livy, whose accounts 
correspond very well, state that Scipio deliberately left the causeway 
unfortified. The Roman fleet occupied the harbour. 
The besieged, led by the Carthaginian general Mago, drew up on the 
causeway, but were forced to retreat into the city by the Romans who then 
brought up scaling ladders and attempted to take the city by storm. The fleet 
made a simultaneous attack. However, the Romans were forced to retreat as 
the walls were defended and many of their ladders were too short. But Scipio 
immediately made a second assault from both the land side and from the lagoon 
at low tide. The defenders were caught between the two forces and the city 
captured. Mago attempted to defend the citadel but surrendered when he 
realized that the city was completely overrun. Until this point, the Romans 
had been engaged in indiscriminate slaughter, (according to Polybius on 
Scipio's orders), but then stopped and turned to plunder. 
Citizens of New Carthage were released whilst non-citizens and slaves were 
sent to the fleet. Amongst the Roman plunder were several hundred pieces of 
artillery and a great quantity of equipment and missiles. 
Date: 203 BC 
Place: Locha, Spain 
Refs: Appian Punica 15 
Locha was a large town which was besieged by Scipio and Masinissa with great 
difficulties. As the Romans were about to attack with scaling ladders the 
Lochaeans offered to leave the city under a truce. Scipio sounded the recall 
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but the soldiers were angry because of their sufferings during the siege and 
refused to obey. They scaled the walls and began an indiscriminate slaughter. 
Scipio dismissed the survivors to safety, deprived the army of its loot and 
executed three of the officers, chosen by lot, who had disobeyed orders. 
Date: 189 BC 
Place: Ambracia, Epirus 
Refs: Polybius XXI 27-29 
Livy XXXVIII 4-9 
Ambracia had strong natural defences and a strong wall, and was besieged by 
the consul Marcus Fulvius. His first action was to build two camps and a 
castellum opposite the citadel, all connected by a rampart and ditch. The 
circumvallation was intended to prevent the besieged breaking out and 
reinforcements breaking in, but two groups of reinforcements did achieve this 
during the siege. Having constructed these works, Fulvius began a large- 
scale assault. Five siege engines attacked the wall simultaneously, and the 
Romans also used rams and sickle-shaped wall-hooks to bring down the 
battlements. Against these the defenders used cranes to drop weights on the 
rams, caught the wall-hooks with grapples and made frequent sorties. The 
Romans kept breaking down sections of the wall but could not profit from this 
as the besieged defended the gaps and quickly built up replacement walls. 
As a last resort, Fulvius had a mine dug towards the city. Although the 
Romans took care to hide their actions, the besieged realized what was 
happening when the saw the spoil heap. They dug a trench inside the wall 
and hung up brass plates to discover the position of the tunnel by the 
vibrations, then dug a countermine to intercept the Roman mine. By this time 
the Romans had reached the wall and underpinned a large part of it. When the 
two tunnels met an underground fight broke out, first between the sappers, 
then armed men. The situation was a stalemate until the besieged used a 
device to blow noxious fumes through the mine forcing the Romans to retreat. 
The town later surrendered on condition that the garrison be allowed free, and 
there appears to have been very little plunder. 
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Date: 171 BC 
Place: Haliartus, Boeotia 
Refs: Livy XLII 63 
Lucretius, who was commanding the operation, brought up a number of siege 
engines and rams but the besieged made frequent sorties, destroying the rams 
with stones and lead weights and when stretches of the wall were destroyed 
the besieged hastily built up a rubble replacement. Because the assault was 
taking too long, Lucretius ordered scaling ladders to be brought up on all 
sides. He made a diversionary attack against the town at several other points 
simultaneously. The young and old men were massacred and the armed men 
fled to the citadel but surrendered the following day. The inhabitants were 
sold into slavery and the city was looted and razed to the ground. 
Date: 147-146 BC 
Place: Carthage 
Refs: Livy LI (Ep) 
Appian Punica 117-133 
Plutarch Apophtheqemata 200 
The only narrative account is that of Appian, which was based on Polybius'. 
The siege was a complex operation involving the capture of different areas of 
the city which had independent defences. Scipio's first capture was the 
suburb of Megara, by storm, and as a result Hasdrubal the Carthaginian 
general tortured and executed Roman prisoners to make surrender impossible. 
Scipio then dug a trench across the isthmus and another looking towards the 
mainland and joined the two lines to form a quadrangle in which he stationed 
his army. The ditches were filled with sharp stakes and were palisaded. The 
side looking towards Carthage was fortified by a wall 25 stades (4.5 km) long, 
12 ft (3.5 m) high and 6 ft (1.7 m) wide, with parapets and towers, one of 
which was used for observation. 
Supplies to Carthage were cut off by this work but Scipio's ships were rather 
ineffectual at ensuring the blockade so he blocked the harbour with a massive 
stone mole. The Carthaginians, however, dug another entrance and an 
indecisive naval engagement foUowed. Attempts were then focused on the 
capture of a quay which the Romans partially demolished with a ram. The 
Carthaginians then drove off the Romans, burnt their engines and began 
rebuilding the quay but were forced to retreat again after the Romans 
constructed engines and mounds to fire incendiary devices. The Romans 
eventually recaptured the quay and Scipio had it fortified and garrisoned. 
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During the winter of 147-146 BC Scipio campaigned against Carthage's allies 
in Africa so Carthage could receive no supplies from Africa or elsewhere. The 
offensive against Carthage was resumed in early spring of 146 BC with the 
capture of the inner circular harbour, the neighbouring forum and Temple of 
Apollo. As the Romans advanced towards the citadel of Byrsa they were fired 
on from the roof-tops. Two battles developed, in the streets and along the 
roof-tops, but when the Romans reached Byrsa they fired the houses and the 
inhabitants were burnt. Byrsa held out for six days, then surrendered and 
the defenders were spared. However, Hasdrubal and about 900 Roman 
deserters held out in the Temple of Aesculapius. Shortly afterwards 
Hasdrubal surrendered to Scipio and the deserters were burnt in the temple - 
Carthage itself was totally destroyed, but there seems to have been no 
massacre of the population despite Hasdrubal's treatment of the Roman 
prisoners. 
Date: 143-133 BC 
Place: Numantia (Garray, Soria, Spain) 
Refs: Appian Iberica 76 ff 
Florus 1 33 
Orosius V7 
Schulten Numantia. 
Schulten Historia. di Numancia. 
Cheesman "Numantia" JRS 5 (1915) 
A: Numantia was situated on a plateau surrounded by rivers and ravines. 
After two unsuccessful attempts to take the town, Scipio was elected to take 
charge of the campaign in 134 BC. He avoided a pitched battle and preferred 
to reduce Numantia, through blockade because of the eagerness of the Spanish 
rebels. Seven camps were constructed round the town (4 according to 
Florus), then Scipio ordered the town to be surrounded with a ditch and 
palisade. Orosius claims that this was 10 ft (3 m) wide and 20 ft (6 m) deep, 
which seems highly unlikely. The works enclosing Numantia were over 48 
stades long and Scipio devised a signalling system in case of trouble. 
When this ditch work was completed, Scipio had another built not far behind 
it and this was also fortified with a palisade. Immediately behind this ditch 
was a wall 8 ft wide (2.4 m) and 10 ft high (3 m), not including the parapets. 
Towers built along the whole line of the wall at intervals of 100 ft (30 m) were 
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used for signalling and artillery. Where the line went through marshland, an 
embankment of the same dimensions as the wall was constructed. 
Communications by the river Duero were blocked by the construction of a 
tower on either side of the river from which large timbers were moored so that 
they reached across the river. The timbers were stuck full of knives and 
spear heads and were kept rotating by the river current. The Romans were 
able to hold off attacks on the siege works from Numantia, and the besieged 
were eventually compelled to surrender through starvation. The Numantines 
were sold into slavery and Numantia itself was razed to the ground. 
B: The site of Numantia was investigated by Schulten over a number of years 
from 1905. Schulten believed that as Appian's account was based primarily on 
that of an eyewitness (Polybius) it was accurate. As a result he seems to have 
made particular efforts to confirm in the archaeological record many of the 
details reported in Appian's account. Schulten found more than the seven 
camps mentioned by Appian, but claimed that there were seven camps and two 
redoubts by the rivers to prevent supplies being brought into the town. No 
evidence was found of the first ditch and palisade, though Schulten believed 
that this would only have been necessary on the eastern side of the town 
where there was no protection for the besiegers from the rivers. 
The circumvallation itself was about 9 km long, which corresponds roughly to 
Appian's estimate of about 50 stades (9.2 km), and the stone wall was found 
in five stretches. It has an average width of 4 m, much wider than the 8 ft 
(2.4 m) given by Appian. Schulten suggested that the difference was because 
Appian gave the width of the wall at its top. The original height of the wall 
is not known. No trace of the ditch in front of the wall mentioned in the 
literary sources was found at any point in the circumvallation. Post holes from 
the wooden towers were found but the actual distance between towers is not 
mentioned by the excavators. 
Date: c. 116 BC 
Place: Cirta (Constantine, Algeria) 
Refs: Sallust B. Jug. 21-23 
Jugurtha. besieged his enemy Adherbal in the town of Cirta which had very 
strong natural defences. He encircled the town with his forces and attempted 
to take it by storm using mantlets (vineae), towers and a variety of machines. 
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A 4-- As he was unable to take Cirta in this way, Jugurtha surrounded it with a 
rampart and ditch, built towers and pressed the attack night and day using 
force and stratagems, including bribery. However, despite enormous efforts, 
Jugurtha was unable to take the town and eventually abandoned the siege. 
Date: 108 BC 
Place: Thala 
Refs: Sallust B. Juq. 75-76 
The town was very strongly protected by its position on a steep hill and its 
fortifications. Metellus encircled the town with a rampart and ditch, then in 
the two most suitable places he moved forward mantlets and threw up a mound 
on which towers were erected to provide covering fire. The besieged were 
equally prompt with their (unspecified) counter measures. However, after six 
weeks the Romans breached the walls with rams and captured the town. There 
does not seem to have been a massacre, though Roman deserters in the town 
committed suicide. 
Date: 87 BC 
Place: Athens & the Piraeus 
Refs: Appian Mithridatic Wars 30-40 
Athens and the Piraeus were held by Archelaus and a force of Cappadocians 
who used the Periclean walls for defence. Sulla arrived with five legions and 
auxiliaries and tried to take the Piraeus by storm. When he was forced to 
retire he demolished part of the Long Walls to build a siege ramp, and also had 
engines and artillery constructed. Both sides built towers to fire at the 
other. During the siege the defenders made a number of sorties against the 
Romans and succeeded in burning some of the Roman siege equipment. Sulla 
was kept informed of events in the town by traitors firing inscribed lead sling 
shots to the Romans. As a result of this information, Sulla was able to ambush 
the supplies sent to Athens - 
As winter came on Sulla established a camp at Eleusis and protected it by a 
deep ditch. At the same time he made frequent assaults on the walls but 
without success. During one particularly violent skirmish, Sulla used a type 
of catapult which supposedly fired up to 20 heavy lead shots at one volley, 
forcing Archelaus to withdraw his wooden tower. 
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When the Roman ramp was completed, Sulla brought up engines but the 
besieged had secretly undermined the mound and carried away the earth. 
When the mound subsided the Romans were forced to withdraw their engines. 
Sulla then had a tunnel dug to intercept the defenders' mine. When the 
tunnels met the diggers fought an underground battle. Meanwhile Sulla 
repaired the ramps and demolished part of the walls with rams. The Romans 
also n-dned under part of the wall, underpinned it with wooden beams and then 
fired it with sulphur, hemp and pitch, causing the walls to collapse. The 
besieged built a semicircular wall inside which Sulla attacked while the mortar 
was still damp, but his men were fired on from all sides and were forced to 
retreat. Sulla then abandoned the assault, began a blockade and turned his 
attention to Athens itself. 
After hearing reports from Athens that the defenders were starving and 
resorting to cannibalism, Sulla had the city encircled with a ditch to prevent 
the defenders escaping, then brought up scaling ladders and rams. The 
defenders fled and Sulla ordered an indiscriminate massacre of the inhabit- 
ants. A few occupied the acropolis after burning the Odeum so there would 
be no timber readily available for an assault, but it was soon captured. Sulla 
forbade the burning of the city but allowed his soldiers to plunder it, then 
pardoned the Athenians who had survived the slaughter. 
The Romans then renewed the assault on the Piraeus with rams and artillery 
and undermined the walls. They succeeded in demolishing part of the newly 
built semicircular wall, but Archelaus had anticipated this and had built 
several others like it inside so that the Romans came upon one after the other. 
Despite this the Romans pushed on the assault and Archelaus fled to part of 
the Piraeus which was strongly fortified and surrounded by the sea. As Sulla 
had no ships he was unable to attack it but Archelaus shortly withdrew to 
Thessaly. 
Date: 57 BC 
Place: Noviodunum (? Pommiers, France) 
Refs: Caesar BG 11 12 
When Caesar was informed that the oppidum did not have a proper garrison he 
immediately tried to storm it but was defeated by the width of the ditch and 
height of the walls. He therefore built a camp, brought up mantlets (vineae) 
and made preparations for a siege. Before he had finished the defeated army 
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of the Suessones fled into the oppidum. When they saw the mantlets rushed 
up to the wall, the earth being piled up (either filling the ditch or building a 
siege ramp), and siege towers, the Gauls were alarmed and requested 
surrender which Caesar granted. 
Date: 57 BC 
Place: Oppidum of the Atuatuci (? Namur, Belgium) 
Refs: Caesar BG 11 29-33 
The oppidum had great natural strength surrounded by steep slopes except 
at one point where there was a gently sloping approach approximately 200 ft 
(60 m) wide. On the arrival of the Romans the Gauls sortied and a number of 
skirmishes followed. Caesar then had an earth rampart 12 ft wide (3.5 m) 
built with a circuit of (? ) 5 miles and redoubts at frequent intervals. Then 
the Romans built mantlets (vineae), a siege ramp and a tower some way off - 
The Gauls at first ridiculed the tower but when they saw it moving towards 
them they were alarmed and surrendered. Caesar shut them up in their 
oppidum to prevent his men from harming them but they made a night sortie 
and were driven back with heavy losses. The following day the Romans 
stormed the oppidum and Caesar sold the entire population into slavery. 
Date: 56 BC 
Place: Oppidum of the Sotiates (? Sos, France) 
Refs: Caesar BG 111 21 
P. Crassus was besieging the defeated army of the Sotiates in an oppidum and 
immediately prepared for an assault. Because the garrison resisted he moved 
up mantlets (vineae) and towers. The besieged first attempted a sortie and 
then tunnelled in the direction of the siege ramp and mantlets using their 
skills gained in copper mining and quarrying. The Romans' vigilance meant 
that they could not achieve anything through these mines so they surren- 
dered. 
Date: 54 BC 
Place: British oppidum 
Refs: Caesar BG V9 
The Britons were holding a position with very good natural and artificial 
defences using felled trees to block all the entrances to it. The Britons tried 
in small groups to stop the Romans penetrating the defences but they piled up 
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earth against the fortifications under the protection of a testudo and captured 
the oppidum, driving the Britons out. 
Date: 54 BC 
Place: Cassivellaunus' oppidum 
Refs: Caesar BI V 21 
The oppidum was fortified by a rampart and trench and was well protected by 
forests and marshes. Caesar attacked on two sides and the Britons, after 
putting up a brief resistance, fled. Many were captured and killed. 
Date: 54 BC 
Place: Q- Cicero's winter camp 
Refs: Caesar BG V 38-49 
Q. Cicero was besieged in his winter quarters unable to get a message through 
to Caesar. He strengthened the defences of the camp using timer to build up 
to 120 towers overnight. The next day the Nervii assaulted the camp filling 
in the ditches but for days the Romans were able to hold out. They prepared 
fire hardened stakes and siege spears (pila, muralia) and built extra storeys 
on the towers with wicker breastworks topped by battlements. 
The Romans refused to surrender and the Nervii surrounded the camp with a 
10 ft high (3 m) rampart and a 15 ft wide ditch (4.5 m), a technique they had 
learnt from watching the Romans. Despite not having the proper tools they 
built a3 mile circumvallation in just three hours, then worked on towers to 
overtop the Roman rampart and made assaults using grappling hooks and 
testudines under the instruction of Roman prisoners. After several days the 
Nervii fired moulded bullets of red hot clay and incendiary darts (fusili argill, 
glandis f undis et iacula ferrefacta) at the camp buildings, aided by a strong 
wind. When these caught fire the Nervii assaulted the camp with towers, 
testudines and scaling ladders. The Romans held on despite overwhelming 
odds and Cicero finally got a message through to Caesar who came to relieve 
the siege. 
Date: 52 BC 
Place: Vellaunodunum 
Refs: Caesar BG VII 11 
When advancing to deal with the revolt of Vercingetorix Caesar wished to take 
the oppidum at Vellaunodunum so that no enemy in his rear could interrupt his 
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supply lines. In two days he built a circumvallation and on the third day the 
garrison surrendered - 
Date: 52 BC 
Place: Avaricum (Bourges) 
Refs: Caesar BG VII 14-28 
Dio XL 34 
Avaricum was a hillfort in a very strong position, almost completely sur- 
rounded by a river and marsh and with a strong murus gallicu wall. The 
nature of the terrain made a circumvallation impossible to Caesar pitched his 
camp by the narrow causeway which linked the hillfort with the surrounding 
land and under the protection of mantlets (vineae) the Romans began 
constructing a siege ramp with two towers. The siege operations were 
hindered by the strong defences, attacks by Vercingetorix and bad weather 
but despite this the Romans built a ramp 330 ft wide (97 m) and 80 ft high (23 
m) which almost reached the wall. This took 25 days. 
The besieged in turn used a variety of defensive techniques, including pulling 
away siege hooks with nooses and pulling them up with windlasses, building 
towers covered with hides along the length of the wall which they also 
increased in height, undermining the siege ramp, using their skill acquired 
as iron miners, and countermining the Roman tunnels to block them with 
hardened stakes, pitch and boulders. As the Roman siege works approached 
the walls, the Gauls fired it from their tunnels and at the same time made a 
sortie, piling pith and all kinds of inflammable material on it. The Romans 
were able to respond quickly and after a hard fought action the fires were 
extinguished, the siege towers withdrawn and the Gauls forced back into 
Avaricum. 
The following day the Roman towers were moved forwards and their other siege 
works were positioned. During a heavy rainstorm when the Gallic defences 
were not heavily manned, Caesar launched his attack, causing panic among the 
Gauls. They abandoned the walls and reformed in the town centre but 
scattered when they saw that the Romans had occupied the whole circuit of the 
wall. The population and defenders of Avaricum were massacred in revenge 
for the slaughter of Romans at Cenabum and because of the efforts the Romans 
had taken over the siege. Caesar states that from the population of c. 40,000 
barely 800 escaped to Vercingetorix. 
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Date: 52 BC 
Place: Alesia, (Aiise-Ste-Reine, France) 
Ref s: Caesar BG VII 63-90 
Dio XL 39-41 
Napoleon III Histoire de Jules Cdsar 
Rice-Holmes Caesar's conquest of Gaul 
A: Alesia's situation on a steep sided plateau meant that it was impregnable 
except by blockade. There were rivers on two sides and in front of the town 
was a plain about three miles long. Gallic troops occupied the whole of the 
eastern slope of the hill below the town's walls and fortified their position with 
a ditch and wall 6 ft high (2 m). 
Caesar's siege works were very elaborate: camps were constructed at strategic 
points and 23 redoubts. Then a trench 20 ft wide (6 m) with vertical sides was 
dug to protect the Romans while they worked on the circumvallation. About 
400 paces behind this trench were 2 trenches, each 15 ft wide (4.5 m). The 
inner one was filled with water diverted from the river. Behind the trenches 
was a rampart and palisade 12 ft high (3.5 m), a breastwork with battlements 
and large forked branches projecting at the point where the breastwork joined 
the rampart. Towers were erected at intervals of c. 80 ft (23.5 m) and extra 
defences (cipp , lilia and stimuli) were added because of the small size of the 
Roman force. This line was 11 miles long (16.2 km) and the Romans con- 
structed another identical line of fortifications facing outwards, this one 14 
miles long (20.7 km) to protect themselves from the Gallic relieving army which 
had been sent to Alesia. 
The Gauls then forced the Mandubii, the inhabitants of Alesia, to leave with 
their wives and children because of lack of supplies but Caesar refused to 
allow them through the Roman lines, so they remained between Alesia and the 
Roman lines and starved. The besieged then drew up their forces in front of 
the town, filled the first ditch with wattles and earth but a simultaneous attack 
by the besieged and relieving army was made, but they could not break the 
Roman defences. The next few days were occupied with preparations and 
attacks by the Gauls on both sides of the Roman defences, but these defences 
held. 
The relieving army then attacked a badly sited Roman camp to the north of 
Alesia and Roman reinforcements had to be sent, leaving the defences 
undermanned. The besieged then turned their attention to the Roman wattles 
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and tearing down the rampart and breastworks with hooks. Again reinforce- 
ments were sent but it was not until Caesar was recognized by the colour of 
his cloak that the Romans rallied and repulsed the attack. The Gallic relieving 
army was also repulsed and when the Gauls saw cavalry to the rear and fresh 
cohorts coming up they broke and fled, suffering serious casualties whilst 
pursued by the cavalry. The next day Vercingetorix was handed over to 
Caesar and Alesia surrendered. 
B: Napoleon III carried out extensive excavations in 1862-65 at Alesia with the 
intention of tracing Caesar's siege works. He appears to have been fairly 
successful and traced the positions of Caesar's eight camps and five of the 
redoubts around the circumvallation. Large sections of the investing works 
and their defences were traced and sectioned and some of the extra defences 
mentioned by Caesar such as stimuli were found. 
Like the other siege works, the camps were positioned to make maximum use 
of the terrain. Napoleon probably had this in mind when he plotted the 
conjectural positions of the 18 redoubts not found in the excavations. 
The Roman ditch between the investing works and Alesia was traced along most 
of its length and was found to be slightly less than 6m wide. The inner line 
of investing works has the flat-bottomed ditch and V shaped ditch one is 
usually a little less. Both ditches are about 4.5 m wide, though the V shaped 
one is usually a little less. Neither is 4.5 m deep as Caesar says, but only 2.4 
- 2.7 m deep. Silt deposits in the flat-bottomed ditch show that it held water 
diverted from the river. The outer line of works was only protected by a flat- 
bottomed ditch on the plain, and a V-shaped ditch at other points; no traces 
of the wooden towers mentioned by Caesar survive. 
Date: 51 BC 
Place: Uxellodunum (Puy d'Issolu, France) 
Refs: Caesar BG VIII 32-44 
Napoleon III Histoire de Jules CO-sar 
Rice-Holmes Caesar's conquest of Gaul 
A: Uxellodunum was situated on a plateau protected on all sides by steep rock 
and impossible to take by storm despite the fact that it was held by about 200? 
Gauls. The legate Caninius arrived with two legions, divided them into three 
detachments and built three camps on very high ground. From these he 
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gradually constructed a rampart round the town as far as his limited manpower 
allowed him. 
Hoping to avoid the starvation which the besieged had faced at Alesia, the 
Gallic leaders went foraging leaving a garrison. The Romans surprised the 
foragers, and cut them to pieces. The siege was continued and as there was 
no danger of Gallic forces outside Uxellodunum, Caninius divided his troops 
between a number of guardposts and completed his ring of fortifications, 
building siege works everywhere. Gaius Fabius arrived soon after with 25 
cohorts and took over part of the siege works. But the besieged still held out 
and although Caesar regarded the numbers as insignificant he thought that 
their obstinacy called for severe punishment to discourage the Gauls from 
revolt. 
By the time Caesar arrived at Uxellodunum the town was completely enclosed 
by siege works making escape from the blockade impossible. As the besieged 
had a very large grain supply Caesar set about cutting off the water supply. 
The rivers could not be diverted so Caesar cut off access to them by posting 
archers,, slingers and artillery. This left one spring from which water could 
be obtained. 
The Romans built a ramp despite the difficulty of the terrain and continual 
skirmishes between the two sides. At the same time the Romans secretly dug 
a tunnel towards the source of the spring. The ramp was 60 ft high (17 m) 
with a ten storey tower containing artillery to dominate the spring. The Gauls 
responded by filling barrels with incendiary materials, firing them and rolling 
them down on the Roman siege works, and at the same time launching an 
attack. The Roman siege works were burnt but Caesar ordered troops to climb 
up to the walls of Uxellodunum; the Gauls were recalled as it looked as if the 
Romans were getting control of the fort. The besieged still refused to 
surrender even though some had died of thirst. Finally the Roman tunnels 
reached the spring and diverted it. When the Gauls saw the spring suddenly 
fail they took it as an omen and surrendered. There was no massacre, but to 
deter further outbreaks of revolt Caesar ordered that the hands of all those 
who had carried weapons should be cut off. 
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B: The site of Uxellodunum, Puy d'Issolu in the French Department of Lot, 
was investigated by Napoleon III in 1865. Traces of three camps were found, 
two of which were not properly fortified, possibly because they were in very 
strong positions. The third was strongly fortified by a double line of parallel 
ditches which appears to have continued to form part of the circumvallation, 
the only point at which is had been found. 
One particularly interesting discovery was a tunnel on the west side of 
Uxellodunum which has been identified as the tunnel dug by the Romans to 
divert the spring. The tunnel was about 1.5 m wide and 1.8 m high with an 
arched roof. At certain points along its length the Romans supported the roof 
and walls with wooden props, some of which survived. 
Date: 51-50 BC 
Place: Pindenissum, Cilicia 
Refs: Cicero Ad Fam. II 10; XV 4; Ad Att. V 20 
Pindenissum was a strongly fortified hillfort in S. E. Cilicia held by well armed 
Cilicians who were believed to be pro-Parthian. Cicero drew a rampart and 
ditch round the town with one very large camp and six smaller ones. Then he 
pressed the assault with a large siege ramp, penthouses (vineae), a siege 
tower and plenty of artillery. After a 57 day operation the hillfort was taken 
with many Roman casualties but no fatalities. The town was completely 
destroyed and the population forced to surrender. 
Date: 49 BC 
Place: Massalia (Marseilles) 
Refs: Caesar BC 1 34-36; 56-58; 11 1-22 
Lucan Pharsalia 111308-762 
Vitruvius de Architectura X xvi 11-12 
The siege of Marseilles was one of the first major actions in the civil war 
between Caesar and Pompey. The town was situated on a rocky promontory, 
surrounded on three sides by the sea. The inhabitants had stocked up the 
city with stores, set up arms factories and repaired the town's fortifications 
and fleet. Marseilles had sided with Pompey and could not be persuaded by 
Caesar to surrender. The defence of the town was led by Domitius 
Ahenobarbus who had been sent there by Pompey. Caesar brought up three 
legions and began the siege. 
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Caesar himself does not mention a line of circumvallation but Lucan reports 
that he pitched camp on a hill facing the citadel and drew a large rampart with 
battlements from this camp to the sea on both sides, cutting off water 
supplies. Towers and mantlets (vineae) were prepared and warships were 
built at Arles to engage the fleet at Marseilles. At this point Caesar went off 
to Spain leaving his legate Trebonius to conduct the siege. The siege was 
carried on by land and sea with Caesar's fleet getting the better of Domitius'. 
On the land two timber siege ramps and towers were built under the protection 
of mantlets, the ramps reaching 80 ft high (23 m). However the defenders had 
a huge arsenal with extremely powerful artillery including machines that fired 
12 ft (3.5 m) spiked beams. As a result the Caesarian forces had to built very 
strong mantlets and a testudo which Caesar describes in detail. But the 
Caesarians were hindered by the strength of Marseilles' defences and in 
particular the artillery, though they easily repulsed sorties aimed at burning 
the siege works. 
The Caesarians then built a brick tower on the west side of the operations to 
retire to during sorties and to fight from. It was built very strongly with 
walls 5 ft (1.5 m) thick. When finished it was a 30 ft (9 m) square tower six 
storeys, high with loop-holes for artillery. Under covering fire from this tower 
the besiegers built a very strong covered gallery (musculus) 60 ft long (17.7 
m) and rolled into place to link the brick artillery tower with a tower on the 
town wall. The gallery withstood boulders and incendiary devices while the 
besiegers began undermining the tower, causing part of the wall to collapse. 
Vitruvius, who was probably one of the Caesarian engineers at Marseilles, 
states that more than 30 mines were being dug towards the city so the besieged 
dug their moat deeper and created a water filled basin inside the walls to flood 
and destroy the mines. 
After the collapse of the tower a truce was arranged because Caesar was 
particularly keen for the city to surrender. But the besieged broke the truce 
and fired all the Roman siege engines including the brick tower. According 
to Vitruvius the siege ramp was set on fire by ballistae shooting red hot iron 
bolts. 
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Trebonius resumed the seige and because of a shortage of wood improvised by 
building a very strong new ramp with brick sides - Gates were left in the walls 
to allow troops to advance under cover and the besiegers brought up all their 
equipment under its cover. Since a great part of the city wall was in ruins, 
the besieged were short of supplies and the range was now too short for their 
catapults, they surrendered. Caesar spared the city and its inhabitants 
because of its antiquity and fame, but left a garrison of two legions. 
Date: 41 BC 
Place: Perugia 
Refs: Appian BC V 32ff 
Velleius Paterculus 74 3 
Perugia was held by Antony's brother Lucius with a newly raised army of 6 
legions and he was awaiting reinforcements. When Octavian arrived with his 
entire army he immediately drew a palisade and ditch round the town 56 stades 
long (10.7 km) and extended these works to the Tiber to cut off supplies 
coming by river. Lucius then built a similar line of countervallation at the foot 
of the hill of Perugia to strengthen the defences. 
Octavian quickly strengthened his investment, doubling the depth and width 
of the ditches to 30 ft (8.8 m) deep and wide. He increased the height of the 
rampart and built 1500 wooden towers along it at 60 ft intervals (17.7 m). 
There were also strongly fortified camps and various other entrenchments with 
the lines facing both inwards and outwards to besiege those within and for 
protection against the expected relieving army. There were frequent 
skirmishes during the construction of the siege works but when they were 
completed Perugia began to starve. As there was no sign of the relieving army 
Lucius attempted to break out with his forces using gear for filling ditches and 
folding ladders under covering fire. 
The besieged made a violent assault, filled up the ditch and scaled the 
palisades. Some began undermining the circumvallation walls whilst others 
fired arrows and lead shot. The mass attack meant that at first Octavian's 
resistance was fairly limited but then his army rallied and threw down the 
ladders and engines. Lucius' army was forced back into the town and then 
surrendered; Velleius suggests that Octavian succeeded in taking it by storm. 
Octavian punished the city officials rather than Lucius and intended to turn 
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the city over to his soldiers to plunder but it caught fire, according to 
Appian, when one citizen fired his own house. 
Date: AD 26 
Place: Hillfort in Thrace 
Refs: Tacitus Annals IV 46-51 
The Thracian mountain tribesmen had revolted and were occupying strongly 
defended hilltop fortresses. Sabinus built a camp and then seized a narrow 
ridge which led to the nearest Thracian hillfort. The Thracians sortied but 
were repulsed; Sabinus moved his camp nearer the hillfort and began 
constructing redoubts round the fortress which he linked with a ditch and 
breastwork 4 miles in circumference (5.9 km). He gradually tightened the 
blockade to cut off the defenders from water and fodder, and built a mound 
from which to throw rocks, spears and firebrands at the Thracians. 
The Thracians suffered a serious water shortage and disagreement arose over 
tactics; one party surrendered to Sabinus and of the men who remained, some 
committed suicide whilst others attempted to break out with hurdles and 
scaling ladders. The Romans forced them back with siege spears (muralia 
pila) and missiles and although a few Thracians broke through the Roman lines 
the rest were forced back into the hillfort and surrendered. 
Date: AD 43 
Place: Southern Britain 
Refs: Suetonius Vesp. 4 
Richmond Hod Hill vol II 
A: Vespasian's achievements during the conquest of Britain were the defeat 
of two powerful tribes, the capture of more than 20 oppida and the capture of 
the Isle of Wight. 
B: Hod Hill may have been one of the oppida taken by Vespasian. The hillfort 
defences were undergoing alterations at the time of the Roman invasions but 
these were left unfinished. Richmond has attempted to reconstruct events 
from the evidence inside the hillfort. Here, one hut came under heavy 
catapult fire, shown by the distribution of catapult bolts on the ground. The 
distribution suggests a catapult was situated at the east corner, possibly on 
a tower at least 50 ft high. The concentration of fire was probably on a 
chieftain's hut and was presumably intended to induce surrender. This 
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appears to have been successful as there is no evidence of an assault on the 
hillfort or destruction inside, although the defences were slighted. 
Date: AD 51 
Place: Hill in N. Wales 
Ref s: Tacitus Annals XII 33-35 
When he was about to fight the Romans Caratacus selected a site which would 
be favourable to him and impede the Romans; on one side were steep hills and 
wherever the slope was gentler the Britons build crude stone ramparts. At 
the front of the hill facing the Romans was a river with a difficult crossing. 
On his arrival Ostorius made a reconnaissance of the defences, crossed the 
river and attacked the rampart. In an exchange of missiles the Romans came 
off worse but under cover of a testudo formation they tore down the makeshift 
rampart. In the subsequent fight at close quarters the Britons, unprotected 
by armour, were driven back and cut to pieces. 
Date: AD 58 
Place: Volandum, Armenia 
Refs: Tacitus Annals XIII 39 
In order to avoid a drawn out an unprofitable campaign in Armenia and put the 
Armenians on the defensive, Corbulo prepared to destroy their forts. Two 
were attacked and stormed by officers while Corbulo attacked Volandum, the 
strongest fort in the region. On arrival Corbulo made a reconnaissance and 
planned an assault. He then divided his force into four detachments; one 
began to undermine the wall under a testudo formation and another attacked 
with scaling ladders. The two other detachments provided covering fire of 
torches and javelins fired by artillery and two types of slingers firing lead 
shot at long range. 
The Armenians were very hard pressed at every point and the attack was so 
fierce that the defenders were forced from the walls in a few hours, the 
barricades at the gates were flattened and fortifications taken with no Roman 
fatalities and only minor casualties. Every adult male was slaughtered, the 
non-combatants sold into slavery and the town thoroughly plundered. 
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Date: AD 67 
Place: Jotapata 
Refs: Josephus Bj 111 135-408 
Jotapata was the first of the three great sieges which formed the putting down 
of the Jewish revolt. The siege was described in great detail by Josephus who 
commanded the Jewish forces in the town. The town itself was situated on a 
high plateau accessible only from the north and Josephus had incorporated 
this slope into the defences. Vespasian pitched camp to the north of the town 
in the best position to carry out the siege and the first Roman actions were 
failed attempts to take the town by storm. 
Vespasian therefore began a ramp to attack the vulnerable section of the wall 
under the covering fire of artillery. But the Jews increased the height of the 
walls as the ramp grew and then sortied and burnt the Roman siege works. 
Vespasian then decided to starve the town into submission and had a close 
watch kept on the town. The Jews continued to sortie and cause the Romans 
such problems that Vespasian reverted to his original plan to take the town by 
storm. 
As the ramps neared the walls a ram was brought up protected by artillery 
fire. Josephus protected the walls for a time by manoeuvring chaff-filled 
sacks in front of the ram head but the Romans cut down the sacks with reaping 
hooks attached to long poles. The Jews then sortied and destroyed the siege 
works but the Romans set up the ram again and soon forced a breach in the 
wall. The Romans tried to enter using a testudo formation but the Jews 
poured boiling oil on them and boiled fenugreek on the gangway boards so the 
Romans could not get any grip. 
The Romans raised the height of the platforms and erected three towers 50 ft 
high encased in iron for protection, and holding artillery. After 47 days the 
ramps overtopped the walls and on advice from an informer attacked just 
before dawn. The Romans captured the town without resistance and mass 
slaughter followed. Josephus surrendered to Vespasian to save his life. 
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Date: AD 69 
Place: Placentia (Piacenza) 
Ref s: Tacitus Histories 11 19-22 
The town of Placentia was held by supporters of Otho who had reinforced the 
walls, added parapets, heightened the towers and gathered supplies. The 
besiegers were Vitellians under the command of Caecina and for the first days 
the action was a violent assault. The besiegers did not have the proper 
protective equipment and were forced to retire with serious casualties. One 
side succeeded in burning the amphitheatre outside the walls, but it is not 
known which, as both were hurling torches and incendiary missiles. 
The following day the besiegers attacked with screens and mantlets (plut 
cratesque et vineae) and began to undermine the walls, build an earth siege 
ramp and attack the gates with crowbars. The defenders armed themselves 
with stakes, stones, lead and bronze objects and hurled down millstones and 
missiles at the Vitellians, forcing them to retire. Caecina abandoned the 
siege. 
Date: AD 69 
Place: Vetera (Xanten, Germany) 
Refs: Tacitus Histories IV 21-24 
The legionary fortress at Vetera was designed for two legions but was held by 
only 5000 soldiers so the ramparts were sparsely manned. The Romans 
strengthened the defences and demolished the neighbouring civilian settlement 
but Tacitus points out that the defences were not designed to withstand a 
siege. Civilis first tried to take the fortress by storm; the Batavians opened 
fire at some distance but the range was too great although the Romans could 
return fire with artillery. Some Batavians then used scaling ladders whilst 
others climbed on a testudo formed by their comrades but they were forced to 
retreat under a hail of Roman missiles. 
Roman deserters and captives then showed the Batavians how to build a timber 
siege tower to keep the defenders off the rampart whilst others at a lower level 
could undermine the wall. However the badly built engine was destroyed by 
stones shot from ballistae. Screens and mantlets (crates et vineae) prepared 
by the Batavians were burnt by firebolts shot from catapults. Civilis then 
briefly abandoned the assault, knowing that the Romans were short of 
supplies. 
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While the Batavians who had served in the Roman army built siege machinery 
the Germans made uncoordinated attacks on the rampart. A two storey siege 
tower was built and pushed towards the Porta Praetoria where the ground was 
most level. When it was near enough the Romans thrust out poles and used a 
crane to lift up several of the besiegers at a time and drop them into the 
fortress. Civilis again gave up the assault and tried to persuade the Romans 
to surrender. 
The Romans held out and when a relieving army arrived made a sortie. In the 
ensuing battle Civilis was reported dead or injured and the Batavians and 
Germans fled. 
Date: AD 70 
Place: Jerusalem 
Refs: Josephus BJ V 1-VI 442 
Tacitus Histories V 11-13; frags 1-3 
Dio LXV 4 
Jerusalem was composed of a number of different areas, each with its own 
fortifications, and held a number of factions who had violent disagreements 
over how the war should be fought. Titus arrived with four legions and a 
number of allies and auxiliaries. His first camp was about 3ý miles from 
Jerusalem, then he moved the legions in closer, three legions on one side of 
the city and the fourth on the other. The Jews sortied against the single 
legion but were repulsed and the Romans levelled the ground as far as the city 
walls. The three legions on the west side of the city then moved in closer to 
begin the assault and it was only then that the Jewish forces made any attempt 
to unite. 
Titus' first target was to capture the northern suburb of Jerusalem known as 
the New City and he constructed platforms where the walls were not strongly 
guarded. An artillery battle broke out, the Jews using captured Roman 
artillery, but without causing much damage because of their inexperience. 
The Roman artillery, particularly that of the Xth, was very effective and the 
Romans brought up a ram. However the Jews were still hindering the assault 
so Titus had three 75 ft high (20 m) towers set up on platforms to bombard the 
Jews. Although one tower fell down the Jews were forced to withdraw from the 
wall, the ram pierced it and after 15 days of the siege Titus captured the New 
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City. Four days later Titus took the Middle Town after using the ram against 
a tower in the wall. 
A five day lull in hostilities then followed in which Titus tried unsuccessfully 
to get the Jews to surrender. Titus then divided his legions and built ramps 
against the fortress of Antonia and the Upper City. The Romans came under 
heavy fire and Josephus tried to persuade the Jews to surrender, again 
unsuccessfully. The Jews then undermined the ramps by Antonia and these 
collapsed. Titus seems to have abandoned the assault for a short time and in 
three days his legions constructed a 4ý mile long circumvallation (6.6 km) with 
13 forts, causing the food shortages in Jerusalem to become severe. 
The Romans then concentrated on taking Antonia, built ramps, brought rams 
to bear on the walls and began undermining them. The wall collapsed because 
of the assault and Jewish counterrnines but the defenders had already built 
another wall behind it which could not be reached by the ram. A short violent 
struggle for the fortress was ended after two days when a small party of 
legionar-ies entered secretly and sounded their trumpets. Titus attacked and 
the Jews fled. The fortress was destroyed and a wide road built to the 
Temple, the Romans' next objective. Several ramps were built, rams were 
brought up and the Romans took the Outer Temple by storm. The Inner 
Temple was then burnt when a soldier threw in a firebrand. 
Again Titus offered the Jews an opportunity to surrender I then took the 
Lower and Upper Cities, using ramps to reach the latter. The last area of 
Jerusalem to hold out was Herod's Palace which was also taken using platforms. 
The final capture was followed by a massacre, although many prisoners were 
also taken. Many others had committed suicide or died of starvation; Josephus 
describes with some relish the effects of the famine. Titus razed the entire 
city apart from three towers and a short section of the wall. 
Date: AD 72/73 
Place: Machaerus (Mukawar, Jordan) 
Refs: Josephus BJ VII 176- 
Strobel " Das r6mische Belagerungswerk um Machc'irus "Z DPV 90 (1974) 
A: The fortress of Machaerus had very strong natural defences, situated on 
a plateau surrounded by deep ravines. Herod had fortified the place and 
ensured good supplies of weapons and engines for defence. Bassus, the 
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governor of Judaea and legate of Legion X, made a reconnaissance and 
immediately began to built a siege ramp to the east of the fortress. The Jews 
made frequent sorties and both sides suffered heavy casualties. The Jews 
eventually surrendered when one of their favourites was captured by the 
Romans and Bassus made as if to crucify him. Josephus makes no mention of 
a line of circumvallation but states that the Jews were trapped inside the town. 
B: Neither the Roman siegeworks nor the Jewish fortress at Machaerus have 
been excavated but a certain amount of fieldwork has been carried out, as a 
result of which the Roman siege ramp, a number of camps and long stretches 
of a circumvallation have been traces. 
Traces of 11 camps of various sizes have been found, and possibly three more. 
These camps surround the fortress and most would appear to have been 
connected to the circumvallation, though it is impossible to be certain because 
of the fragmentary state of the circumvallation. 
The circumvallation survives in four long and several short sections. The 
total surviving lengths are 2.5 km long and the whole circumvallation would 
have been about 1 km longer. The stone wall varies in width from 1.8 m to 2.3 
m along its length and on the S. W sector are the stone foundations of towers, 
all c. 2x4m, and with an interval of 25-35 m between (80-100 Roman feet). 
The earth and stone siege ramp was on the west side, not the eastern as 
Josephus says, and was c. 85 m long and ran along a ridge leading up to the 
fortress (cf : Masada). Its width varies between 15 m at the base to 30 m at the 
top. Strobel suggests a siege tower 15-20 m, high from the width of the ramp. 
The ramp appears to be unfinished and its completion may have been rendered 
unnecessary by the surrender. 
Date: AD 72/73 
Place: Masada 
Refs: Josephus BJ VII 275-406 
Hawkes 1929 
Schulten 1933 
Richmond 1962 
Yadin 1966 
A: Masada was the last fortress to hold out in Judaea and was held by the 
Sicarii from AD 66 to its capture in AD 72 or 73. The fortress was situated on 
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a plateau surrounded by deep ravines and was accessible in only two places, 
the easier of these, on the western side, guarded by a fort. Masada had a 
limestone wall 18 ft high (5.5 m) with towers all the way around and the 960 
Sicarii were well supplied with food and water. 
The Xth legion was very experienced in siege warfare, having been present 
at both Jotapata and Jerusalem. Silva, the legate of the legion and governor 
of Judaea, immediately built a circumvallation, forts at strategic points and 
posted sentries. He then established his HQ at the most convenient site for 
directing the siege works, on the western side where the rocks on which 
Masada stood were linked to the higher land around. From here the Romans 
began work on a siege ramp along a limestone projection which ended 450 ft 
(135 m) below the level of Masada. A platform of earth 300 ft high (100 m) was 
heaped up along the projection and as this was not strong enough to take the 
engines, the Romans built a stone pier 75 ft wide (21 m) wide and the same 
height on top of it. 
A 90 ft high tower (30 M) covered with iron plates and fitted out with artillery 
and a ram was constructed and when this had been hauled up the ramp, the 
artillery kept the defenders off the walls while the ram breached the wall. But 
the Sicarii had already built another wall inside the first and this was of earth 
and timber and so impervious to the blows of the ram. Silva ordered his 
soldiers to throw burning torches at it and it caught fire. Josephus states 
that the Romans kept a close vigil overnight and entered the fortress in the 
morning to find that all the defenders except 7 had committed suicide. 
B: Josephus does not go into great details about much of the Roman 
siegeworks but it is possible to fill in some of the details from the 
archaeological evidence. The circumvallation itself, 4.5 km long, was built of 
the local limestone and is 1.5 - 1.8 m wide. Because of the rough terrain a 
ditch was not necessary, and not possible because of the hardness of the 
ground. For the most part the line takes advantage of the steep slopes; on 
the eastern side where the ground was more open a series of ten stone towers 
was built along the length of the wall about 80 - 100 m apart. There are eight 
camps surrounding the fortress, two large and six small, which are situated 
at strategic points as Josephus stated. Silva's HQ at the most convenient 
point for directing operations may well be camp Fl, very near to the ramp. 
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The ramp itself , of earth and timber, was essentially an extension of a 
limestone spur. Nearby was an artificially levelled area, possibly the 
engineers' yard for the construction of the siege engines. In the fortress 
itself, where most investigations have been concentrated, little certain 
evidence has been found of the siege. 
Date: AD 135 
Place: Beththera, (Bettir) 
Refs: Dio Ep. LXIX 13 
Eusebius Ecclesiastical Hist. iv 6 
Carroll "Bettir and its archaeological remains" AASOR 1924 
Schulten 1933 
Abel Histoire de la Palestine vol 11 1952 
A: Beththera was a strong citadel near to Jerusalem held by Jewish rebels - 
The place was besieged by the Romans and the siege lasted a long time before 
the Jews were destroyed by famine and thirst. Neither Eusebius nor Dio (who 
makes no specific reference to Beththera) explains whether the place 
surrendered or was taken by storm. According to the Talmud the siege 
operations lasted 2ý years though it is not known how intensive the Roman 
operations were during this period, and when it was taken the inhabitants 
were massacred. 
B: Bettir was recognized as the site of Eusebius' Beththera by the Roman 
circumvallation which is not mentioned in any of the literary accounts. The 
circumvallation consisted of two stone walls about 3m apart, probably filled 
with earth and small stones. It was 4 km long and at several points along the 
north and western sections there is a second wall which may form a 
contravaHation, though Schulten suggests a long stretch of this second wall 
on the vulnerable N. W side may be to provide additional defences. One Roman 
camp has been identified, on a plateau to the N. E of Bettir, but any others 
have been destroyed. The archaeological evidence gives no clue as to how the 
place was taken. 
Date: ? 
Place: Woden Law 
Refs: Richmond & St Joseph "Excavations at Woden Law 1950" PSAS 1982 
Frere & St Joseph 1983 
B: The Iron-age hillfort at Woden Law is partly enclosed by a series of 
investing works of Roman design. Three different stages of siege-lines are 
visible, the innermost being about 21 m from the defences of the hillfort, and 
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all three lines being composed of a number of ditches and ramparts - The 
ditches vary in depth between 0.9 - 1.2 m and in width between 3-3.3 m. 
The ramparts are 4.2 - 6.3 m wide. In addition there is a mound which may be 
an artillery platform. 
All the lines in the circumvallation are incomplete, there are no signs of any 
siege camps as at Burnswark, Masada etc. and the hillfort's defences are such 
that they could have been taken by direct assault. It has therefore been 
suggested that the works are practice siege works from training exercises. 
This also explains the successive lines and evidence that the sections of each 
line were built by different units and not properly linked up. Woden Law was 
next to a main road and troops undergoing training could have been quartered 
in the camps at Pennymuir, 1.6 km to the north west of the site. Such 
practice works are suggested by the literary sources (Appian Iberica 86; 
Veg. 1 25; Seneca Ep. 18 6). 
Date: ? 
Place: Burnswark 
Refs: Frere & St Joseph 1983 
B: There are two siege camps at Burnswark, one on either side of the hillfort - 
The larger fort, to the south, has three gateways facing the hillfort, each 
defended probably by an artillery platform. The northern camp dominated the 
hillfort's water supply but is incomplete. There is no circumvallation. Lead 
and clay catapult shots were found on the hillside. The site may have been 
used as a training area, as at Woden Law. Alternatively, the presence of two 
camps suggests that an actual siege may have been carried out. This is made 
more likely by the presence of 2nd century pottery on the site and it may have 
been held by rebels. It if was, the siege appears to have been resolved before 
the northern camp was finished. 
Date: c. AD 199-200 
Place: Hatra 
Refs: Dio LXXVI 10- 
Herodian 111 93 
Dio describes Hatra as being surrounded mostly by desert with little water or 
other supplies available locally, thus creating considerable difficulties for 
besiegers. He blames this partly for the failure of both Trajan and Severus 
to take the city. Only Dio mentions that Severus made two attempts to capture 
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Hatra. On the first attempt Severus withdrew after suffering heavy losses - 
The following year the Romans used a wide variety of siege machinery in an 
attempt to take the city by storm, though no particular engines are specified - 
The Romans succeeded in breaking down a short stretch of the outer circuit 
wall despite vicious counter-attacks by the inhabitants who hurled down 
stones and naphtha and used very powerful artillery, some of which seem to 
have been capable of firing two missiles simultaneously. Severus had watched 
the assault from a tribunal and gave the Hatrenes an opportunity to surrender 
following the breaching of the outer wall. However, according to Dio, the 
besieged rebuilt the wall and when Severus ordered another assault his army 
mutinied. As a result of this he abandoned the siege. 
Date: c. AD 256 
Place: Dura Europos 
Refs: Ed. Rostovtzeff, Reports of Excavations at Dura 
B: Dura is situated on the Euphrates about 150 miles east of Palmyra. This 
important Roman garrison town was captured by the Persians under Shapur 
in, or shortly after, AD 256. The siege is not mentioned in the literary 
sources and the archaeological evidence is by no means full but some events 
of the siege are clear. The Romans made preparations in case of a siege, 
including strengthening the city walls by building sloping earth embankments 
against the walls on both the inside and outside. The inner embankment was 
later widened to reinforce it further. 
It seems probably that the Persians would first have attempted to take Dura 
by assault but would have been impeded by the high walls and artillery fire, 
including incendiary missiles from the towers. Several attempts were made to 
undermine the walls. One mine was directed at a tower near the Palmyrene 
gate on the S. E section of the walls. The Persians undermined the tower and 
part of the adjacent curtain wall and underpinned both with timber. The 
Romans dug a countermine to prevent the undermining and destruction of the 
wall and when the two mines met there was a skirmish underground. The 
Romans retreated and blocked up the countermine, trapping some of their 
companions. The Persians then completely obstructed the countermine and 
fired their mine using pitch, possibly sulphur, and straw. A section of the 
wall and tower collapsed but the Persians do not seem to have been able to 
enter the city here. 
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The Persians also carried out operations against the S. W wall of the city. A 
very narrow mine over 40 m long was dug from the edge of a ravine to the S-W 
corner tower. The mine was widened out near the foundations of the tower 
and these foundations were almost completely undermined and underpinned. 
A short ventilation tunnel was built and when the mine was fired this tower 
was almost completely destroyed. Rostovtzeff believed that this tower was 
destroyed so that the Persians working on the siege ramp further along the 
wall would not be exposed to missile fire. The Persian ramp against the south 
wall was built of brick, earth and debris from tombs, and the Romans 
increased the height of the walls and seem to have undermined the ramp 
causing it to collapse. It seems likely that the siege was fairly long consider- 
ing the great efforts the Persians took. The city was finally captured and 
sacked but the excavations have not shown how it was taken. 
Date: AD 278 
Place: Cremna, Anatolia 
Refs: Zosimus 1 69-70 
Mitchell & Waelkens Anatolian Studies 1987 & 1988 
A: The town of Cremna was held by a group of brigands under the command 
of Lydius and Roman troops were sent to capture him. Cremna was strongly 
fortified and the Romans seem to have blockaded the place. Lydius expelled 
the young and old from the town because of shortage of supplies and when the 
Romans sent them back Lydius hurled them into the ravines which surrounded 
the town. He also had a tunnel dug to bring in supplies from beyond the 
Roman camp. When the famine became worse Lydius killed everyone in the 
town, leaving just enough to defend it. 
Cremna was eventually taken when Lydius punished his most accurate 
artilleryman for missing his target. This man went over to the Romans and 
shot Lydius with a catapult as he looked through a loophole in Cremnals, 
fortifications. Shortly after Lydius' death the rest surrendered. 
B: During excavations in the town of Cremna several features were noted 
which appear to belong to the siege. The town's fortifications were 
strengthened in the mid 3rd century and several of the towers on the west wall 
appear to have been badly damaged in the assault. A series of artillery 
emplacements to the south of the site may also date to the siege and several 
large ballista bc-Ols have been found both inside and outside the defences. 
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Two rough stone walls along the crest of the ridges facing the city's western 
defences may be part of the Roman blockading lines; the front wall, facing the 
town, had stone towers attached to it and sallyports. Some traces of Roman 
encampments have been found and the site of the Roman HQ has been 
tentatively identified by the discovery of an inscription to the Emperor Probus 
dating to this year immediately to the rear of the second line of blockading 
walls and beside the Roman road. This inscription also mentions Terentius 
Marcianus who may have commanded the operations (IGR 3 434,358). 
On the west side of the town are also the remains of what is probably a Roman 
siege mound c. 140 m long and at least 23 m high. The defenders appear to 
have attempted to counter this by constructing a mound inside the town wall 
opposite the Roman mound. Both sides may have used their mounds as 
artillery platforms. The archaeological evidence suggests that the field 
operations were more extensive than Zosimus implies. 
Date: AD 359 
Place: Amida (Diyarbakir, Turkey) 
Refs: Ammianus XIX 1 
Amida, situated on the upper reaches of the Tigris was in Sapor's line of 
march. For two consecutive days the Romans were asked to surrender which 
they were expected to do. However the Romans opened fire on the Persians 
who approached, so they resolved to destroy the city. The Persians' first 
attempt was by direct assault, including the use of captured Roman artillery 
but they were driven back by artillery and other missiles. Amida was then 
surrounded by sheds and mantlets (vineae et pluteii) and siege ramps and 
towers were constructed. The towers were protected by iron plates and had 
artillery on top to drive the defenders from the walls. Some of the Roman 
soldiers made reckless sorties so the gates were blocked up. At one point 
Persian archers entered the city through underground tunnels and took 
possession of a tower. When the Persian forces attacked the Roman defenders 
were fired on from this tower so they brought artillery to bear on the tower 
and opened fire, causing serious casualties. 
As the Persian siege ramp grew the Romans inside constructed earthworks to 
increase the height of the walls - In one incident Gallic troops made a night 
sortie but got into difficulties and the Romans seem to have fired catapults 
with no ammunition so the Persians would be frightened by the noise - The 
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Persians finally decided to take Andda by storm and brought up their siege 
towers which drove the defenders off the walls. The Romans brought onagri 
to bear on the towers, destroying thein and dislodging the artillery - 
Both sides continued to raise their earth mounds but eventually the Roman one 
subsided, creating a passage from the wall to the earth bank over which the 
Persians gradually advanced and took the city, presumably after breaching 
the outer wall of Amida. According to Ammianus the Persians slaughtered the 
Romans but he escaped. 
Date: AD 360 
Place: Singara (Beled Sinjar, Iraq) 
Refs: Ammianus XX 6 
The town, situated in Mesopotamia, was held by two legions and other units 
and was besieged by Sapor during an advance through Roman territory. As 
the Persians approached the inhabitants prepared nxissiles and artillery and 
posted themselves along the walls. Sapor gave the inhabitants several days 
in which to surrender, then made a direct assault on all parts of the town 
using scaling ladders and siege engines. Meanwhile the main body of his force 
began to undermine the walls under the protection of penthouses and mantlets 
(vineae & pluteii). The Romans fired a variety of missiles at the miners. 
The fighting continued indecisively for several days with heavy losses on both 
sides. Finally the Persians brought up an exceptionally powerful ram and 
attacked a round tower which had recently been rebuilt after being breached 
in a previous siege. The Romans tried to burn the ram with incendiary 
missiles and both sides kept up fierce fire with bows and slings but the 
Persian ram was very effective in the joints of the newly built wall where the 
mortar was still damp and the tower collapsed. The Persian troops entered the 
town. A very small number was killed indiscriminately and the rest, including 
the soldiers, were transported to remote parts of Persia. 
Date: AD 360 
Place: Bezabde I 
Refs: Ammianus XX 7 
Bezabde was a very strong fortress on the upper reaches of the Tigris. On 
the side facing the river the low ground was protected by a double wall. 
Sapor gave the town a day to surrender, then his troops advanced with 
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scaling ladders and for the next two days both sides suffered heavy losses in 
the fighting. After a one day truce the Persians tried to bring rams up the 
narrow paths and were opposed by very heavy fire from bows and artillery 
which also fired blazing wicker baskets smeared with pitch and bitumen. The 
Persian engines came to a halt under the fire and were burnt by the incendiary 
devices. 
Despite heavy losses the Persians were keen to take the town quickly and 
during the struggle the exposed themselves to extreme danger. One of the 
Persian rams was covered with soaked hide and was therefore less likely to be 
damaged by the Roman missiles. It was used against a weak tower and a weak 
stretch of the wall. When this collapsed the Persians rushed into the town. 
After fighting at close quarters the Romans scattered. A massacre and looting 
followed, though many prisoners were also taken. 
Date: AD 360 
Place: Bezabde II 
Refs: Ammianus XX 11 
The Persian garrison was given an opportunity to surrender but this was 
rejected. The Romans attempted to take the town by storm using a testudo 
formation and scaling ladders but were driven back. Roman penthouses were 
destroyed by missiles including millstones and chunks of column. After ten 
days the Romans brought up a massive ram which the Persians had used at 
Antioch. This was protected by a very strong mantlet but could not make an 
impact under heavy artillery fire. 
Roman earthworks were built to enable the rams to be used effectively and 
when these were brought into action the Persians fired various incendiary 
missiles at them but in vain as the beams were elaborately protected f rom fire. 
When the great ram was about to destroy a tower the Persians caught its head 
in a noose and then poured down boiling pitch, forcing the Romans to retreat. 
The Persians then sallied and burnt nearly all the siege engines. When the 
siege ramps overtopped the walls, artillery fire kept the defenders off the 
walls while the Romans attacked in three divisions, using a ram against one of 
the towers. Again the Romans were repulsed and despite being hard pressed 
the Persians sortied and burnt one of the Roman siege mounds which was made 
of wood, rushes and cane. 
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Constantius decided to resort to blockade to starve the Persians out but with 
the approach of winter he abandoned the siege after suffering severe losses - 
Date: AD 361 
Place: Aquileia 
Refs: Amrrdanus XXI 12 
Aquileia was seized by supporters of Constantius so Julian sent a force to take 
it although it was known to have survived several sieges without ever being 
destroyed or surrendered. The defenders were given an opportunity to 
surrender and when they refused Julian's forces advanced under the 
protection of penthouses and closely woven hurdles (pluteii et cratesque 
densius textas) and tried to undermine the walls but an assault was repulsed. 
With the failure of the frontal assault the besiegers transferred their efforts 
to a regular siege. 
The town's position by a river ruled out the use of rams or mines so the 
besiegers constructed wooden towers placed on platforms of three ships 
fastened together. Soldiers on top of the tower kept the defenders off the 
walls whilst light armed troops at a lower level crossed on gangways and tried 
to breach the wall. As the towers approached they were showered with a 
variety of incendiary devices and the towers fell into the river. The following 
day direct assault was again tried and the besiegers tried tobreak down a gate,, 
but were forced to retire in the face of fire and n-dssiles. 
When the besiegers were unable to find a weak spot to take the city by direct 
assault or with engines they began to prosecute the siege with less energy. 
Attempts were made to force Aquileia to surrender by cutting the aqueducts 
and diverting the river but the town did not surrender until it heard that 
Constantius was dead. 
Date: AD 363 
Place: Pirisabora 
Refs: Ammianus XXIV 2 
Zosimus 3 17-19 
Libanius Or. xviii 227-228 
This was a town on the lower reaches of the Euphrates which Zosimus 
describes in detail. It was enclosed by two circular walls and on the north 
side it was further protected by water diverted from the river whilst on the 
eastern side there was a deep ditch, a palisade and towers. The citadel had 
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its own walls of bitumen and baked brick - When the Persians made as if to 
surrender but didn't, Julian brought up siege engines and filled in the 
trenches then breached a corner tower with a ram. The defenders then 
abandoned the outer walls and fled to the citadel. The Romans fired artillery 
and set up siege engines, then attacked the gate under the protection of a 
testudo formation but were forced to retreat. Julian next attempted to 
undermine the gate and then built a helepoLis siege tower. When this 
approached the Persians surrendered. 2500 prisoners were taken and Zosimus 
states that they were given safe conduct through the Roman lines. 
Date: AD 363 
Place: Maozamalcha 
Refs: Ammianus XXIV 4 
Zosimus 3 20-22 
Libanius Or. xviii 235-41 
Maozamalcha stood on a hill less than 50 miles west of Ctesiphon and was 
fortified with two walls and 16 towers, surrounded on all sides with a deep 
ditch which at one point was filled with water. Julian moved his camp to a 
suitable position to conduct the siege and fortified it with a doubt rampart. 
When the town, which was held by a picked garrison, refused to surrender, 
the Romans filled in the ditches, built ramps, set up artillery and began a mine 
up to the town. The Romans also attacked in testudo formation but came under 
fire from slingers, archers, stones, flares, fire bombs and artillery and were 
forced to withdraw. 
Julian was forced to concentrate on devices to protect his forces f rom, the 
missile attacks. Meanwhile his officers broke down a section of the wall or a 
gate with a ram and a fierce fight followed. The next day a replacement team 
of miners completed their work just as the ram breached another gate. During 
a night attack, the Romans made a diversionary assault on the walls while the 
sappers entered the town. The Romans overran the town, slaughtered the 
population because they did not want to take prisoners, plundered it and 
razed it to the ground - 
Date: AD 378 
Place: Adrianople 
Refs: Ammianus XXXI 15 
The Goths were eager to take Adrianople after the battle nearby because they 
had heard there was treasure there. They surrounded the city and made a 
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direct assault on all sides. When this failed the Goths ordered the city to 
surrender but the Romans refused. Measures of defence included blocking 
gates, strengthening weak parts of the wall, setting up artillery in suitable 
places and storing water. The Goths tried to take the city with the help of 
Roman traitors and when this failed tried direct assault again. As the Goths 
were re-using Roman missiles, the Romans ordered the cords fastening the 
barbs to arrow shafts to be partly severed so they could not be reused. 
During the assault the Goths came under heavy and accurate Roman fire and 
their attempts using scaling ladders were foiled by the Romans throwing down 
stones and masonry, including column drums. Because of their lack of success 
the Goths became less interested in the siege and eventually abandoned it to 
go after easier loot. 
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